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 1 
1 Introduction 
This dissertation examines the antecedents, processes, and outcomes of organiza-
tional routine change and argues that organizational context is underappreciated 
in routine research. Context matters because it helps explain when, why, and how 
routines change. Organizational routines represent the primary means through 
which organizations perform and prevail, and can be found in such diverse tasks 
as hiring new employees (Rerup and Feldman, 2011), assembling cars in auto-
mobile plants (Adler, Goldoftas and Levine, 1999), and conducting surgery in 
hospitals (Edmondson, Bohmer and Pisano, 2001). Changing organizational rou-
tines has implications for the efficiency, quality, and flexibility of an organiza-
tion’s production and service-delivery processes (Becker et al., 2005). Therefore, 
changing routines is a matter of interest to management scholars and practitioners 
alike, as documented by recent bestselling books (Duhigg, 2012) and a steady 
annual increase in research publications1 and recent special journal issues (e.g., 
D'Adderio et al., 2012; Felin et al., 2012). Change in routines touches on strate-
gic, organizational, and behavioral issues. To address these levels of analysis, I 
have organized the chapters of this dissertation as five self-contained studies ra-
ther than a single-study monograph. While each chapter may therefore be read as 
a distinct research effort, the common thread among them is the enabling and 
constraining role of context in organizational routine change. They theoretically 
argue and empirically demonstrate that routines change within an organizational 
context and that these contextual antecedents influence processes and outcomes 
of routine change itself. This first chapter will introduce organizational routines 
by providing an overview of the historic development and current streams of rou-
tines research. Building on this literature review, I will demonstrate that current 
empirical routine research largely neglects the role of context when examining 
routine change. To highlight how each subsequent chapter addresses this research 
gap, I conclude the introductory chapter with a brief outline of the research pre-
sented in the following five chapters. 
 
                                                 
1 Web of Science (2013) lists 830 relevant publications between 1974 and 2013, with approximately two-
thirds of this research being published within the last ten years and a peak of 74 publications in the year 
2012. My search was based on the keywords “routin*” and “chang*” in the title or topic and drew on 
three citation databases (Science Citation Index Expanded, Social Sciences Citation Index, and Arts & 
Humanities Citation Index). To exclude publications irrelevant to this thesis (e.g., in civil engineering), 
I refined my search to the categories management, business, economics, operations research manage-
ment, and sociology. 
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1.1 History of Routines in Organization Research 
Organizational routines are usually defined as repetitive and recognizable inter-
dependent activities involving multiple actors (Feldman and Pentland, 2003; 
Parmigiani and Howard-Grenville, 2011). This short definition provides criteria 
for identifying the phenomenon we call organizational routine. However, it does 
not provide an explanation of when, why, and how organizational routines 
change. In order to answer these questions, a theory of organizational routines is 
required (Sutton and Staw, 1995; Feldman and Pentland, 2003). Throughout the 
history of organization research, scholars have agreed on the vital importance of 
routines for organizations (Stene, 1940; Cyert and March, 1963; Thompson, 
1967; Nelson and Winter, 1982). However, their assumptions and interests in 
studying this phenomenon have differed fundamentally in the past (Cohen et al., 
1996; Lazaric, 2000) and continue to differ in present research (Felin and Foss, 
2011; Winter, 2013). This disagreement has created a fruitful cornucopia of eco-
nomic, sociological, and psychological theories on organizational routines 
(Parmigiani and Howard-Grenville, 2011) while also severely hampering our 
progress in developing a common theory of organizational routines (Becker, 
2005a; Feldman and Pentland, 2008a; Winter, 2013). The present chapter re-
views the historical development of the routine concept. My review of the histor-
ical routine literature serves two purposes: One, it documents the central role of 
organizational routines in the twentieth century core readings on organization 
theory. Two, it demonstrates when, why, and how organization research shifted 
from a notion of habit and custom emphasizing change and flexibility to a notion 
of organizational routines emphasizing inertia, inflexibility, and the need for ex-
ogenous routine change. I elaborate on these two aspects because these develop-
ments bring forward two distinct perspectives on organizational routines to 
which this dissertation will contribute. 
1.1.1 Habit, Custom, and the Emergence of the Routine Concept 
Organizational routines emerged from the concepts of individual habit and col-
lective custom (Hodgson, 1999; Becker, 2002; Cohen, 2007b). Individual habit 
and collective custom are repetitive and recognizable (interdependent) human 
activities (Camic, 1986; Biggart and Beamish, 2003) and have been studied in 
philosophy (e.g., Hume, 1777; Kant, 1787; Hegel, 1830) and social theory (e.g., 
Durkheim, 1893; Veblen, 1899; Weber, 1922). The implications of habit and cus-
tom for human conduct were of particular interest to the pragmatist movement in 
philosophy (e.g., James, 1890; Dewey, 1922; Commons, 1934; Peirce, 1934). For 
example, Dewey emphasized the distinction between lively habits that grow 
“more varied, more adaptable by practice and use” and pathological “dead habit” 
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which captures rote activity and mindless repetition (1922: 71, 72). The pragma-
tists more generally emphasized that individual habit and collective custom 
change through their performance, due to the reciprocal interplay of human ac-
tion and perception (James, 1890; Dewey, 1922; Neal, 2008). For these forefa-
thers of routine research, individual habit and collective custom are therefore nei-
ther unitary nor inherently stable entities. As I demonstrate below, early organi-
zation researchers (e.g., Simon, 1947) referenced the work of Dewey (1922) and 
James (1890), but understood habit and custom in quite different ways (Cohen, 
2007a). Only recently have these original thoughts been revitalized in the genera-
tive-systems perspective on organizational routines (e.g., Birnholtz, Cohen and 
Hoch, 2007; Cohen, 2007b; Winter, 2013). 
 
As precursors of organizational routines, habit and custom were also analyzed in 
the context of organizations (Camic, 1986; Biggart and Beamish, 2003). These 
attempts were made by early social theorists interested in studying the societal 
implications of industrial production. For example, Weber employed habit and 
custom in his studies on discipline and obedience in large-scale economic organ-
izations (Weber, 1922; see also: Weber, 1995) while Veblen (1898a; 1899) ana-
lyzed changes in productive activity habits. While both researchers explore the 
economic implications of habit (Camic, 1986), Veblen elaborates in detail on the 
role of habit in evolutionary economic change (Veblen, 1898b; a; 1899). Veb-
len’s ideas later found their way into the influential work of Nelson and Winter 
(1982) on organizational routines as genes (Hodgson, 1999). The habits and cus-
toms of workers also became the subject of popular management concepts 
(Becker, 2002). For example, Taylor (1911) adopted an extreme behavioristic 
notion of habit in the popular concept of Scientific Management. He had ob-
served that the working habits of many blue-collar employees were guided by 
“rule-of-thumb methods” and represented a major source of inefficiency in pro-
duction processes (Taylor, 1911: 16). While Taylor emphasized that workers 
should be encouraged to “suggest improvements,” he also made clear that “the 
workman is not allowed to use whatever implements and methods he sees fit in 
the daily practice of his work” (1911: 128). Instead, he suggests that changing 
working habits required exogenous interventions by knowledgeable engineers. 
Obviously, Taylor’s (1911) rote conceptions of habit are in clear contrast to the 
inherently dynamic concepts of habit explored earlier by the pragmatists (e.g., 
James, 1890; Dewey, 1922). While Taylor (1911) had established patterns of (in-
ter)action as unit of analysis in organizations, the term organizational routine 
only began to diffuse in the literature after the First World War (Becker, 2002). 
In the initial phase of this diffusion, researchers did not develop an explicit theo-
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ry of organizational routines, but integrated the term in their theories of execu-
tives (e.g., Barnard, 1938) and economic change (e.g., Schumpeter, 1926). 
 
Following the formation of organization research as a distinct field of scientific 
inquiry during the Second World War, an increasing number of scholars attempt-
ed to develop a theoretical model of organizational routines. Extant literature at-
tributes to Stene (1940) the first work that explicitly incorporates routines into an 
organization theory (e.g., Gersick and Hackman, 1990; Feldman and Pentland, 
2003). Stene (1940: 1129) defines organizational routines as “[…] that part of 
any organization's activities which has become habitual because of repetition and 
which is followed regularly without specific directions or detailed supervision by 
any member of the organization.” He conceptualizes routines as coherent and 
inherently stable entities that are changed by mechanisms exogenous to the rou-
tine. Stene (1940) makes a sharp distinction between organizational routines and 
actions governed by deliberate decisions, an understanding that subsequently 
took hold in the literature (e.g., Katona, 1946; Machlup, 1946; Penrose, 1952). 
These researchers conceptualized routines as inflexible action patterns that stood 
in contrast to “genuine business decisions” (Katona, 1946: 46) which are based 
on “careful calculations of differential revenue and cost” (Machlup, 1946: 524). 
In the following four decades, two important theories of the firm placed organi-
zational routines front and center, with one approach applying a behavioral per-
spective (Simon, 1947; March and Simon, 1958; Cyert and March, 1963) and the 
other an evolutionary one (Nelson and Winter, 1982). Both reinforced the conno-
tations of organizational routines as naturally “unitary and unchanging” 
(Feldman and Pentland, 2003: 97). 
1.1.2 Behavioral Theory Approaches to Organizational Routines 
The book Administrative Behavior (Simon, 1947) is the first encompassing pub-
lication setting an agenda for a behavioral research program on organizations, 
later followed by Organizations (March and Simon, 1958) and A Behavioral 
Theory of the Firm (Cyert and March, 1963). These works together became 
“tremendously influential” for later organization research (Gavetti, Levinthal and 
Ocasio, 2007: 523). While most research at that time focused on describing or-
ganizations or diagnosing their inefficiencies (e.g., Gulick and Urwick, 1937), 
Simon (1947) identified decision making as the central explanatory element in 
organization theory (see also: Barnard, 1938; Stene, 1940). Drawing on psychol-
ogy and sociology, the research advanced by Administrative Behavior and the 
subsequent works Organizations and A Behavioral Theory of the Firm shares a 
common interest in “the ‘limits to rationality’ with which the principles of ad-
ministration must deal” (Simon, 1947: 40). These limits emphasize that adminis-
I N T R O D U C T I O N  
5 
trative decisions follow less from calculation and distant forecasts and more from 
proximate feedback and past experiences (Gavetti et al., 2012). To process prox-
imate feedback, store past experiences, and economize on scarce cognitive re-
sources, Simon (1947: 100) introduces organizational routines as an artificial 
organizational counterpart of individual habit. In developing his notion of organ-
izational routines as artificial habits, he references the work of the pragmatist 
philosophers Dewey (1922) and James (1890), yet at the same time significantly 
deviates from pragmatist conceptions of habit (Ansell, 2002; Cohen, 2007b; a). 
While Dewey (1896; 1922) emphasized the inherently dynamic and manifold 
nature of habit, Simon (1947: 88) emphasizes that artificial habits are not “ob-
jects of reconsideration.” This understanding entrenched the idea that routines are 
unitary entities that save scarce cognitive resources and substantially influenced 
to routine concept in Organizations and A Behavioral Theory of the Firm. 
 
Organizations (March and Simon, 1958) and A Behavioral Theory of the Firm 
(Cyert and March, 1963) introduce performance programs (programs) and 
standard operating procedures (procedures) as observable manifestations of Si-
mon’s (1947) inherently stable and coherent organizational routines. In these 
models, organizational routines (i.e., programs and procedures) primarily “serve 
to economize on bounded rationality” (Gavetti et al., 2007: 527). Accordingly, 
programs and procedures are “most likely to be treated as fixed” because they 
“give stability to the organization and direction to activities that are constantly 
recurring,” such as “How does the part get fabricated?” and “How are the books 
kept?” (Cyert and March, 1963: 103). Similar to the notion of organizational rou-
tines advanced in Administrative Behavior, programs and procedures allow or-
ganizations to execute complex actions without any apparent effort spent on 
searching for alternatives, solving problems, or deliberating over choices (March 
and Simon, 1958; Cyert and March, 1963). For example, Simon and March 
(1958: 160) theorize that if environmental stimuli have frequently been experi-
enced in the past, the stimulus will evoke little “computational activity” (ibid: 
161) in the organization. Instead, the organization will select an appropriate re-
sponse from the program repertory, and execute the response along the lines of 
the selected program. While programs and procedures are embedded in the minds 
of organization members, the employees’ discretion in responding to the stimulus 
remains a function of the specificity, form, content, and completeness of the pro-
gram or procedure, thus deemphasizing the agency of routine participants (March 
and Simon, 1958; Cyert and March, 1963). Accordingly, the behavioral theory 
approaches to organizational routines emphasize the importance of routines for 
organizations to function while also reinforcing the notion that organization 
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members have little discretion in executing programs or procedures. Routine 
change and routine execution are conceptualized as strictly separate processes. 
 
While these researchers consider programs and procedures to be inherently sta-
ble, they acknowledge that organizations can change routines based on an adap-
tive-rational process (March and Simon, 1958; Cyert and March, 1963). This 
process promotes and reinforces routines that achieve or exceed aspiration levels, 
while routines that fall below aspiration levels are scrutinized by the organiza-
tion. More specifically, when a program or procedure fails to achieve an expected 
outcome, the organization initiates a search process for alternatives and replace-
ment becomes more likely (Cyert and March, 1963; for an early empirical inves-
tigation, see: Manns and March, 1978). Such adaptive-rational processes provide 
a foundation to organizational learning based on proximate performance feed-
back (Fiol and Lyles, 1985; Levitt and March, 1988; Greve, 2003). Learning op-
erates on routines as entities, either by recombining programs or procedures that 
are already in existence or by elaborating new programs or procedures (March 
and Simon, 1958; Cyert and March, 1963). However, as exemplified by state-
ments such as “planned search is relatively unimportant in inducing changes in 
existing solutions that are viewed as adequate” (Cyert and March, 1963: 121), the 
behavioral theory in general conceptualizes a comparatively passive model of 
organizations (Rerup and Feldman, 2011). These works contributed much to the 
“crystallization” (Becker, 2002: 253) of organizational routines as unitary and 
unchanging entities. However, the behavioral theory did little to explore the 
mechanisms that cause organizational routines to be inherently stable and rele-
gated exogenous routine change to adaptive “firefighting” mechanisms. The 
mechanisms causing routine stability and exogenous change are elaborated in 
more detail in Nelson and Winter’s (1982) treatment of organizational routines as 
genes in An Evolutionary Theory of Economic Change published over three dec-
ades after Administrative Behavior. 
1.1.3 Evolutionary Economics Approaches to Organizational Routines 
The behavioral perspective outlined above views organizations as decision-
making units tied to established organizational routines (Simon, 1947; March and 
Simon, 1958; Cyert and March, 1963). Nelson and Winter’s (1982) An Evolu-
tionary Theory of Economic Change also assumes that organizational routines 
capture the regular and predictable behavior of a firm. However, their work shifts 
the focus from intra-firm decision-making routines to populations of organiza-
tions with heterogeneous routine repertoires. In doing so, Nelson and Winter 
(1982: 134) describe organizational routines as “genes” that are carried by organ-
izations. Companies with a superior set of organizational routines will do better 
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than other companies with inferior organizational routines (Nelson and Winter, 
1982). Organizational routines become (imperfectly) replicated across organiza-
tions while the organizations’ competitive environment selects routines that fos-
ter evolutionary fitness (see also: Aldrich, 1979; Nelson and Winter, 2002; 
Hodgson and Knudsen, 2004). Overall, these researchers emphasize the active 
interplay between the external organizational context and internal organizational 
routines as constituents of an evolutionary process of economic change 
(Hodgson, 1999). 
 
Nelson and Winter (1982) develop their routines concept based on an analogy to 
individual skill. By individual skill, they mean “a capability for a smooth se-
quence of coordinated behavior that is ordinarily effective relative to its objec-
tives, given the context in which it normally occurs” (Nelson and Winter, 1982: 
73). Examples of skills are the ability to play tennis well or to evaluate job can-
didates (ibid). Skills incorporate tacit knowledge (i.e., intuitive knowledge ac-
quired by practical experience that cannot be communicated), which introduces 
rigidity into the behavioral repertoire of individuals (Polanyi, 1958; 1967). Once 
individuals have acquired a skill, reflections on and conscious interventions in 
skill-based performances become harder (Bargh and Chartrand, 1999; Squire, 
2004). Analogous to the skills concept, organizational routines may contain a 
significant level of tacit knowledge that constrains the extent to which they can 
be changed, replicated, or copied by other organizations (Nelson and Winter, 
1982). However, because routines are collective phenomena, they also go beyond 
the analogy to individual skill. More specifically, organization members with 
potentially divergent interests must be motivated to participate in an organiza-
tional routine (see also: March and Simon, 1958: 84-136). Nelson and Winter 
(1982: 107-112) bypass this motivational issue by postulating that routines are 
“organizational truces.” They argue that any attempt to break such truces may 
cause larger latent conflicts among organization members to reemerge, causing a 
“fear of breaking the truce” that disciplines routine participants (Nelson and Win-
ter, 1982: 112). Therefore, organizational routines are considered to be largely 
self-enforcing, self-sustaining entities. Due their deep embeddedness in the inter-
nal organizational context, routines as conceived by Nelson and Winter (1982) 
are inherently difficult to change (Pierce, Boerner and Teece, 2002). On a more 
general level, Nelson and Winter (1982) metaphorically (by introducing the no-
tion of routines as genes) and theoretically (by emphasizing mechanisms such as 
truces) enforce the notion of organizational routines as inherently stable entities. 
 
However, Nelson and Winter (1982) also significantly advance our understand-
ing of the directed and undirected mechanisms through which organizational rou-
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tines can change. Considering the impact of individual routine participants and 
undirected change, they highlight that the loss of an employee with idiosyncratic 
skills and knowledge may cause an undirected routine change. With regard to 
directed change, Nelson and Winter (1982: 116) acknowledge that a routine par-
ticipant “trying to do a better job can presumably accomplish something more 
than ‘undirected change,’” thus acknowledging the agency of routine partici-
pants. However, given that a single routine participant will most likely lack a 
comprehensive understanding of the whole organizational routine and (in-
ter)dependent entities, beneficial directed change by a single individual is highly 
unlikely. As a result, control processes in organizations tend to resist most at-
tempts at endogenous routine change (i.e., routine change caused by the routine 
participants). So while Nelson and Winter (1982) theoretically introduce endoge-
nous routine change to their model, they remain highly skeptical that it is empiri-
cally feasible by routine participants. Instead, most routine change will be di-
rected from the organizational level. 
 
More specifically, Nelson and Winter (1982) propose that higher-level search 
routines can cause intentional mutations in the organization’s repertoire of organ-
izational routines in order to strategically position the organization in a dynamic 
environment. Enacting such search routines may uncover routine modifications 
or new routines in the environment that may yield higher anticipated profits. The 
authors (1982: 17) highlight search routines conducted selectively by depart-
ments for market analysis, and operations research, or any organization member 
that from time to time “may engage in scrutiny of what the firm is doing and why 
it is doing it, with the thought of revision or even radical change.” They suggest 
that routines on the operating level ought to be considered as a means to achieve 
stability and reliability, while search routines on the strategic level of the firm 
ought to be considered as means to achieve directed change in operating routines. 
In contrast to behavioral theory concepts of routine change that emphasize feed-
back-triggered problem-solving and incremental learning (Simon, 1947; March 
and Simon, 1958; Cyert and March, 1963), Nelson and Winter (1982) argue that 
organizations may intentionally affect their evolutionary development and long-
term survival by strategically altering their operating routines over time. Herein 
lies one major contribution of Nelson and Winter (1982): While organizations are 
constrained in their ability to evolve, they may also intentionally seek out routine 
change. Organizations pursue exogenous routine change while also implementing 
mechanisms that prevent routine participants from initiating endogenous routine 
change. 
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In concluding this historical review, I want to highlight how past organization 
research has conceptualized organizational routines as inherently stable and co-
herent entities. Core readings in organization theory have associated routines 
with artificial habits (Simon, 1947); performance programs (March and Simon, 
1958); standard operating procedures (Cyert and March, 1963); and genes 
(Nelson and Winter, 1982). Such unitary-entities approaches emphasize that or-
ganizational routines require an exogenous mechanism to change (Meyer, 1982; 
Pentland and Feldman, 2005). Building on these notions of routines as unitary 
and unchanging entities, studies have demonstrated that organizational routines 
contribute to organizational inertia (Hannan and Freeman, 1984), suppression of 
deliberation in novel circumstances (Gersick and Hackman, 1990), and mind-
lessness (Ashforth and Fried, 1988). Around the end of the twentieth century, 
such unitary-entities approaches had become the dominant conception of organi-
zational routines (Pentland and Feldman, 2005; Salvato and Rerup, 2011). In the 
subsequent chapter, I demonstrate how empirical findings caused some research-
ers to question this established understanding of routines. I present current re-
search on routine formation, contingencies of endogenous routine stability and 
change, and organizational outcomes of routines. This review provides the foun-
dation for exploring the neglected but relevant impact of context on organiza-
tional routine change addressed by my thesis. 
1.2 Contemporary Research on Organizational Routines 
Contemporary research encompasses two distinct streams of work on organiza-
tional routines (Pentland and Feldman, 2005; Parmigiani and Howard-Grenville, 
2011; Rerup and Feldman, 2011): the unitary-entities perspective and the genera-
tive-systems perspective. Each stream pursues distinct interests and explanations 
in their study of organizational routines and draws on different concepts from the 
history I have outlined above. On the one side, organizational economists tend to 
conceptualize routines as unitary entities (Hodgson and Knudsen, 2004; Salvato 
and Rerup, 2011). This perspective falls into the tradition of Simon (1947) and 
the behavioral theory of the firm, later substantially refined by Nelson and Win-
ter (1982). These researchers focus on the firm level, and are mainly interested in 
organizational outcomes of routines, such as their impact on company-level per-
formance (e.g., Zollo, Reuer and Singh, 2002; Bottazzi et al., 2010; Romme, 
Zollo and Berends, 2010). On the other side, organizational sociologists and psy-
chologists are more interested in studying how organizational routines operate in 
practice and how stability and change emerge endogenously from what routine 
participants actually do (e.g., Feldman, 2000; D'Adderio, 2003; Turner and 
Rindova, 2012). While this latter perspective shows great ontological and epis-
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temological heterodoxy, it mainly conceptualizes routines as generative systems 
(Rerup and Feldman, 2011). In the following chapters, I briefly introduce each of 
the two perspectives, as this dissertation contributes to both streams of research. 
 
While the conception of routines as unitary entities largely emerged from theo-
retical work (e.g., Nelson and Winter, 1982), the routines as generative-systems 
conception emerged from empirical observations of how individuals perform or-
ganizational routines (Becker, 2004). In organizational settings that seemed to 
foster organizational routines of “mind-numbing stability” (Feldman and Or-
likowski, 2011: 1244), researchers revealed routines that were not mind-numbing 
but effortful accomplishments of routine participants (Pentland and Rueter, 1994; 
Lazaric and Denis, 2005; Turner and Rindova, 2012) and that exhibited endoge-
nous routine change (Feldman, 2000; D'Adderio, 2008; Anand, Gray and Siem-
sen, 2012). For example, Feldman (2000) conducted a longitudinal case study on 
the hiring, training, budgeting, and move-in routines in the residence halls of a 
large university. She found that routine participants changed routines when rou-
tine outcomes fell short of ideals or when undesired outcomes resulted. Her find-
ings suggest that the impetus for routine change results not from exogenous trig-
gers, but rather comes about from performing the routine by the participants. 
These exploratory research efforts suggest that the agentic nature of routine par-
ticipants should be moved to the foreground (Pentland and Rueter, 1994; Feld-
man, 2000). In exploring the implications of these emerging perspectives, some 
researchers have begun to question the unitary-entities perspective for ignoring 
the internal structure and dynamics of routines (Feldman and Pentland, 2003; 
Parmigiani and Howard-Grenville, 2011; Salvato and Rerup, 2011) and have 
brought forward consistent qualitative and quantitative evidence that organiza-
tional routines provide the potential to generate both stability and change, mak-
ing them a generative system (e.g., Feldman, 2003; Howard-Grenville, 2005; 
Pentland and Feldman, 2008a; Pentland, Hærem and Hillison, 2010). 
 
To explain both stability and change as properties of organizational routines, re-
searchers have drawn on diverse literatures, including Dewey’s (1922) notion of 
habit and custom, Giddens’ (1979; 1984) structuration theory, and Bourdieu’s 
(1977; Lave, 1988; 1990) concept of habitus (e.g., Pentland and Rueter, 1994; 
Feldman, 2000; Birnholtz et al., 2007). These literatures differ considerably in 
their assumptions and interests. However, the routine research that emerged from 
these efforts commonly distinguishes between a level of action and a level of rep-
resentation that constitute every routine (Becker, 2005a; Cohen, 2012). Similar to 
other phenomena (e.g., human language), organizational routines are therefore 
comprised of an unobservable generative structure (e.g., knowledge about gram-
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mar) and observable expressions (e.g., utterances) (Pentland, 1995; Miller, Pent-
land and Choi, 2012). For example, Feldman (2000) introduced the distinction 
between the ostensive (i.e., representative level) and the performative (i.e., action 
level) aspect of organizational routines. The performative aspect represents “spe-
cific actions, by specific people, in specific places and times” while the ostensive 
aspect represents an “abstract, generalized idea of the routine” (Feldman and 
Pentland, 2003: 101). The performative and the ostensive aspect of a routine are 
mutually interdependent. Following the notion of agency, the performative aspect 
creates, maintains, and modifies the ostensive aspect, while routine participants 
use the ostensive aspect to guide, account for, and refer to the performative as-
pect (Feldman and Pentland, 2003). Through the mutually constitutive relation-
ship between the ostensive and performative aspect “the development of the rou-
tine occurs through the enactment of it” (Feldman and Orlikowski, 2011: 1245, 
original emphasis). 
 
Research following the generative-systems perspective emphasizes how organi-
zational routines operate internally (Parmigiani and Howard-Grenville, 2011). 
Previous research employing laboratory studies (e.g., Cohen and Bacdayan, 
1994; Egidi and Narduzzo, 1997; Loch, Sengupta and Ahmad, 2013), qualitative 
(e.g., Feldman, 2000; Howard-Grenville, 2005) as well as quantitative (e.g., 
Pentland et al., 2010; Pentland, Haerem and Hillison, 2011) field studies, and 
simulation models (e.g., Miller et al., 2012; Pentland et al., 2012) has provided 
evidence on processes that operate inside routines. However, given that organiza-
tional routines operate within organizations, this begs the question when, how, 
and why organizational routines bring about relevant organizational outcomes 
(Parmigiani and Howard-Grenville, 2011; Salvato and Rerup, 2011). Addressing 
these meso-level outcomes seems pertinent, since the unitary-entities perspective 
provides convincing empirical evidence that organizational outcomes, such as the 
competitive advantage of companies, are affected by organizational routines 
(Adler et al., 1999; Rindova and Kotha, 2001; Helfat et al., 2007). Because of 
these incomplete understandings, in the following subsections I first review re-
search from the generative-systems perspective on the formation and endogenous 
dynamics of organizational routines. I establish an argument that routine partici-
pants and organizational context may foster endogenously stable organizational 
routines. Building on this notion, I then present research from the unitary-entities 
perspective on organizational outcomes of routines. 
1.2.1 Formation 
To observe the formation of an organizational routine, we have to observe the 
formation of repetitive and recognizable interdependent activities that involve 
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multiple actors (Feldman and Pentland, 2003; Becker, 2005b). Interdependent 
activities become recognizable when single interdependent actions form a coher-
ent sequence. Interdependent activities become repetitive when a similar se-
quence of interdependent actions occurs across more than two observations 
(Pentland et al., 2010; Pentland et al., 2012). The conceptual literature suggests 
that organizational routines form as a “natural product of action” (Feldman and 
Pentland, 2003: 98) when multiple actors face the challenge of solving similar 
and recurring tasks using coordinated interaction. Given that organizations avoid 
“enact[ing] routines with no attention to the purposes of the work […]” 
(Birnholtz et al., 2007: 328), organizations enable some actions and constrain 
others, making it more likely that routine participants execute some actions while 
avoiding others (cf. Adler and Borys, 1996; Faraj and Xiao, 2006). Artifacts, 
such as information and communication technologies, may serve as channels that 
shape the interactions among routine participants (D'Adderio, 2003; Lazaric, 
Mangolte and Massué, 2003; Pentland and Feldman, 2007). Patterns of interac-
tion will form as routine participants choose to take the easier actions and avoid 
actions that seem harder (Feldman and Pentland, 2003), thus reinforcing memory 
of specific patterns of interaction. 
 
Empirical research recognizes that “the emergence of routines is difficult to ob-
serve and has only rarely been examined” (Loch et al., 2013: 100). Accordingly, 
the literature provides little empirical evidence on routine formation (Lazaric and 
Denis, 2005; Dionysiou and Tsoukas, 2013). However, established organization-
al routines have been observed in diverse settings, addressing a broad spectrum 
of simple and complex as well as rare and frequent tasks. Examples include mu-
nicipal solid-waste collection (Turner and Fern, 2012; Turner and Rindova, 
2012) and medical-service units (Edmondson et al., 2001; Faraj and Xiao, 2006), 
where tasks arise daily or weekly, and other settings, such as summer camps 
(Birnholtz et al., 2007) or university housing (Feldman, 2000; 2003), where tasks 
recur annually. This research implies that organizational routines may form under 
a considerably broad spectrum of conditions addressing tasks of strikingly differ-
ent frequency and complexity—depending on the structures and resources the 
organization provides for the execution of recurring interdependent tasks (cf. 
Pentland and Feldman, 2008a). 
 
Whether the formation of organizational routines does depend on the nature of 
tasks performed is subject to ongoing debates (e.g., Pentland, 2011; Felin and 
Foss, 2012; Pentland et al., 2012; Winter, 2013). However, recent simulation 
studies substantiate the claim that organizational routines may form around any 
recurring interdependent task. Miller et al. (2012) conducted an agent-based sim-
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ulation study where routine participants with heterogeneous skills coordinate to 
solve a series of problems. The nature of tasks is exogenous to the model and 
varied from a series of identical problems to completely random problems across 
time. This study was complemented by Pentland et al. (2012) in another simula-
tion study. They modeled tasks as completely endogenous, based on a history 
matrix incorporating prior task experiences and varying degrees of random varia-
tion. While both simulation studies show that organizational routines may form 
without further consideration of the nature of tasks (Pentland, 2011), they also 
emphasize that organizational routines only form when task experiences are 
memorized (Pentland et al., 2012). Three types of human memory—declarative, 
procedural, and transactive—are involved in the process of routine formation 
(Cohen, 2012; Hecker, 2012; Miller et al., 2012). Together, they can be consid-
ered approximations to what some researchers taking a generative-systems per-
spective label the ostensive aspect (Miller et al., 2012). Below, I briefly describe 
how routine formation impacts each type of human memory, as the following 
subsection builds on this differentiation. 
 
Humans use their declarative memory to store knowledge about facts, events, and 
propositions; knowledge that is frequently termed “know-what” (Tulving, 1972; 
Cohen, 1991; Edmondson et al., 2003). Accordingly, declarative memory allows 
humans to consciously recall specific experiences or general factual knowledge 
(Costello, 2008). Individuals use their declarative knowledge to make sense of 
situations, such as interpreting problems faced in an organizational routine and 
inferring appropriate responses (Weick, 1995b; Squire, 2004). In the process of 
routine formation, the routine participant’s understanding of task sequences and 
goals of the organizational routine will develop (Feldman and Rafaeli, 2002; Mil-
ler et al., 2012). Routine participants may also develop accounts and labels for 
their activity (cf. Feldman and Pentland, 2003). Frequent repetition of a behav-
ioral sequence is not necessary for developing declarative knowledge (Ofen-Noy, 
Dudai and Karni, 2003). For example, individuals usually understand that they 
should call the fire department in the case of a fire without ever having experi-
enced such a situation before (Betsch et al., 2001). While individuals may draw 
on declarative knowledge learned prior to becoming routine participants, proce-
dural memory is reinforced through repeating activity patterns. 
 
Procedural memory is demonstrated in the performance of particular action pat-
terns; knowledge that is frequently termed “know-how” (Tulving, 1972; Cohen, 
1991; Edmondson et al., 2003). Previous research has demonstrated that proce-
dural memory differs from declarative memory in important respects (Bargh and 
Chartrand, 1999; Squire, 2004). Procedural memory is less explicitly accessible, 
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less easily transferable to new circumstances and “less subject to decay” (Cohen 
and Bacdayan, 1994: 557). Therefore, routines primarily stored in procedural 
memory reside in the “organizational unconscious” (Cohen and Bacdayan, 1994: 
556) and thus seem to mirror the notions of skill and tacit knowledge that charac-
terize organizational routines described by Nelson and Winter (1982). In a classic 
laboratory experiment examining the emergence of routines, Cohen and Bacda-
yan (1994) found that organizational routines formed after actors repeated partic-
ular patterns of interaction in a card game. These patterns of interaction were 
(partially) stored across the procedural memories of individual routine partici-
pants. Due to the nature of procedural memory, routine participants found these 
interaction patterns comparatively easy (despite their potential complexity) and 
eventually had difficulty in articulating or deliberately changing them (Cohen 
and Bacdayan, 1994; Egidi and Narduzzo, 1997). While declarative and proce-
dural memory pertain to the individual level, the formation of organizational rou-
tines may also entail transactive memory that is shared among routine partici-
pants and therefore resides at the group level. 
 
Transactive memory situates the individual routine participants’ knowledge in a 
social context; it stores knowledge on “who-knows-what” (Lewis, 2004; Ren and 
Argote, 2011). Contrary to declarative and procedural memory, transactive 
memory is a shared property among routine participants, which complements 
individual knowledge (Ren and Argote, 2011). Forming an organizational routine 
usually involves connecting and sharing information among routine participants, 
such as engaging with imposed knowledge structures, coordinating interdepend-
ent tasks, and sharing experiences (Feldman and Rafaeli, 2002; Jarzabkowski, Lê 
and Feldman, 2012; Turner and Rindova, 2012). In the process of routine for-
mation, routine participants develop knowledge about the expertise or skills 
available in the proximate work environment and about the locations (i.e., indi-
viduals or knowledge-embedding artifacts) where particular expertise or skills 
are stored (Hutchins, 1995; Wegner, 1995; Hollingshead, 1998). Transactive 
memory forms the basis of collective knowledge and represents a supra-
individual micro foundation for the formation of organizational routines (Hecker, 
2012; Dionysiou and Tsoukas, 2013). Empirical research and simulation models 
have demonstrated the relevance of transactive memory in explaining the for-
mation of organizational routines as mechanisms to achieve collective task per-
formances (Pearsall, Ellis and Bell, 2010; Miller et al., 2012). 
 
In conclusion, organizational routines form while routine participants accomplish 
recurring interdependent tasks in a purposefully designed organizational context. 
For example, modern automobile assembly routines are often based on product 
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designs and machinery that facilitate simple and highly repetitive activity pat-
terns of routine participants, while physically constraining activities that would 
cause malfunctions in the final product (Flynn, Sakakibara and Schroeder, 1995; 
Coriat, 2000). As routine participants begin to collectively perform a task, the 
activities by which the task is accomplished become subject to retention in hu-
man memory (Miller et al., 2012; Pentland et al., 2012). Across the iterations of 
an organizational routine, patterns of interaction are retained and re-created based 
on the routine participants’ declarative, procedural, and transactive memory. For 
example, a comparatively simple interaction pattern with limited interaction 
among routine participants will foster the formation of an organizational routine 
primarily stored in the routine participants’ procedural memories (cf. Cohen and 
Bacdayan, 1994; Egidi and Narduzzo, 1997). The organizational context facili-
tates (formally or informally) specific repetitive and recognizable interdependent 
activities involving multiple actors. In the following section, I argue that the type 
of memory in which the organizational routine has been stored and the organiza-
tional context in which the routine is performed has implications for the emer-
gence of endogenous stability and change in organizational routines. 
1.2.2 Endogenous Stability and Change 
Organizational routines have been characterized as endogenously stable (even 
when requirements change) or endogenously changing entities (even when re-
quirements are stable) (Feldman and Pentland, 2003; Pentland et al., 2012). Pre-
vious research therefore suggests that established routines are “(n)ever-changing” 
(Birnholtz et al., 2007: 316), depending on the granularity and duration over 
which we observe the routine (Pentland, 2003; Becker, 2005a). The more we fo-
cus on the behavioral details of an established organizational routine and the 
longer we observe an organizational routine, the higher the likelihood that en-
dogenous change can be observed (Birnholtz et al., 2007; Pentland et al., 2010). 
While such observations should caution us to consider different levels of analysis 
and observation timeframes, current empirical research provides clear qualitative 
and quantitative evidence supporting the notion that some organizational routines 
are more prone to endogenous stability and other organizational routines are 
more prone to endogenous change (Howard-Grenville, 2005; Pentland et al., 
2011; Turner and Fern, 2012). However, current research has shown little interest 
in exploring the boundary conditions that may reconcile these divergent findings 
(Parmigiani and Howard-Grenville, 2011). This situation raises the question of 
which mechanisms will cause which routine dynamic to surface. 
 
Recent work stemming from the generative-systems perspective argues that nov-
el performances are stored in the (declarative, procedural, and transactive) 
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memory of the routine participants, thereby influencing future routine perfor-
mances (Miller et al., 2012). This conceptualization implies that endogenous sta-
bility or change of organizational routines follows from processes of performa-
tive variation and selective retention (Feldman and Pentland, 2003). A recent 
simulation study by Pentland et al. (2012) explores this conceptualization. These 
researchers find that whether organizational routines exhibit endogenous stability 
or change is determined by the amount of variation introduced into the organiza-
tional routines, given that past experiences are memorized. For example, when 
routine participants introduce variation in their routine performance (e.g., by 
treating a patient with a new medication), such variation may become memorized 
and thereby alter the repertoire for potential future performances (e.g., future 
treatments of similar patients may eschew the old medication in favor of the new 
medication). In the following section, I build on these findings to differentiate 
between three configurations of effortful (drawing on declarative and transactive 
memory) and effortless (drawing on procedural memory) organizational routines 
weakly or strongly embedded in an organizational context. 
 
Variation across routine performances becomes more likely when routine per-
formances are effortful accomplishments and when the organizational routine is 
weakly embedded in an organizational context. Routines are effortful accom-
plishments when routine participants are mindful (Langer, 1992; Levinthal and 
Rerup, 2006) of their enactment of the organizational routine and primarily draw 
on their declarative and transactive memory when engaging in routine perfor-
mances (cf. Hutchins, 1991; Pentland and Rueter, 1994; Feldman, 2000; 2003). 
Feldman (2000), in her studies on university-housing organizations, found that 
routine participants deliberated about whether the intended outcomes of the or-
ganizational routine were achieved, and whether and why unintended and unde-
sirable outcomes were produced. Executing the annual move-in routine presuma-
bly included transactive memory, as routine participants engaged in outreach to 
other university departments and city officials. When engaging in routines as ef-
fortful accomplishments, routine participants may seek to deliberately introduce 
variations (Feldman, 2003; Miller et al., 2012). Accordingly, variations in routine 
performances may occur because the organizational routine is stored in con-
sciously accessible declarative and transactive memory. Given that participants 
executing routines can access their declarative and transactive memories, their 
routine performances become mindful, they may care about the outcomes of rou-
tine performances, and in turn respond to problems or opportunities that were 
made evident from past performances (e.g., Lazaric and Denis, 2001; Rerup and 
Feldman, 2011; Turner and Fern, 2012). 
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That said, variation may be less likely to occur when routine performances are 
effortful accomplishments and the organizational routine is strongly embedded in 
an interdependent organizational context. Organizational routines are strongly 
embedded in an organizational context when variations caused by routine partici-
pants also impact other organizational structures. Previous research offers diverse 
motives for why routine participants deliberatively decide to reproduce past per-
formances, such as routine participants striving to adopt specific patterns of in-
teraction (Lazaric and Denis, 2005), avoiding political confrontations and striv-
ing for legitimacy (Feldman, 2003), maintaining an established truce (Nelson and 
Winter, 1982; Zbaracki and Bergen, 2010), and avoiding variations that could 
upset other interrelated routines (Howard-Grenville, 2005). To minimize varia-
tions across effortful accomplishments, organizations employ mechanisms and 
structures to keep patterns of employee interaction “on track” (Schulz, 2008: 
228). Examples of such structures include trauma protocols in emergency rooms 
(Faraj and Xiao, 2006), software systems for enterprise resource planning 
(Pentland and Feldman, 2007), and written plans used in roadmapping routines 
(Howard-Grenville, 2005). Routine participants may therefore engage in effortful 
accomplishments to deliberately reproduce past performances, thereby reinforc-
ing endogenously stable organizational routines (Feldman, 2003; Miller et al., 
2012). In contrast, variation across routine performances is more likely to occur 
and cause endogenous routine change when routine participants have the ability 
to vary performances and perform their actions in weakly embedded routines 
(Howard-Grenville, 2005). 
 
Finally, variation in routine performances becomes less likely when routine per-
formances are effortless (i.e., mindless) accomplishments (Langer, 1992; Levin-
thal and Rerup, 2006). Previous research considers routines as effortless accom-
plishments when routine participants primarily utilize procedural memory while 
engaging in routine performances (Ashforth and Fried, 1988; Gersick and Hack-
man, 1990; Cohen and Bacdayan, 1994). While procedural memory allows rou-
tine participants to perform fast, complex patterns of interaction reliably, it is less 
explicitly accessible and less easily transferable to new circumstances. These 
characteristics of procedural memory limit possibilities to introduce variation in 
routine performances (Pentland et al., 2012) to the extent that organizational rou-
tines may even “misfire” when tasks change (Cohen and Bacdayan, 1994: 554). 
Egidi and Narduzzo (1997) provide empirical evidence on these phenomena. 
They conducted a laboratory study where pairs of test subjects first learned dif-
ferent routines to play a card game. Arguing that these routines emerged from the 
procedural memory of the routine participants, they found that after routine par-
ticipants were led to favor a particular strategy in an initial round, they were 
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more likely to use the learned routine in a subsequent round, even when it proved 
less effective. Furthermore, Egidi and Narduzzo (1997) observed many instances 
where routine participants exclusively played using the routine they had initially 
learned. Additional anecdotal evidence on the endogenous stability of routines 
based on procedural memory is provided by Allison (1971) in his analysis of the 
Cuban missile crisis. To avoid detection, Russian soldiers dressed in civilian 
clothes prior to their landing in Havana. Once landed, however, procedural 
memory formed by repeated military drills overruled intentions—and they 
marched away in neat rank and file (cf. Cohen, 2012), thus aiding detection. To-
gether, these findings demonstrate that organizational routines primarily stored in 
the distributed procedural memories of routine participants are likely to cause 
little variation in routine performances; that is, they are likely to demonstrate en-
dogenous stability (Cohen and Bacdayan, 1994; Egidi and Narduzzo, 1997; Pent-
land et al., 2012). 
 
In conclusion, these configurations effect different levels of variation in routine 
performances, and therefore produce endogenous stability or change in organiza-
tional routines. More specifically, organizational routines that are effortful ac-
complishments of routine participants (i.e., participation requires extensive use of 
declarative and transactive memory) and that are weakly embedded in their or-
ganizational context will lead to high levels of variation across routine perfor-
mances (and hence, endogenous change). In contrast, organizational routines that 
represent effortful accomplishments of routine participants that are strongly em-
bedded in their organizational context will foster low levels of variation across 
routine performances (and hence, endogenous stability). Organizational routines 
that represent effortless accomplishments of routine participants (i.e., participa-
tion is based on procedural memory) will foster low levels of variation across 
routine performances (and hence, endogenous stability), irrespective of the or-
ganizational context. Accordingly, whether organizational routines exhibit en-
dogenous stability or change is substantially influenced by the type of memory 
they are stored in and the organizational context in which they become enacted. 
1.2.3 Organizational Outcomes 
Organizational outcomes of organizational routines, such as their impact on or-
ganizational performance, have mainly been studied by researchers conceptualiz-
ing organizational routines as unitary entities (e.g., Adler et al., 1999; Ethiraj et 
al., 2005; Drnevich and Kriauciunas, 2011). While theoreticians within the uni-
tary-entities perspective on organizational routines increasingly acknowledge the 
importance of individual routine participants (Abell, Felin and Foss, 2008; Felin 
and Foss, 2012; Felin et al., 2012), empirical researchers within this perspective 
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mostly sustain the frames of their theoretical ancestors (e.g., Penrose, 1959; Nel-
son and Winter, 1982). In emphasizing that organizational routines “[…] partly 
serve the purpose of minimizing the need for agency on a continual basis, by 
providing order and stability” (Katkalo, Pitelis and Teece, 2010: 1179), these 
researchers largely assume that routines operate with little influence asserted by 
routine participants (Salvato, 2009; Parmigiani and Howard-Grenville, 2011). 
Following the framework I have elaborated above, such organizational routines 
are assumed to be reinforced through strong organizational embeddedness or 
largely draw on the procedural memory of routine participants. Such routines are 
considered to exhibit persistence and inflexibility, while also acting as contextu-
ally embedded repositories for tacit knowledge in an organization (Gavetti and 
Levinthal, 2000; Dutta, Zbaracki and Bergen, 2003; Gilbert, 2005). Against this 
backdrop, organizational routines foster heterogeneity across a population of or-
ganizations and may contribute to short-term beneficial organizational outcomes. 
 
Routines that encompass high levels of tacit knowledge and that are deeply em-
bedded in an organizational context cannot easily be imitated or transferred to 
other organizational settings (Dierickx and Cool, 1989; Ichniowski, Shaw and 
Prennushi, 1997; Rivkin, 2000) and were found to stick to their organizational 
context (von Hippel, 1994; Szulanski, 1996; Szulanski and Jensen, 2004). For 
example, Dutta et al. (2003) studied the pricing capability of a large manufactur-
ing firm and showed that pricing incorporates nested routines, resources, and 
skills that influence whether a firm is able to create value through price setting. A 
company’s pricing systems and processes are developed over time and are tai-
lored to meet both the company’s and its customers’ requirements. Due to the 
tacit nature of organizational routines and their context-dependent development, 
imitating well-performing routines is likely to be error-prone or partial (Reed and 
DeFillippi, 1990; Zander and Kogut, 1995; Winter and Szulanski, 2001). This 
finding implies that organizations differ in their organizational routines in im-
portant and persistent ways. These differences in organizational routines in turn 
differently affect organizational outcomes. Given that it is difficult for competi-
tors to imitate particularly well-performing routines, routines may provide a 
source of value and represent a firm’s competitive advantage to achieve superior 
organizational performance over a certain period of time (Wernerfelt, 1984; Bar-
ney, 1991; Collis, 1994; Helfat, 2003). 
 
Simply exploiting well-performing organizational routines, however, may not be 
sufficient to sustain competitive advantages over a longer period of time, because 
over time competition between companies usually erodes their value (March, 
1991; Winter, 2003; Teece, 2007). While learning processes based on perfor-
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mance feedback may gradually improve the fit of organizational routines to their 
environments in comparatively stable environments (Levitt and March, 1988; 
Huber, 1991; Argote, 1999; Greve, 2003), organizational routines may lock or-
ganizations into inflexible and unchanging patterns of action in highly dynamic, 
competitive environments. In such environments, core competencies may quickly 
turn into core rigidities (Leonard-Barton, 1992; Gilbert, 2005). Without any ex-
ogenous strategic intervention, organizational routines may become sources of 
maladaptation, inferior performance, and organizational demise in reasonably 
dynamic environments. Research based on the work of Nelson and Winter (1982) 
focuses on how meta-routines (i.e., routines for changing other routines) and op-
erating routines interact to address the tradeoffs inherent in organizational out-
comes of organizational routines, such as balancing flexibility and efficiency 
(Adler et al., 1999) or operational effectiveness and superior adaptation (Knott, 
2001). For example, Adler, Goldoftas, and Levine (1999) explore why the Toyo-
ta Production System outshines those of other automobile companies in terms of 
efficiency and flexibility. These authors describe and contrast model changeovers 
using the Toyota Production System and those of US car manufacturers. They 
find that the Toyota Production System used highly efficient operating routines 
while also employing meta-routines that led to both change and stability and 
were deeply embedded in the organizational context. This suggests that low-level 
operating routines may help a company operate more efficiently, thereby exploit-
ing the benefits of stability in organizational routines, while higher-level meta-
routines apply exogenous change to operating routines and thereby assure long-
term beneficial organizational outcomes (Teece, Pisano and Shuen, 1997; Winter, 
2003; Teece, 2007). 
 
In concluding my review of the contemporary research on organizational rou-
tines, I want to reiterate that while organizational routines have been of interest to 
organization researchers since the inception of this research field (e.g., Stene, 
1940; Simon, 1947), the research on this phenomenon remains contradictory. 
This contradiction can be seen in the strikingly different conceptualization of or-
ganizational routines issued by two camps of routine researchers. While one 
camp conceptualizes organizational routines as inherently dynamic generative 
systems, the other camp sees them as “unitary and unchanging” (Feldman and 
Pentland, 2003: 97) building blocks embedded in larger organizational structures 
(Parmigiani and Howard-Grenville, 2011; Salvato and Rerup, 2011). Traditional-
ly, each perspective grounds its theorizing in different assumptions about the in-
herently stable or changing nature of organizational routines (Parmigiani and 
Howard-Grenville, 2011). Building on recent research (Howard-Grenville, 2005; 
Miller et al., 2012; Pentland et al., 2012), I suggest an integrative perspective 
connecting different types of memory in routine participants and the organiza-
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tional context in which the organizational routine is enacted. This integrative per-
spective on organizational routines acknowledges the internal structure and dy-
namics of routines found by research from the generative-systems perspective, 
while also allowing for endogenous routine stability central to the unitary-entities 
perspective. In doing so, my review proposes a common ontological ground to 
study strategic, organizational, and behavioral issues of organizational routines 
change. Given that organizational routines may exhibit either endogenous stabil-
ity or change, depending on how routine participants and organizational context 
interact, organizational routines should be studied across organizational contexts. 
In the following chapter, I offer a critique of the present research and argue that 
context remains underappreciated in current empirical research studying organi-
zational routines. Expanding on this critique, I provide a short overview of the 
contributions the following chapters make in studying context as an antecedent of 
processes and outcomes of organizational routine change. 
1.3 Critique of Present Research and Thesis Outline 
In recent years, conceptual research has fundamentally advanced our understand-
ing of how organizational routines should be defined and why they change 
(Cohen et al., 1996; Feldman and Pentland, 2003; Cohen, 2007b). Researchers 
today largely agree that organizational routines should be defined as repetitive 
and recognizable interdependent activities involving multiple actors that change 
exogenously or endogenously (Feldman and Pentland, 2003; Parmigiani and 
Howard-Grenville, 2011; Dionysiou and Tsoukas, 2013). Organizational routines 
may change through exogenous efforts such as meta-routines and managerial 
intervention or through endogenous routine change caused by variations intro-
duced by routine participants (Pentland and Feldman, 2005; Teece, 2007; Parmi-
giani and Howard-Grenville, 2011). While research on organizational routines 
has significantly advanced over the last decades, much work remains theoretical 
in nature. Parmigiani and Howard-Grenville (2011: 447), in their authoritative 
review of current routine research, concede that they “were rather surprised at the 
small number of empirical studies” they found. More generally, research progress 
on “how organizational routines emerge, how they change, and what impact they 
have on organizations” (Becker et al., 2005: 780) has frequently been found 
“frustratingly slow” (Cohen, 2007b: 774; see also: Pentland and Feldman, 2005; 
Peteraf, Di Stefano and Verona, 2013). 
 
Empirical research has studied routines within diverse organizational contexts, 
including automotive plants (Adler et al., 1999; D'Adderio, 2008), meat-
processing facilities (Lazaric and Denis, 2005), and football teams (Aime et al., 
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2010). This research demonstrates that routines form and evolve within the spe-
cific context of an organization (Teece et al., 1997; Cohendet and Llerena, 2003; 
Becker, 2004), making context “fundamental” for understanding routines (Cohen 
et al., 1996: 662). While this research shows that routines are embedded in exter-
nal (e.g., market dynamism [Winter, 2003]) and internal (e.g., organizational 
schemata [Rerup and Feldman, 2011]) organizational contexts, most empirical 
routine research fails to study routines across different external and internal or-
ganizational contexts (for exceptions, see: Edmondson et al., 2001; Howard-
Grenville, 2005; Drnevich and Kriauciunas, 2011). I define context broadly as 
situational constraints and enablers that impact organizational behavior, thereby 
restricting the range of observable behavior, affecting base rates with which be-
havior occurs, and influencing how behavior and outcomes relate (Mowday and 
Sutton, 1993; Rousseau and Fried, 2001; Johns, 2006). Accordingly, external and 
internal organizational contexts represent relevant antecedents to processes and 
outcomes of organizational routine change (Levinthal and Rerup, 2006). There-
fore, failure to study organizational routine change across different contexts seri-
ously limits our understanding of processes and outcomes of endogenous and 
exogenous routine change (Barreto, 2010; Parmigiani and Howard-Grenville, 
2011; Salvato and Rerup, 2011). 
 
Organizational context impacts processes of endogenous routine change and its 
economic outcomes by offering or constraining resources to effect routine change 
(cf. Feldman, 2004; Howard-Grenville, 2005; Pentland and Feldman, 2008a). For 
example, routine participants may operate in an internal organizational context 
that welcomes or sanctions participants revealing problems in routine perfor-
mances (Edmondson, 1999). Depending on such different climates of psycholog-
ical safety, endogenous routine change may be encouraged or penalized 
(Nembhard and Edmondson, 2011). Organizational context also impacts process-
es of exogenous routine change and their economic outcomes, because organiza-
tional context induces or constrains the application of meta-routines or manageri-
al interventions in operating routines (Nelson and Winter, 1982; Teece, 2007; 
Davis, Eisenhardt and Bingham, 2009). For example, meta-routines may contrib-
ute less to the economic performance of operating routines in an external organi-
zational context exhibiting low levels of environmental dynamism due to meta-
routines’ high maintenance costs and limited effect in low-dynamic environments 
(Aragón-Correa and Sharma, 2003; Winter, 2003). 
 
Despite the relevance of external and internal organizational context as an ante-
cedent to processes and outcomes of organizational routine change, we currently 
lack empirical research that explores how the embeddedness of routines within 
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and across multiple levels and types of organizational context shapes and moder-
ates processes and outcomes of routine change (Barreto, 2010; Salvato and Re-
rup, 2011; D'Adderio et al., 2012; Turner and Fern, 2012). Current research 
agrees that further empirical inquiry is required to develop a more-complete un-
derstanding of how external and internal organizational context impacts process-
es and outcomes of organizational routine change (Becker, 2005b; Barreto, 2010; 
Parmigiani and Howard-Grenville, 2011). I join earlier researchers (e.g., Co-
hendet and Llerena, 2003; Salvato and Rerup, 2011; Turner and Fern, 2012) 
when I argue that much progress depends on integrating external and internal 
organizational context more strongly into our empirical studies of organizational 
routine change. 
 
My dissertation responds to this neglect of context by studying organizational 
routines within and across different external and internal organizational contexts. 
In my research, organizational context represents an antecedent that (qualitative-
ly) shapes or (quantitatively) moderates processes and outcomes of organization-
al routine change. The following subsections provide a short summary of how the 
chapters of my dissertation relate organizational context to processes and out-
comes of organizational routine change. Table 1 provides an overview of the fo-
cus of the subsequent chapters. 
 
Table 1.1: Explanatory Focus of Chapters 
Chapter 
Antecedent: 
Organizational Context 
Process: 
Routine Change and Stability 
Outcome: 
Economic Impact 
External Internal Exogenous Endogenous  
2      
3      
4      
5      
6      
 Note: Greyed boxes indicate the explanatory focus of a chapter. 
 
In the first subsection (1.3.1) below, I summarize the contributions of chapters 2 
and 3 of my dissertation. Both chapters study processes of exogenous routine 
change that are accomplished through organizational meta-routines. Chapter 2 
highlights how external and internal organizational context fosters the emergence 
of different types of these meta-routines in organizations. Chapter 3 tests the 
economic impact of meta-routines on operating-routine performance in high- and 
low-dynamic external contexts. In the second subsection (1.3.2) below, I provide 
an overview of chapters 4 and 5 that focus on endogenous routine change and 
stability. Chapter 4 explores configurations of external and internal organization-
al context that promote stability in organizational routines. Chapter 5 tests inter-
nal organizational contexts in which individual routine participants fail and suc-
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ceed in generating novel and useful ideas that may lead to endogenous routine 
change. In the third subsection (1.3.3) below, I summarize chapter 6. This chap-
ter presents a critical perspective on exogenous routine change driven by mana-
gerial interventions in organizational routines. More specifically, this research 
explores how managers account for intentional interventions in organizational 
routines using popular management concepts, while facing multiple and poten-
tially conflicting demands from the external and internal organizational context. 
1.3.1 Change Through Organizational Meta-Routines 
Research taking a unitary-entities perspective on organizational routines has 
identified dynamic capabilities as a driver of sustained competitive advantage. 
Dynamic capabilities enable companies to constantly adjust inherently stable op-
erating routines and adapt to changing environmental demands, thus allowing 
them to outperform their competitors (Teece et al., 1997; Winter, 2003; Helfat et 
al., 2007). Within the literature, specific organizational meta-routines (i.e., recur-
ring action patterns allowing for a competitively adequate adjustment of operat-
ing routines and resources of the company) are considered the basis of such ca-
pabilities (Collis, 1994; Szulanski, 1996; Dosi, Nelson and Winter, 2000). While 
operating routines are geared towards the operational functioning of a company 
and thus describe the way a company operates day-to-day, dynamic capabilities 
focus on routines that are used to create, extend, and/or modify these routines 
(Winter, 2003). Today, the bulk of management research examines companies in 
contexts characterized by high levels of environmental dynamism (Keupp, 
Palmié and Gassmann, 2012), such as high-tech and IT industries, and few stud-
ies evaluate different environmental circumstances (e.g., Deeds, Decarolis and 
Coombs, 2000; Wu, 2007; Bruni and Verona, 2009). Despite researchers’ grow-
ing attention to dynamic capabilities and their influence on change in operating 
routines, current research lacks empirical analyses about what types of dynamic 
capabilities cause change in operating routines in different external and internal 
organizational contexts (cf. Barreto, 2010; Di Stefano, Peteraf and Verona, 2010; 
Parmigiani and Howard-Grenville, 2011). Failing to consider different types of 
dynamic capabilities within different contexts hampers our theoretical under-
standing of dynamic capabilities and is unlikely to resolve some recent puzzling 
empirical results. For example, some researchers theorize that dynamic capabili-
ties form only in rapidly changing environments (Teece et al., 1997), while oth-
ers argue that dynamic capabilities “take on a different character” in moderately 
dynamic environments (Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000: 1106). The lack of empiri-
cal research exploring the connection between external and internal organization-
al context and types of dynamic capabilities has hindered a reconciliation of the 
fundamentally different and contradictory conceptualizations of dynamic capabil-
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ities in the literature (Arend and Bromiley, 2009; Barreto, 2010; Vogel and 
Güttel, 2013). 
 
In the second chapter (co-authored by Indre Maurer)2, we explore how the char-
acteristics of dynamic capabilities are contingent on external and internal organi-
zational contexts. We use fuzzy-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis to analyze 
the frequency and formalization of dynamic capabilities that change the highly 
routinized purchasing processes of 103 small- and medium-sized enterprises in 
high versus low levels of environmental dynamism. Our findings reveal four dif-
ferent types of dynamic capabilities that equifinally cause change in operating 
routines: experiential, reactive, programmed, and analytic. Additional analysis 
reveals that each type corresponds to organizations with similar internal contexts, 
such as demographic characteristics and shared process innovation mindsets. 
While experiential, reactive, programmed-type dynamic capabilities change op-
erating routines in high-dynamic environments, we find that analytic-type dy-
namic capabilities change operating routines in low-dynamic environments. A 
major contribution of this chapter is to advance a framework integrating different 
and seemingly contradictory types of dynamic capabilities based on external and 
internal organizational contexts. We therefore provide researchers with a more 
complete and accurate view of dynamic capabilities by advancing our theoretical 
understanding and empirical evidence of the balancing of stability and change of 
operating routines in present-day organizations. 
 
The second chapter demonstrates that dynamic capabilities may take different 
forms depending on the external and internal organizational context. However, 
we do not address whether and when dynamic capabilities impact the economic 
performance of operating routines. While prior research studying change through 
dynamic capabilities found undisputed performance-enhancing effects of these 
meta-routines, the systematic investigation of the conditions under which dynam-
ic capabilities lead to success is still in its infancy (Easterby-Smith, Lyles and 
Peteraf, 2009; Di Stefano et al., 2010; Vogel and Güttel, 2013). In particular, the 
impact of environmental dynamism on the performance effect of dynamic capa-
bilities remains under-investigated (Wang and Ahmed, 2007; Barreto, 2010). 
Some authors find no moderating environmental effect on the potential perfor-
mance implications of dynamic capabilities (Drnevich and Kriauciunas, 2011; 
Protogerou, Caloghirou and Lioukas, 2012), while others provide evidence for 
this relationship (Pavlou and El Sawy, 2006; Romme et al., 2010). Given that the 
                                                 
2 An earlier version of the second chapter was presented at the 29th EGOS Colloquium 2013, Montréal. 
The second and third chapters rely on the same data set. Maren Schlömer was involved in collecting the 
data for chapter 2, but did not participate in developing this chapter. 
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progress of research on dynamic capabilities is seriously hampered by such in-
consistent findings in empirical research (Barreto, 2010; Vogel and Güttel, 
2013), the different contextual conditions of dynamic capabilities’ impact on op-
erating-routine performance deserve investigation to resolve inconsistent re-
search findings and provide guidance for practitioners. 
 
In the third chapter (co-authored by Maren Schlömer and Indre Maurer)3, we 
continue investigating dynamic capabilities by hypothesizing and testing the im-
pact that dynamic capabilities have on two different performance yardsticks of 
operating routines under high versus low levels of environmental dynamism. 
More specifically, we conceptualize operating-routine performance by distin-
guishing between evolutionary fitness (i.e., goal achievement) and technical fit-
ness (i.e., goal achievement in relation to underlying costs). We analyze data on 
the purchasing processes of 200 small- and medium-sized enterprises. The find-
ings reveal that dynamic capabilities increase the evolutionary fitness of operat-
ing routines irrespective of the level of environmental dynamism faced by the 
organization; however, the extent to which dynamic capabilities affect the tech-
nical fitness of operating routines differs considerably depending on the level of 
environmental dynamism. These findings corroborate and extend prior conceptu-
al arguments on the impact dynamic capabilities have on firm fitness (Teece et 
al., 1997; Winter, 2003; Helfat et al., 2007; Helfat and Winter, 2011). 
1.3.2 Change Within Organizational Routines 
Research from the generative-systems perspective on routines seeks to explain 
how routine participants generate endogenous routine change or stability 
(Pentland and Rueter, 1994; Feldman, 2003; Lazaric and Denis, 2005; Zbaracki 
and Bergen, 2010). Such research emphasizes the agency of routine participants 
and frequently downplays the impact that the external and internal organizational 
context has on routine participants (Parmigiani and Howard-Grenville, 2011; 
Salvato and Rerup, 2011). My review on endogenous stability and change of rou-
tines has demonstrated that organizational context represents an important ante-
cedent of endogenous routine processes and their economic outcomes: Some or-
ganizational contexts foster stability and continuity in organizational routines that 
are prone to variation and endogenous change, such as treatment routines in a 
hospital (Bohmer, 2010), to ensure short-term efficiency in routine performances 
(Katkalo et al., 2010). Other organizational contexts exhibit managerially super-
vised processes to achieve highly controlled endogenous change in stable organi-
zational routines, such as suggestion systems implemented in the operating rou-
                                                 
3 Earlier versions of the third chapter were presented at the 73rd Annual Meeting of the Academy of Man-
agement 2013, Orlando and the WK ORG-Workshop 2011, Berlin. 
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tines of an industrial enterprise (Adler et al., 1999; Arthur and Aiman-Smith, 
2001), to allow for incremental adaptation (Farjoun, 2010). Neglecting organiza-
tional context as an antecedent of processes and outcomes of routine change will 
yield a partial and incomplete understanding and explanation of endogenous rou-
tine change (Johns, 2006; Levinthal and Rerup, 2006). The subsequent chapters 
present empirical inquiries into settings where the organizational context fosters 
stability in situations where endogenous routine change is common (chapter 4) 
and where the organizational context fosters change in situations where endoge-
nous stability is common (chapter 5). In doing so, these chapters contribute to our 
understanding of how the embeddedness of routine participants in a wider exter-
nal and internal organizational context influences the dynamics of organizational 
routines. 
 
In the fourth chapter (co-authored by Jessica Chromik)4, we explore configura-
tions of external and internal organizational contexts as antecedents of stability in 
organizational routines. More specifically, we seek to explain when and why 
written organizational rules—as a mechanism to foster stability in organizational 
routines—are persistently enacted within organizational routines that otherwise 
exhibit high levels of variation and endogenous change. Persistent rule enactment 
is critical for organizations to function, as failure of persistent rule enactment 
may lead to poor performance, organizational delegitimization, and even the 
death of employees or customers (cf. Weick, 1990; Inoue and Koizumi, 2004; 
Bruns, 2009). While current research demonstrates that organizational routines 
and written rules frequently drift apart (Anand et al., 2012), routine research has 
largely ignored contextual conditions that operate on multiple levels above (e.g., 
institutional pressures) and below (e.g., task complexity) the routine but never-
theless affect the enactment of written rules (cf. Parmigiani and Howard-
Grenville, 2011; Salvato and Rerup, 2011). Our exploratory study is based on a 
fuzzy-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis of 19 medical-treatment routines 
performed in 10 internal-medicine departments of university hospitals. We iden-
tify three multilevel configurations where written rules persisted in an empirical 
setting characterized by high levels of improvisation and little managerial over-
sight: When institutional pressure is high, written rules will persist in routines 
addressing tasks of high complexity (“reducing risk”) or when highly experi-
enced routine participants execute tasks at high frequency (“securing status”). 
When institutional pressure is low, written rules will persist in routines where 
routine participants have low levels of experience in the face of high task vol-
umes of little complexity (“surviving stress”). Our study contributes a multilevel 
                                                 
4 Earlier versions of the fourth chapter were presented at the 73rd Annual Meeting of the Academy of 
Management 2013, Orlando and the 28th EGOS Colloquium 2012, Helsinki. 
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framework that incorporates external and internal organizational context into rou-
tine research. We conclude that written rules persist when they function as a re-
source to routine participants and provide them with confirming experience when 
enacting the written rule. Therefore, theories of organizational routines need to 
be broadened to include external and internal organizational contexts as anteced-
ents of persistent rule enactment in organizational routines. 
 
In the fifth chapter (co-authored by Andreas Richter and Thorsten Semrau)5, we 
focus on employee creativity in suggestion systems. Suggestion systems repre-
sent a formal process through which many organizations channel and control rou-
tine participants’ impetus for endogenous routine change, in particular in con-
texts where routines have to be performed at high levels of efficiency (Coriat and 
Dosi, 1998; Adler et al., 1999; Coriat, 2000). Organizations employ such systems 
to collect, evaluate, and compensate routine participants’ ideas for changing work 
routines (Robinson and Stern, 1998; Frese, Teng and Wijnen, 1999). The devel-
opment and submission of suggestions on how to improve work routines repre-
sents an example of creative performance behavior (Adler et al., 1999; Coriat, 
2000; Montag, Maertz and Baer, 2012). Such behavior, however, does not neces-
sarily lead to creative outcomes that are novel and useful to the organization 
(Montag et al., 2012). As Nelson and Winter (1982: 116) argue, individual rou-
tine participants that try “to do a better job” frequently fail to improve the rou-
tine’s economic impact because they lack a comprehensive understanding of the 
whole organizational routine and its interdependent entities. More generally, be-
cause of the risky and uncertain nature of creativity (Weick, 1995a; Simonton, 
1999; Fleming, 2001; Kelley and Littman, 2001; Sutton, 2001; March, 2010), 
creative failure is common and relevant for employees attempting to endogenous-
ly change organizational routines. 
 
This chapter examines how the internal organizational context moderates how 
failed employee creativity predicts subsequent employee creativity in a sugges-
tion system. Employee creativity encompasses creative performance behavior as 
well as the creative outcomes produced by that behavior. Because individual em-
ployee creativity is often enacted in teams (Shalley, Zhou and Oldham, 2004; 
Hirst, Van Knippenberg and Zhou, 2009), we argue that the team social context 
in particular influences whether prior creative failure triggers or stifles subse-
quent creative activity. Specifically, we posit that if employees with failure expe-
riences work in teams that are psychologically safe (i.e., teams that are safe for 
interpersonal risk taking; Edmondson, 1999), they receive the encouragement 
                                                 
5 Earlier versions of the fifth chapter were presented at the WK TIE Workshop 2013, St. Gallen and the 
8th Annual INGRoup Conference 2013, Atlanta, where it received the Best Conference Paper Award. 
I N T R O D U C T I O N  
29 
and support they need to attenuate threat-rigidity reactions and boost self-efficacy 
beliefs, resulting in sustained creative effort. Beyond socio-emotional support, 
teams that provide a safe environment for interpersonal risk-taking may also en-
courage employees with failure experiences to seek out advice and information 
from, and confide in, their team colleagues. Provided that teams share a well-
developed transactive memory system (Wegner, 1987), this environment may 
further fuel their idea-development process (Richter et al., 2012). We tested our 
hypothesis using archival and survey data from 218 employees working in 42 
teams and found that creative failure positively predicted creative performance 
behavior and creative outcomes if employees worked in teams with medium-to-
high levels of psychological safety. Under these conditions, employee creativity 
also benefited from well-developed team transactive memory systems. Given that 
we know little about how employees overcome creative failure for sustained cre-
ativity, this chapter goes beyond the boundaries of current routine research 
(Barreto, 2010; Parmigiani and Howard-Grenville, 2011; Salvato and Rerup, 
2011) and focuses on employee creativity as a micro-foundation for endogenous 
routine change (Farjoun, 2010; Hirst et al., 2011; Rerup and Feldman, 2011). By 
examining the role of the team context in which employee creativity is enacted, 
we provide answers to the question of how employees can overcome prior crea-
tive failure for sustained creative activity. 
1.3.3 Managers and Organizational Routine Change 
Managers represent an important driver of change in organizational routines be-
cause managerial decisions shape formal structures, place routine participants in 
job positions, and provide rationales for particular patterns of interaction (Knott, 
2001; Becker et al., 2005; Pentland and Feldman, 2005). Managers frequently 
employ popular management concepts, such as Total Quality Management and 
Lean Production, as a means to improve the economic outcome of established 
organizational routines (Watson, 1994; Abrahamson, 1996; Kieser, 1997; Beck-
er, Knudsen and March, 2006). The implementation of a popular management 
concept in an organizational routine differs from routine change triggered by me-
ta-routines, as popular management concepts usually “do not enable an enterprise 
to earn more than its cost of capital, or outperform its competitors” (Teece, 2007: 
1321). Furthermore, popular management concepts usually remain ambiguous in 
their content, as they do not originate from the organizational routine in which 
they are implemented (Benders and Van Veen, 2001; Røvik, 2002). Therefore, 
the ad hoc implementation of popular management concepts also differs from 
endogenous routine change triggered by routine participants. Popular manage-
ment concepts require extensive adaptation to the particular organizational rou-
tines within the specific organization (Benders and Van Veen, 2001; Ansari, Fiss 
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and Zajac, 2010). Routine participants shape the implementation of popular man-
agement concepts when they carry out their daily tasks (Lozeau, Langley and 
Denis, 2002; Feldman and Pentland, 2003). While prior research has advanced 
our understanding of why managers adopt popular concepts, we still know little 
about what happens to popular concepts after they have been adopted by an or-
ganization (Heusinkveld, Sturdy and Werr, 2011; Røvik, 2011). 
 
In the sixth chapter (co-authored by Suleika Bort)6, we explore how managers 
account for their use of popular management concepts adopted by their organiza-
tions. We conducted extensive interviews with top managers in Germany. Based 
on the managers’ narrations of how they understand and apply popular manage-
ment concepts, we identify four discourse categories: (1) learning from others’ 
experiences, (2) controlling organizational change, (3) gaining external legitima-
cy, and (4) collective sensemaking. We argue that these discourse categories all 
draw on the social norm of rationality that is central to managerial identity 
(Townley, 2002). While each of the four discourse categories accounts for the 
consumption of concepts in terms of means and ends, we find that even managers 
within the same company consuming the same concept do not share a single 
common goal or end toward which the consumption of the concept is directed. In 
addition, we find that managerial accounts of concept consumption are highly 
contingent on particular external or internal organizational contexts. Therefore, 
managerial needs when implementing popular concepts in organizational rou-
tines are not homogeneous but vary according to the external and internal organi-
zational context that managers face. Based on our finding that antecedents of ex-
ogenous routine change caused by managerial intervention are not limited to the 
alleged economic impact of popular concepts, but also encompass micro-political 
and macro-institutional motives, we argue that researchers should employ a logic 
of appropriateness rather than a logic of consequence (March, 1994; March and 
Olsen, 2008) when studying the implementation of popular management con-
cepts. 
 
                                                 
6 The sixth chapter is published and should be cited as follows: Wilhelm and Bort (2013): “How manag-
ers talk about their consumption of popular management concepts: Identity, rules and situations,” in: 
British Journal of Management 24 (3): 428-444. Original layout and headings have been adapted and 
reformatted for the purposes of this dissertation. Previous versions of this publication have been pre-
sented at the 70th Annual Meeting of the Academy of Management 2010, Montreal and the 26th EGOS 
Colloquium 2010, Lisbon. The data analyzed in this chapter was collected by the first author as part of 
his diploma thesis at Mannheim University. 
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1.4 Conclusion 
The research compiled in this dissertation provides insight into antecedents, pro-
cesses, and outcomes of organizational routine change. In examining routines 
within and across different external and internal organizational contexts, the fol-
lowing chapters further our understanding of organizational routine change, and 
in doing so, our understanding of the foundations by which organizations per-
form and prevail. This dissertation contributes to current literature on organiza-
tional routines in the following ways. First, I focus on how organizational context 
influences the economic outcome of routine change. I demonstrate the implica-
tions that the external and internal organizational context may have for the eco-
nomic impact of exogenous routine change, such as operating-routine perfor-
mance (chapter 3), and endogenous routine change, such as the novelty and use-
fulness of improvement suggestions (chapter 5). In doing so, I directly contribute 
to closing research gaps by systematically investigating the contextual conditions 
under which change trough routines (Barreto, 2010; Peteraf, Di Stefano and 
Verona, 2013) and change within routines (Parmigiani and Howard-Grenville, 
2011; Salvato and Rerup, 2011) contributes to economically relevant outcomes. 
 
Second, my dissertation contributes to a more thorough understanding of the im-
plications that the contextual embeddedness of routines has for processes of rou-
tine change. I contribute to our understanding of how contextual embeddedness 
and processes of routine change relate by studying how consistent types of meta-
routines emerge within different external and internal organizational contexts 
(chapter 2). These meta-routines represent alternative processes to achieve exog-
enous change in operating routines. Additionally, I contribute research on how 
and why organizational context impacts managers’ accounts of processes of ex-
ogenous routine change (chapter 6). Finally, I advance research that explicitly 
incorporates organizational context as an antecedent of different processes of 
endogenous routine dynamics (chapters 4 and 5). In doing so, I address research 
gaps on how processes of organizational routines are shaped by their external and 
internal organizational embeddedness (Howard-Grenville, 2005; Bresman, 2013). 
 
Third, in contrast to much prior research on organizational routines, most chap-
ters in my dissertation explicitly account for the embeddedness of organizational 
routines in multiple levels (chapter 2, 4, and 5) and forms (chapter 4 and 6) of 
organizational context. For example, I explicitly integrate economic necessities 
and social expectations into my conceptualization of context (chapter 4 and 6). 
Doing so allows me to address the potentially complementary or contradictory 
effects of different levels (chapter 4) and forms (chapters 4 and 6) of organiza-
tional context. In addition, some chapters in my dissertation recognize that con-
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textual embeddedness may foster positive or negative outcomes of routine 
change (chapters 3 and 5), thus recognizing both opportunities and challenges of 
the embeddedness of organizational routines. My work on the multilevel and 
multi-faceted nature of contextual embeddedness of organizational routines ad-
dresses recent criticism highlighting a lack of theoretical and empirical work 
studying how multilevel (Salvato and Rerup, 2011) and multi-context embed-
dedness (Parmigiani and Howard-Grenville, 2011; Dionysiou and Tsoukas, 
2013) impacts change in organizational routines. In studying organizational rou-
tines embedded in external and internal organizational contexts, my dissertation 
broadens our current understanding of organizational routine change by comple-
menting mere outcome or process perspectives dominant in current routine re-
search with organizational context as an antecedent of when, why, and how rou-
tines change (chapters 2 to 6). 
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2 Exploring Change in Operating Routines 
2.1 Introduction 
Organizations are in a permanent struggle between stability and change, seeking 
to balance efficiency and flexibility in order to perform and persist in the face of 
competition (March, 1991; Davis et al., 2009; Lavie, Stettner and Tushman, 
2010). This struggle between stability and change is reflected in the operating 
routines of an organization (March and Simon, 1958; Cyert and March, 1963; 
Nelson and Winter, 1982; Winter, 2003): While many operating routines are de-
signed to deliver stable and efficient performance, competitive environments may 
require repeated and extensive changes to these routines. Failure to change oper-
ating routines in the face of changed environmental circumstances is likely to 
jeopardize organization performance and survival (Tushman and Anderson, 
1986; Leonard-Barton, 1992; Danneels, 2011). To explain how organizations 
achieve such adaptation, recent research emphasizes the importance of meta-
routines as drivers of change in operating routines (Collis, 1994; Eisenhardt and 
Martin, 2000; Zollo and Winter, 2002). Whereas operating routines describe the 
way an organization carries out its day-to-day business, meta-routines are aimed 
at creating, extending, and/or modifying operating routines (Winter, 2003). Meta-
routines constitute an organization’s dynamic capabilities that prevent the rigidity 
and the drawbacks of operating-routine stability; in other words, they prevent the 
generalization and misapplication of outdated operating routines in the face of 
changed circumstances (Teece and Pisano, 1994; Teece et al., 1997; Romme et 
al., 2010). 
 
Despite researchers’ growing attention to dynamic capabilities and their influ-
ence on change in operating routines, comparative empirical analysis on what 
types of dynamic capabilities cause such change is lacking (cf. Barreto, 2010; Di 
Stefano et al., 2010; Parmigiani and Howard-Grenville, 2011). This lack of em-
pirical research exploring the connection between types of dynamic capabilities 
and operating routine change has hindered a reconciliation of the fundamentally 
different and contradictory conceptualizations of dynamic capabilities in the lit-
erature (Arend and Bromiley, 2009; Barreto, 2010; Vogel and Güttel, 2013). The 
most influential conceptualizations significantly differ with regard to the bounda-
ry conditions, core elements, and characteristics of the dynamic-capabilities con-
cept: While Teece et al. (1997) theorize that dynamic capabilities apply only in 
rapidly changing environments, Eisenhardt and Martin (2000: 1106) argue that 
dynamic capabilities “take on a different character” in moderately dynamic envi-
ronments (Peteraf et al., 2013). Conceptual contradictions are mirrored in empiri-
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cal research, which tends to follow one of these dominant perspectives (Di Stefa-
no et al., 2010; Peteraf et al., 2013). More specifically, quantitative research in 
each camp focuses on testing the impact of predefined dynamic capabilities types 
on organizational outcomes (e.g., Marcus and Anderson, 2006; Drnevich and 
Kriauciunas, 2011; Protogerou et al., 2012). Qualitative research focuses on de-
scribing how a single or a few companies alter their operating routines (or fail to 
do so) by leveraging firm-specific dynamic capabilities (e.g., Galunic and Eisen-
hardt, 2001; Rindova and Kotha, 2001; Danneels, 2011). 
 
While both theoretical perspectives and their respective empirical work have 
yielded valuable insights, we still lack knowledge about what commonalities dy-
namic capabilities exhibit across organizations that allow them to effect change 
in operating routines and what boundary conditions may drive idiosyncratic exe-
cution. Failing to consider different types of dynamic capabilities and 
acknowledge their equifinal outcome hampers our theoretical understanding of 
dynamic capabilities and is unlikely to resolve some recent puzzling empirical 
results. For example, quantitative studies that evaluate different levels of envi-
ronmental dynamism have shown that dynamic capabilities are of value in both 
dynamic and less-dynamic environments (Drnevich and Kriauciunas, 2011; Pro-
togerou et al., 2012). This is a puzzling finding, because the dominant conceptu-
alization proposed by Teece et al. (1997) denies any benefit of dynamic capabili-
ties under conditions of low environmental dynamism. While such empirical 
findings imply that distinct types of meta-routines are contingent on environmen-
tal dynamism and equifinally lead to changes in operating routines, empirical 
research has shown little effort to engage in their comparative exploration. 
 
This chapter seeks to address this research gap by employing fuzzy-set Qualita-
tive Comparative Analysis (fsQCA) to quantitative data collected from small- 
and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) in order to study how dynamic capabilities 
effect changes in operating routines. In doing so, we explore the logical links 
among environmental dynamism, dynamic capabilities, and change in operating 
routines. More specifically—using fsQCA—we explore what configurations of 
environmental dynamism; execution frequency; and codification of higher-order 
sensing, learning, and reconfiguring routines represent necessary and/or suffi-
cient explanations for change in operating routines. Our analysis reveals four dis-
tinct types of dynamic capabilities: experiential, reactive, programmed, and ana-
lytic. While experiential, reactive, and programmed-type dynamic capabilities 
cause operating routine change in environments characterized by high levels of 
dynamism, we find that analytic-type dynamic capabilities cause operating rou-
tine change in environments exhibiting low levels of dynamism. Taken together, 
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this study advances research on dynamic capabilities and routine change by 
providing a framework integrating different and seemingly contradictory types of 
dynamic capabilities. We therefore provide researchers with a more complete and 
accurate view of dynamic capabilities by contributing theoretical understanding 
and empirical evidence on the balancing of operating routine stability and change 
in present-day organizations. 
 
In the next sections, we introduce the theoretical foundations of our exploratory 
study. In order to better understand the context of our study, we review the litera-
ture on operating routines and dynamic capabilities (Nelson and Winter, 1982; 
Teece et al., 1997; Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000). We elaborate on dynamic capa-
bilities as exogenous triggers of change in operating routines (Zollo and Winter, 
2002; Winter, 2003). Then we provide information on our empirical data. We 
analyze this data using fsQCA. Finally, we present our results, discuss our find-
ings, and highlight the implications and limitations of this work. 
2.2 Theory 
2.2.1 Stability and Change in Operating Routines 
Operating routines capture the characteristic patterns with which organizations 
accomplish value-adding tasks. Routines drive organizational efficiency, as they 
economize on individuals’ cognitive resources, thereby increasing reliability and 
speed-of-task performances (Cohen and Bacdayan, 1994), and coordinating em-
ployees’ efforts to form coherent activity patterns (Cohen, 2013; Dionysiou and 
Tsoukas, 2013). Operating routines have been studied in various recurring organ-
izational activity patterns, including employee selection (Feldman, 2000), invoice 
processing (Pentland et al., 2011), drug development in pharmaceutical compa-
nies (Bresman, 2013), and price-setting (Zbaracki and Bergen, 2010). They have 
been found to be inherently important for the perseverance and performance of 
any organization (Becker, 2004) and serve as efficiency drivers in many organi-
zations (Stene, 1940; March and Simon, 1958; Nelson and Winter, 1982). 
 
While researchers have traditionally depicted routines as relatively stable entities 
(cf. Cyert and March, 1963; Gersick and Hackman, 1990), more-recent research 
emphasizes that routine participants are capable of reflecting upon routine per-
formances. Depending on the ideals, experiences, and resources available to rou-
tine participants, they may engage in endogenous change and improve the operat-
ing routine’s adaptation to environmental demands (Feldman and Pentland, 
2003). For example, Feldman (2000), in her ethnographic study on university 
housing organizations, showed how employees initiated significant changes to 
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the yearly move-in routine for new residents after it was found to be economical-
ly inefficient and left an undesirable and negative impression on new residents. 
Also employing ethnographic methods, Howard-Grenville (2005) showed how 
the intentions, expectations, and temporal orientation of operating-routine partic-
ipants in a semiconductor company produce routine change or stability over time. 
These changes comprise the alteration of routine patterns, such as changing the 
sequence of activities or implementing novel activities within an existing operat-
ing routine. 
 
While such proactive employee behavior represents an important source of oper-
ating-routine change, many operating routines “[…] partly serve the purpose of 
minimizing the need for such agency on a continual basis, by providing order and 
stability” (Katkalo et al., 2010: 1179). To foster reliability in operating routines 
and to further exploit what has proven successful in the past (March, 1991), or-
ganizations employ mechanisms and structures to keep patterns of employee in-
teraction “on track” (Schulz, 2008: 228). Examples of such structures include the 
strict behavioral scripts governing customer interaction in Apple stores (Kane 
and Sherr, 2011) and McDonald’s (Leidner, 1993). While stable operating rou-
tines are likely to increase organizational efficiency through habitualization 
(Cohen and Bacdayan, 1994) and organizational learning (Argote, 1999), such 
exploitative patterns can hinder exploration of alternatives to the established op-
erating routine (Leonard-Barton, 1992; Levinthal and March, 1993). Alternatives 
to the established operating routine are likely to be perceived as less certain in 
their performance, remote in time, and more distant from the current locus of ac-
tion (March, 1991; Lavie et al., 2010). Therefore, mechanisms and structures de-
signed to foster uniform, reliable, and efficient operating routines are likely to 
lead to operating-routine rigidity, a common source of inertia (Gilbert, 2005). 
 
Inertia usually causes organizational maladaptation, implying that an organiza-
tion is unable to respond to environmental opportunities or threats (Miller and 
Friesen, 1980; Hannan and Freeman, 1984; Collinson and Wilson, 2006). Failure 
to address environmental threats may not only decrease organizational perfor-
mance, but also threaten organizational survival in the long run. This outcome is 
particularly true for small- and medium-sized organizations, as their possibilities 
to diversify into markets with independent and unrelated environmental threats 
are limited. Given the often-cited rigidity of operating routines, there is a major 
interest to understand the conditions leading to changes in operating routines 
(Gilbert, 2005; Parmigiani and Howard-Grenville, 2011; Vergne and Durand, 
2011). Previous research suggests that organizations employ meta-routines—so 
called dynamic capabilities—to change rigid operating routines in order to ad-
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dress environmental opportunities and threats and thereby avoid harmful organi-
zational inertia (Teece et al., 1997). For these reasons, we argue that it is im-
portant to better understand meta-routines as drivers of change in operating rou-
tines. 
2.2.2 Dynamic Capabilities and Change in Operating Routines 
Recent literature on dynamic capabilities acknowledges meta-routines as drivers 
of change in a company’s operating routines (Zollo and Winter, 2002; Winter, 
2003; Helfat et al., 2007). These higher-order routines are most commonly re-
ferred to as sensing routines (i.e., scanning activities directed towards observing 
the environment and identifying relevant changes), learning routines (i.e., devel-
oping new ways of responding to observed environmental changes), and recon-
figuring routines (i.e., reorganizing existing resources and processes) (Teece and 
Pisano, 1994). Higher-order sensing routines allow organizations to quickly de-
tect and evaluate opportunities and threats in their environment (Drnevich and 
Kriauciunas, 2011). Higher-order learning routines expand the potential actions 
organizations can take and thus help to generate adequate responses when envi-
ronmental conditions change (Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000). Higher-order recon-
figuring routines imply that companies have access to and can provide the re-
quired resources if adequate solutions need to be implemented to adjust operating 
routines to new conditions (Teece et al., 1997). 
 
Because of their ability to prevent the drawbacks of routine rigidity and instead 
keep operating routines flexible, dynamic capabilities are assumed to be especial-
ly beneficial under conditions of high environmental dynamism. Some influential 
conceptual work even views dynamic environments as a constitutive element in 
the dynamic-capabilities concept (Teece et al., 1997; Teece, 2007). Accordingly, 
the great majority of empirical work has studied the implications of dynamic ca-
pabilities in dynamic environments such as high-tech and IT industries (e.g., 
Deeds et al., 2000; Wu, 2007; Bruni and Verona, 2009). However, recent studies 
have challenged the notion that dynamic capabilities are valuable exclusively 
under conditions of high environmental dynamism; they thus also question high 
levels of environmental dynamism as a necessary condition under which higher-
order routines (constituting dynamic capabilities) emerge. While earlier empirical 
work does not explicitly acknowledge such external organizational context (cf. 
Barreto, 2010), recent studies consider different environmental conditions. They 
hypothesize and empirically demonstrate the beneficial impact dynamic capabili-
ties have on organizations under high and low levels of environmental dynamism 
(Drnevich and Kriauciunas, 2011; Protogerou et al., 2012). Such findings give 
rise to the question of whether the higher-order routines that manifest dynamic 
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capabilities are contingent on environmental dynamics and are thus characterized 
by different features and core characteristics (Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000; 
Romme et al., 2010; Helfat and Winter, 2011). More concretely, the conceptual 
work by Eisenhardt and Martin (2000) suggests that the dynamic capabilities in 
highly dynamic environments need to quickly create new knowledge and imple-
ment novel solutions. To do so, they rely on higher-order routines that are simple 
and unstable. In contrast, in less-dynamic environments, dynamic capabilities 
operate in line with the slower pace of change in these environments and are as-
sumed to be more detailed and structured. 
 
Types of dynamic capabilities, then, may vary with regard to the level of envi-
ronmental dynamism, as well as with regard to the execution frequency and codi-
fication of their underlying higher-order sensing, learning, and reconfiguring rou-
tines. In this study, we seek to explore the types of conditions (environmental 
dynamism, as well as execution frequency and codification of higher-order rou-
tines) that equifinally effect change in stable operating routines. Equifinality here 
refers to the possibility of reaching the same final state by different and distinct 
causal paths (Katz and Kahn, 1978). 
2.3 Sample and Method 
2.3.1 Research Approach 
Research on dynamic capabilities and change in organizational routines mostly 
draws on inductive case studies or deductive model-testing (Parmigiani and 
Howard-Grenville, 2011; for an exception, see: Pentland et al., 2012). These ap-
proaches have considerably enhanced our understanding of the activities underly-
ing higher-order routines and their impact on operating-routine development and 
change. However, these approaches are also limited in their ability to provide 
insights into complex cause-effect relationships linking types of conditions to 
changes in operating routines (cf. Ragin, 2000). In the current chapter, we com-
plement these approaches by using a set-theoretic method. Set-theoretic methods, 
such as fsQCA, are uniquely suitable for exploring equifinal and multilevel con-
figurations that lead to specific outcomes because they treat cases as configura-
tions of attributes (Ragin, 2000; Fiss, Cambré and Marx, 2013). 
 
FsQCA applies Boolean logic to examine the presence or absence of conditions 
in which the outcome is present (e.g., all cases in which operating routine change 
occurred) and then uses Boolean algebra to reduce the configurations into a (su-
per)set of conditions that are causally related to the outcome (Ragin, 2000). In 
doing so, fsQCA allows equifinal explanations because this method does not as-
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sume that there is only one constellation of features among all observed cases 
that causes the outcome (Fiss, 2011). Emergent processes, such as dynamic ca-
pabilities causing changes to operating routines, are typically equifinal in form 
(Crutchfield, 2008). Given that extant literature highlights the equifinal nature of 
dynamic capabilities (Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000; Laamanen and Wallin, 
2009), explicitly questions whether high environmental dynamism is a necessary 
or sufficient condition of dynamic capabilities (cf. Protogerou et al., 2012), and 
problematizes cross-level interactions between meta-routines and operating rou-
tines (Salvato and Rerup, 2011), we argue that fsQCA represents the appropriate 
method to shed light on the causal relationship between configurations of dynam-
ic capabilities as well as environmental dynamism resulting in changes in operat-
ing routines. 
2.3.2 Sample and Data Collection 
The data for the present chapter was collected in a larger research program on 
dynamic capabilities in the procurement departments of SMEs in three German 
industrial sectors—engineering, rubber and plastics, and paper processing 
(Schlömer et al., 2013, see also chapter 3). The empirical setting of industrial 
SMEs and their purchasing processes seems particularly suited to explore types 
of dynamic capabilities effecting operating-routine change. In general, dynamic 
capabilities are likely to be of high relevance for SME firm survival (Sawers, 
Pretorius and Oerlemans, 2008). SMEs usually have scarce resource endowments 
when compared to large organizations. In order to survive, it is critical that SMEs 
efficiently use and develop their processes (Pressey, Winklhofer and Tzokas, 
2009). This assertion is particularly true for the purchasing processes of SMEs: 
Today’s firms tend to reduce their level of in-house value creation thereby in-
creasing the impact purchasing has on firm performance (Zheng et al., 2007). 
This circumstance makes change and adaptation in the procurement process cru-
cial for firm survival. Therefore, German SMEs’ procurement processes are par-
ticularly appropriate to explore and test the concept of dynamic capabilities. 
 
We developed a standardized written questionnaire to obtain information about 
the organization, its procurement processes, and its dynamic capabilities. Follow-
ing the design of earlier studies, the companies’ top managers served as key in-
formants (cf. Danneels, 2008). More specifically, we considered the head of the 
procurement department to be the most-knowledgeable informant, responsible 
for the procurement department’s processes and possessing in-depth knowledge 
about the performance of the department. In order to avoid key-informant bias, 
we adopted a number of procedural remedies when developing the survey 
(Podsakoff et al., 2003). In a preliminary qualitative study, we thoroughly pre-
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tested the survey in order to refine questions and constructs and to gain valid 
items and reliable scales, thus avoiding ambiguity and vagueness in the final 
questionnaire (cf. Tourangeau, Rasinski and Rips, 2000). Our preliminary quali-
tative study entailed interviews with purchasing managers and general managers 
from 11 SMEs from the three industries surveyed. In these interviews, we em-
ployed a think-aloud protocol to receive structured feedback on the validity and 
comprehensibility of the questionnaire (Sudman, Bradburn and Schwarz, 2010). 
The think-aloud protocol allowed us to substantially refine the questionnaire 
across interview rounds. To guard against key-informant and social desirability 
biases, the respondents were guaranteed strict confidentiality, asked to answer the 
questions as honestly as possible, and reminded that the questions being asked of 
them had neither right nor wrong answers. Also, the measures of the independent 
and dependent variables were spatially and methodologically separated 
(Podsakoff et al., 2003). Following data collection, we checked for key-
informant bias by cross-validating self-reported measures with data from second 
informants and archival data. Furthermore, we checked for possible non-response 
bias by employing an Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) to test for significant dif-
ferences between early and late respondents. The assumption is that late respond-
ents are more similar to non-respondents than to early respondents (Armstrong 
and Overton, 1977; Jansen, Simsek and Cao, 2012). The ANOVA did not reveal 
any significant difference between these two groups, indicating that non-response 
bias was not a problem in this study. For these reasons, we feel confident that the 
respondents provided reliable data on the variables gathered in this study. 
 
To promote awareness of our survey, we sent a formal invitation letter by mail to 
each SME employing at least 40 people in the selected industries in Germany 
(5,152 in total). Each letter contained login details for an online survey tool we 
used to administer the questionnaire. Following our initial mailing and emailed 
follow-ups, 632 companies responded to our invitation and logged into the sur-
vey site. Following emailed follow-ups and telephone calls, 200 SMEs returned 
completed questionnaires that contained less than ten percent missing values. To 
avoid data loss due to missing values, we employed mean substitution (Roth, 
1994; Lemieux and McAlister, 2005). The final sample captures about four per-
cent of the total population in Germany and is representative in terms of group 
size and industry composition. The majority of sampled firms (89.5%) employ 
between 50 and 499 people, with an average of 4.09 people working in a pur-
chasing function (SD = 3.87). 
 
In order to explore higher-order routines as drivers of change in operating rou-
tines, we had to ensure that the procurement processes we sampled were stable 
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organizational routines that exhibited comparatively little routine drift through 
endogenous change (Helfat and Winter, 2011; Pentland et al., 2011). Routiniza-
tion is likely to foster stability in patterns of interaction (Cohen and Bacdayan, 
1994). Therefore, our questionnaire measured the routinization of the operating 
process by adapting Withey et al.’s (1983) items (Cronbach’s alpha = .87). A 
sample item from this scale reads: “Our operative purchasing activities exhibit a 
fixed sequence of steps.” The answers were rated on a Likert scale ranging from 
1 (fully disagree) to 5 (fully agree). To exclude organizations where change 
might result from an inherently instable procurement process, we deleted all cas-
es exhibiting routinization in their procurement process below the sample median 
(4.0). This operation reduced our dataset to 103 cases in total. 
2.3.3 Measures 
In developing the items and scales for the measurement of the focal concepts, we 
used existing measures, scales, and items wherever possible (see Schlömer et al., 
2013). Because we studied change processes, our data collection had to account 
for possible time lags between configurations of higher-order sensing, learning, 
and reconfiguring routines and the outcome “operating routine change.” In line 
with the recommendations of Drnevich and Kriauciunas (2011), we constructed 
measures of the explanatory conditions (environmental dynamism, as well as ex-
ecution frequency and codification of sensing, learning, and reconfiguring high-
er-order routines) retrospectively to the year 2005; that is, five years before the 
survey was conducted. Furthermore, given that the frequency and codification 
refer to concrete attributes of a specific interaction pattern—an assessment that 
was confirmed by virtually unanimous agreement in our extensive pretest with 
procurement-department managers—we measured frequency and codification of 
scanning, learning, and reconfiguring activities using a single-item scale 
(Rossiter, 2002; Bergkvist and Rossiter, 2007; Heimeriks, Schijven and Gates, 
2012). In the questionnaire, an introductory sentence describes each of the high-
er-order routines in managerial language. We believe this explanation provided 
survey respondents with a clear understanding of sensing, learning, and reconfig-
uring activities in the context of purchasing processes. 
 
Explanatory Conditions. To measure the execution frequency of higher-order 
routines, we asked our respondents how often sensing, learning, and reconfigur-
ing activities (respectively) had been executed by the purchasing department five 
years prior to the study. The possible responses to each question were as follows: 
daily, every week, monthly, once a quarter, or once a year. Our extensive pretest 
showed that procurement-department managers were able to look into and regu-
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larly drew on objective archival data, such as procurement controlling reports, 
when answering these questions. 
 
To measure codification, we asked our respondents whether “the purchasing de-
partment had written standard operating procedures that prescribe activity pat-
terns to be performed when engaging in” sensing, learning, and reconfiguring 
(respectively) activities. The answers were rated on a Likert scale ranging from 1 
(fully disagree) to 5 (fully agree).  
 
The present inquiry uses three industry sectors—engineering, rubber and plastics, 
and paper processing—to investigate different levels of environmental dyna-
mism. To capture the multiple characteristics of environmental dynamism, we 
relied on constructs to measure the innovation/sales ratio, changes in the sales 
volume, the number of employees and the number of companies in an industry 
(Child, 1972; McCarthy et al., 2010; Haunschild, zu Knyphausen-Aufseß and 
Rahmel, 2011). In line with prior studies on dynamic capabilities and environ-
mental dynamism (Pavlou and El Sawy, 2011; Protogerou et al., 2012), these 
measures capture changes in competition, customer preferences, and technology, 
leading to conditions of uncertainty and unpredictability for the company. In or-
der to distinguish and compare results from highly dynamic and less dynamic 
industries, we dummy-coded two groups. The first group (67 respondents) con-
sists of SMEs operating in the German engineering industry, which represents a 
highly dynamic environment according to the above-mentioned criteria when 
compared to the average of all German manufacturing industries. Engineering 
SMEs in Germany traditionally face “fierce competition between a small number 
of firms which do not want to set their market position at risk […]” (Grotz and 
Braun, 1997: 548). Over the last years, engineering has ranked among the top 
four manufacturing industries in Germany in terms of R&D expenditure, sales 
generated with product innovations, and successful completion of innovation 
projects (Statistisches Bundesamt, 2010; ZEW, 2013). The second group (36 re-
spondents) is characterized by comparatively low levels of environmental dyna-
mism according to the above-mentioned criteria; it ranks well below the average 
of all German manufacturing industries (Statistisches Bundesamt, 2010; ZEW, 
2013). It contains firms from the plastics, rubber, and paper-processing indus-
tries. Companies from these industries usually devote fewer resources to R&D 
and their sales volumes are less dependent on product innovation and the suc-
cessful completion of innovation projects than engineering companies. 
 
Outcome. The outcome, operating routine change, was measured by counting 
the number of changed process steps in the company’s procurement routine over 
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the last five years. We presented generic procurement process steps (specifying 
goods; searching suppliers; contracting; tracking orders; scheduling incoming 
goods; inspecting incoming goods) to our respondents. For each single procure-
ment process step we provided our respondents with a predefined set of actions 
that this process step may encompass (e.g., searching suppliers via trade fairs). 
The generic procurement process steps and actions were derived from our pretest 
and procurement process norms (ISO-Norm DIN EN ISO 9004: 2005/9001, 
2008). Based on the process steps and the action sets, the respondents described 
their procurement processes in the years 2005 and 2009, respectively. Based on 
these two descriptions of the respondent’s procurement process, we calculated 
the extent of change in the operating routine between 2005 and 2009 using the 
number of changed action sets across all procurement process steps. The result-
ing variable indicates a minimum of zero and a maximum of seven operating rou-
tine changes per case. 
2.3.4 Analytical Approach 
We followed standard procedures in preparing and conducting our fsQCA (e.g., 
Ragin, 2000; Fiss et al., 2013). To ensure transparency, our analysis is based on 
the established software package fsQCA version 2.5 (Ragin and Davey, 2009), 
which proceeds stepwise through each analytical moment. In preparing our 
fsQCA, we first converted the variable labels into logical sets (e.g., the variable 
environmental dynamism was relabeled to the set high environmental dynamism). 
Turning variables into logical sets is required, as fsQCA is based on logical sets 
rather than statistical variables. To capture meaningful differences in kind and 
degree between cases, we then determined the extent to which each empirical 
case is a set member (e.g., to what extent a case is a member of the set high envi-
ronmental dynamism). The fuzzy-set approach we employed transcends the 
Boolean either/or view by allowing membership scores between 1 and 0. Cases 
are therefore not forced into a dichotomous schema, but can be partial members 
of a given set. Set membership values approaching but below 1 indicate a strong 
but partial membership, while set membership values close to but above 0 indi-
cate a strong but partial non-membership. The crossover point provides a demar-
cation between being “inside” or “outside.” It represents “the point of maximum 
ambiguity (i.e., fuzziness) in the assessment of whether a case is more in or out 
of a set” (Ragin, 2008b: 30).7 The process of determining set-membership values 
is referred to as “calibration.” The researcher has to devise three threshold values 
when calibrating a fuzzy set: full membership, full non-membership, and the 
                                                 
7 To prevent cases from dropping out of the fuzzy-set analyses, Ragin (2008b) recommends avoiding 
calibrating cases to 0.5 set-membership scores. In line with prior research (Fiss, 2011), we complied 
with his recommendation by adding a constant of 0.001 to all causal conditions with full set-
membership scores below 1. 
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crossover point. However, lack of preexisting qualitative and quantitative scien-
tific knowledge for calibration is a common condition in the social sciences 
(Ragin, 2008b). Consistent with previous fsQCA research, we also relied on em-
pirical knowledge when initially calibrating our sets (Fiss, 2011; Greckhamer, 
Misangyi and Fiss, 2013). 
 
Environmental dynamism was measured using a categorical industry-membership 
variable. Therefore, we calibrated the cases to the set high environmental dyna-
mism using the indirect method, which is appropriate for categorical data (Ragin, 
2008a: 96): SMEs operating in the engineering industry were coded as full set 
members (value of 1), while SMEs competing in the rubber/plastics and the pa-
per-processing industry were coded as full non-members (value of 0).  
 
Given that our measures for the higher-order routines’ execution frequency and 
codification as well as operating routine change are continuous, we used the di-
rect method to calibrate all explanatory conditions and the outcome (Ragin, 
2008b). The direct method requires the researcher to devise three threshold val-
ues that indicate full non-membership, full membership, and the crossover point. 
 
The set high execution frequency of sensing was calibrated such that SMEs con-
ducting scanning activities less than every quarter were full non-members and 
SMEs conducting scanning activities more often than monthly were full mem-
bers. The crossover point was located between monthly and quarterly scanning 
activities and allowed us to calibrate the set membership of the remaining cases. 
Given that scanning activities consume fewer resources and can be done more 
easily than can learning and reconfiguring activities, we employed a slightly re-
laxed frequency calibration for learning and reconfiguring meta-routine activi-
ties. More specifically, high execution frequency of learning was calibrated such 
that SMEs conducting learning activities less than yearly were full non-members 
and SMEs conducting learning activities more often than quarterly were full 
members. The crossover point was located between quarterly and yearly learning 
activities and allowed us to calibrate the set membership of the remaining cases. 
The same threshold values were applied for high execution frequency of recon-
figuring. 
 
The sets high codification of the meta-routine activities sensing, learning, and 
reconfiguring were measured using a 5-point Likert scale. For calibration, we 
employed Likert-based threshold values suggested by prior research (Fiss, 2011). 
More specifically, we calibrated such that the extreme ends of the Likert scale 
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represented full non-membership and full membership, while the center of the 
scale represented the crossover point. 
 
Operating routine change was calibrated such that SMEs that had changed less 
than one process step in the company’s procurement routine were full non-
members of the set. In our sample, 15 companies had not changed their procure-
ment routines between 2005 and 2010. SMEs that changed more than two pro-
curement process steps were calibrated as full members of the set. In particular, 
we decided that 2.5 changes in procurement process steps was an appropriate 
threshold for full membership in high operating routine change because this val-
ue implies that the SME changed about half of the activities constituting their 
procurement process. In our sample, 36 cases exhibited such high levels of oper-
ating-routine change. The crossover point (1.5) was located in the middle of both 
thresholds to distinguish between 52 cases exhibiting some but little operating-
routine change. 
 
Calibrating all explanatory conditions as well as the outcome to set membership 
values generates the fuzzy-set data matrix (Ragin, 2000; Fiss, 2011). The fuzzy-
set data matrix provides the empirical basis for causal analysis in fsQCA. Causal 
analysis in fsQCA builds on the notion of necessary and sufficient conditions. 
Since procedures uncovering sufficient conditions cannot be relied on to uncover 
necessary conditions, we analyzed necessary and sufficient conditions separately 
(Schneider and Wagemann, 2010). Logically, necessary conditions are always 
present if the outcome is present; and there must not be an instance in which the 
outcome is present and the condition absent (Schneider and Wagemann, 2007). 
By convention, a consistency value of at least 0.9 is required for indicating nec-
essary conditions (Ragin, 2006). We employed the necessary conditions proce-
dure provided by fsQCA 2.5 and found that none of the conditions can be con-
sidered necessary for operating routine change to occur. We continued our analy-
sis by testing for sufficient conditions. 
 
For a sufficient condition, the outcome is always present if the condition is pre-
sent and there must not be an instance in which the condition is present and the 
outcome absent (Schneider and Wagemann, 2007). To analyze the data for suffi-
cient conditions, we relied on the Quine-McClusky truth-table algorithm provid-
ed in fsQCA 2.5. The Quine-McClusky algorithm requires the researcher to first 
specify a truth table based on the fuzzy-set data matrix. While the fuzzy-set data 
matrix depicts the set membership values of every case, the truth table captures 
all possible dichotomous combinations of conditions in a given fuzzy-set data 
matrix. As our present study entails seven explanatory conditions (high environ-
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mental dynamism, three conditions pertaining to high execution frequency of dy-
namic capabilities, and three conditions pertaining to high codification of dynam-
ic capabilities), our truth table exhibits 27 rows. However, not every row on the 
truth table will yield an adequate number and proportion of cases that display the 
outcome (e.g., high operating routine change). Therefore, fsQCA 2.5 requires 
the researcher to specify a minimum number of empirical cases and a consistency 
threshold value to code the outcome of a row and proceed with the analysis. 
Rows that fail to meet the minimum number of empirical cases are removed from 
the truth table. Rows that fail to meet the consistency threshold are coded as non-
members of the outcome set. We employed a threshold of two cases per truth 
table row. While this frequency threshold captures most (74%) of our empirical 
cases for the analysis, it also reduce the impact of possible outliers and measure-
ment errors on our solution terms (Ragin and Fiss, 2008). We applied a con-
sistency threshold of 0.825, which is stricter than Ragin’s (2008a) recommenda-
tion (0.75). 
 
The Quine-McClusky algorithm uses Boolean algebra to reduce these truth-table 
rows to less complex expressions. In this minimization procedure, complex con-
figurations are reduced in favor of logically equivalent but less complex solution 
terms (Schneider and Wagemann, 2007). In the course of the minimization pro-
cedure, the fsQCA software allows for three types of solutions. Whereas the par-
simonious and the intermediate solution (to various extents) incorporate logical 
remainders, the complex solution incorporates only statements about situations 
that occur empirically (Ragin, 2000) and therefore represents the most conserva-
tive approach (Vis, 2012). Accordingly, our analysis relies on the complex solu-
tion. 
2.4 Findings 
The findings are presented in Table 2.1 using the notation suggested by Ragin 
and Fiss (2008). In this notation style, black circles (W) indicate the presence of a 
condition, while circles with a cross (m) indicate the absence of a condition. 
Blank spaces indicate a so-called “don’t care” situation, in which the condition 
may be either absent or present. Table 2.1 depicts the complex solution encom-
passing five different solutions that are covered by 20 cases from our sample.8 
Based on similar gestalts, we created four types that group the five sufficient 
equifinal solutions explaining the outcome of operating-routine change (see Ta-
ble 2.1).  
                                                 
8 The parsimonious and the intermediate solution are available upon request. 
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Table 2.1: Configurations Causing Change in Operating Routines 
Solution 
Condition 1 2 3a 3b 4 
     
High Environmental Dynamism W W W W m 
      
High Execution Frequency      
Sensing m W W m 
Learning m W m W 
Reconfiguring W m W W m 
      
High Codification       
Sensing m m W W W 
Learning m m W W 
Reconfiguring m W W W W 
          
Consistency .86 .91 .86 .90 .86 
Raw Coverage .24 .15 .11 .13 .06 
Unique Coverage .12 .05 .01 .05 .06 
Overall Solution Consistency .88 
Overall Solution Coverage .42 
 
In general, the consistency indicators provided with each solution capture “how 
closely a perfect subset relation is approximated” (Ragin, 2008b: 44). The overall 
solution consistency (0.88) as well as all consistency terms are above the mini-
mum 0.80 consistency recommended by Ragin (2008b). This result indicates that 
there is an appropriate correspondence between our empirical data and the set-
theoretic relationships captured in the solution terms. As indicated by the overall 
solution coverage, together all solutions account for approximately 42 percent of 
the fuzzy-membership values in the outcome. This scenario implies that almost 
half of the outcome is explained by the solution terms, comparable to other re-
search applying this method (Fiss, 2011; Jackson and Ni, 2013). 
 
In the following section, we give a detailed description of the four solution types 
our analysis revealed. These types show major differences regarding the level of 
environmental dynamism as well as the frequency and codification of higher-
order sensing, learning, and reconfiguring routines. Interestingly, all configura-
tions we found explicitly incorporated environmental dynamism (i.e., we found 
no solution where high environmental dynamism was a “don’t care” condition). 
In addition, we provide information on the organizations covered by each solu-
tion type. This information was collected as part of the overall research project. 
On the one hand, it refers to the organizations’ descriptive attributes (i.e., their 
age measured in years from firm founding until data collection in 2009; size, 
measured in number of employees; and changes in the level of vertical integra-
tion over the last five years). On the other hand, it captures assumptions about the 
importance and realization of process innovations within these organizations. To 
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measure the shared process innovation mind-set, we adapted a scale suggested by 
Jaworski and Kohli (1993). Survey respondents were asked whether they regard 
their organization “as an innovator in procurement standards vis-à-vis competi-
tors” and whether their organization “encourages the development of innovative 
procurement solutions.” The answers were rated on a Likert scale ranging from 1 
(fully disagree) to 5 (fully agree). The scale achieved a Cronbach’s alpha of .79. 
Table 2.2 depicts organizational attributes and shared process innovation mind-
set for each solution type by showing whether the median value for each solution 
corresponds to the overall median (○) or ranges below (--) or above (++), respec-
tively. 
 
Table 2.2: Descriptive Information on Organizations and Types of Dynamic Capabilities 
Dynamic Capabilities Type 
Overall 
Median 
Type 1 
Experiential 
Type 2 
Reactive 
Type 3 
Programmed 
Type 4 
Analytic 
 Rank Median Rank Median Rank Median Rank Median 
Organizational 
Attributes          
Age ○ 61.5 – – 51.24 ++ 77 + 64.5 61 
Size ○ 151.5 – – 98 + 180 ++ 220 147.5 
Vertical Integration – – 2.5 – 3 + 4 ○ 3.5 3.5 
Process Innovation 
Mind-set ++ 3 ○ 2.5 ++ 3 + 2.75 2.5 
 
2.4.1 Type 1: Experiential 
Solution 1 indicates that under high levels of environmental dynamism, non-
codified higher-order sensing, learning, and reconfiguring routines, in conjunc-
tion with a frequent execution of the reconfiguring routine, cause changes in the 
operating routine. More concretely, organizations covered by this solution type do 
not provide procurement staff with a clearly defined and codified procedure for 
how they should scan the environment for relevant changes, develop new ways to 
respond to such changes, and reorganize the existing procurement process in a 
proper way. Rather, procurement staff is given considerable leeway in the execu-
tion of higher-order sensing, learning, and reconfiguring routines, which can, in 
turn, be regarded as inherently flexible. While lacking codified procedures for the 
execution of higher-order routines, reconfiguring activities take place in a regular 
and frequent manner. Variations in the operating-procurement routine are pro-
posed and tested on at least a monthly basis. They may, for example, refer to a 
changed sequence of process steps in supplier search, the inclusion of supplier 
audits, or a switch from local to global supplier. 
 
Eight of our sample organizations are members of this “experiential”-type of dy-
namic capabilities. Compared to all organizations contributing to the typology, 
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these organizations are on average characterized by a medium age and slightly 
greater size. More concretely, the age of five organizations is below the average 
age of 61 years; three organizations are above average. Most of the organizations 
employ between 100 and 200 employees; two of them present outliers, employ-
ing almost 500 employees, which is per definition the upper limit as an SME 
(Günterberg and Wolter, 2003). All organizations lowered their level of vertical 
integration substantially during the last five years. Their lowered in-house pro-
duction is likely to increase the importance of their operating-procurement rou-
tine. Additionally, these organizations show a high level of process innovation 
mind-set. They consider process innovations to be of great importance and view 
themselves as innovators with regard to their procurement processes. 
 
The experiential-type set of higher-order routines resembles dynamic capabilities 
that are usually associated with highly dynamic environments (Eisenhardt and 
Martin, 2000). Such environments are characterized by a flow of opportunities 
and threats that is fast, complex, ambiguous, and unpredictable (Davis et al., 
2009). Therefore, change in operating routines is likely to be caused by higher-
order routines that are simple, experiential, and unstable (i.e., not codified) and 
rely on high rates of change proposals (i.e., frequent execution of the reconfigur-
ing routine). Such higher-order routines themselves are basically in flux 
(Schreyögg and Kliesch-Eberl, 2007) and only their regular and frequent execu-
tion distinguishes them from mere ad-hoc problem solving (Winter, 2003). 
 
The high frequency with which organizations with experiential-type dynamic 
capabilities probe variations to their operating routines is likely to keep them 
highly flexible. Qualitative research on new-product development (Brown and 
Eisenhardt, 1997) and strategic change (Gersick, 1994) revealed that the rhyth-
mic and frequent changes of a time-based pacing enabled organizations to check 
new solutions while at the same time preventing them from committing to obso-
lete ones. Both studies emphasize that time-pacing seems especially suitable in 
fast-changing environments because it creates regular and explicit opportunities 
to assess progress and implement adaptations. This built-in check prevents organ-
izations from missing novel opportunities and thus from becoming inert and mal-
adapted. Rather, high frequency scanning lays the groundwork for a proactive 
and experiential way of seizing novel opportunities in an environment that pro-
vides a diverse and high level of stimuli at a high rate. In the sample organiza-
tions, this proactive approach to routine change is consistent with and backed by 
high degree of process innovation mind-set. 
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The low levels of codification in their higher-order routines help highly dynamic 
organizations to cope with the complex and ambiguous stimuli—be they oppor-
tunities, challenges, or threats. Prior research has claimed (Eisenhardt and Mar-
tin, 2000) and demonstrated empirically (Brown and Eisenhardt, 1997) that high-
performing organizations counteract the challenges of environmental dynamism 
with less-structured processes. This scenario results because such environments 
do not demand well-defined solutions, but rather require broad and unspecified 
searches to identify a range of future options (Rowley, Behrens and Krackhardt, 
2000). Prestructured and codified higher-order routines are likely to confine 
searches, miss or misinterpret opportunities, and predetermine solution space. 
Instead, in highly dynamic environments, non-codified higher-order sensing, 
learning, and reconfiguring routines provide the flexibility needed to detect and 
react to the complex signals encouraging new solutions and necessitating change 
to operating routines. Organizations with low levels of size, age and vertical in-
tegration usually have less coordination requirements (cf. Meilich, 2000). Fur-
thermore, they often are characterized by little organizational slack. Therefore, 
such organizations may eschew costly codification. The experiential-type ap-
proach of little codification fits to these organizations’ comparatively small size 
and lowered levels of vertical integration. 
 
All in all, the high reconfiguration frequency and minimal codification of experi-
ential-type organizations’ higher-order routines supports an experiential way of 
proactively seeking out opportunities (underpinned by an innovative mindset) in 
a flexible way (consistent with younger, smaller, and less-vertically integrated 
firms), which fits to the velocity and complexity of environmental opportunities. 
2.4.2 Type 2: Reactive 
Solution 2 depicts another path to operating-routine change under high levels of 
environmental dynamism. Similar to the experiential type, sensing activities 
show little codification. In contrast to the experiential type, however, reconfigur-
ing activities are highly codified and all higher-order routines (sensing, learning, 
and reconfiguring) are only executed at low frequency. In these organizations, 
procurement staff engages in sensing activities between once a quarter and once a 
year. Learning and reconfiguring activities are temporally pooled and take place 
once a year. While sensing activities are not guided by prestructured codified 
procedures, procurement staff uses codified procedures for the reconfiguration of 
an existing procurement routine. Thus, instead of continuously generating and 
experimenting with new variations of their procurement routine—as is the case 
of the experiential types—this “reactive”-type seems to concentrate sensing, 
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learning, and reconfiguring efforts temporally and adjusts operating routines in a 
prestructured and efficient manner. 
 
We find five organizations belonging to the reactive-type solution. These organi-
zations are comparatively young and small. Four organizations are at or below 
the average of age and size. One organization is only slightly above the average 
age of 61 years. Four of them employ fewer than the average of 147 employees. 
These organizations have lowered their level of in-house production over the past 
five years, yet to a smaller extent than the experiential-type organizations. In con-
trast to experiential, reactive-type organizations view themselves as neither inno-
vative with regard to procurement standards nor as encouraging their members to 
develop innovative procurement solutions. Organizations that exhibit this config-
uration of higher-level routines are likely to change their operating routines at 
diligently planned episodes of change that “punctuate” otherwise stable operating 
routines (cf. Tushman and Romanelli, 1985). 
 
The low frequency in which higher-order sensing, learning, and reconfiguring 
routines are executed implies that these firms are unlikely to seize the various 
opportunities of dynamic environments in a timely manner. They are even less 
likely to set innovative standards that a time-paced approach yields (Gersick, 
1994; Posen, Lee and Yi, 2013). Still, this approach enables reactive-type organi-
zations to revise their operating routines from time to time and thus to catch up 
with existing industry standards. In these organizations reactive adaptation—in 
contrast to proactive opportunity seizing—is in line with comparatively low lev-
els of a shared process innovation mind-set. 
 
Codified reconfiguring routines support these reactive adaptations. The opportu-
nities of codification lie in their efficient way to produce predictable outcomes, 
because standardized processes provide a frame of reference and a foundation to 
organizational learning when changing the organizational resource base (Zollo 
and Singh, 2004). Codified reconfiguring routines cannot provide the flexibility 
needed to explore and experiment with complex and ambiguous environmental 
opportunities. Rather, their design helps to adopt changes in operating routines 
that proved worthwhile. The low-level codification of higher-order sensing rou-
tines might be of help in detecting such best practice solutions before implement-
ing them in an efficient prestructured manner. Moreover, low-level codification 
of sensing may also originate in efficiency strives. In a qualitative study on Ales-
si’s product development, Salvato (2009) mentions several reasons why less cod-
ification of search routines is superior to their deliberate prestructuring. One re-
fers to the opportunity cost of developing and maintaining prestructured routines, 
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which seems especially inefficient if, as in our case, higher-order sensing rou-
tines are applied infrequently. The relatively low levels of higher-order routine 
codification can—similar to the experiential type—be explained by their younger 
ages, smaller sizes, and lower levels of vertical integration, which usually in-
volves a scarce resource endowment and thus the need for efficient processes. 
Taken together, reactive-type dynamic capabilities allow for an efficient adoption 
of best practice solutions by infrequent sensing, learning and reconfiguring as 
well as a flexible search for such solutions and their efficient implementation. 
Efficient adoption corresponds to low levels of a process-innovating mind-set 
and the comparatively poor resource endowment of young and small organiza-
tions. 
2.4.3 Type 3: Programmed 
Solution 3a and 3b represent the last two explanatory paths incorporating high 
levels of environmental dynamism. In organizations exhibiting “programmed”-
type higher-level routines, change in operating routines is a result of higher-order 
routines that are frequently executed and highly codified. These organizations 
engage in a daily to weekly sensing of their environment to detect relevant 
changes and opportunities. Based on such scanning activities, they reengineer 
their operating procurement routines, resulting in monthly to quarterly shifts and 
adjustments. Their frequent sensing, reconfiguring, and (in part) learning activi-
ties are executed most efficiently by relying on detailed and codified operating 
procedures. The high execution frequency and extant codification suggests a pro-
grammed type of dynamic capabilities. 
 
Altogether, five organizations are members of the programmed-type set solution; 
solution 3a includes one organization, solution 3b encompasses four organiza-
tions. The organizations exhibiting programmed-type dynamic capabilities are 
comparatively older than the organizations exhibiting different types of dynamic 
capabilities, with some of them founded at the end of the nineteenth and the be-
ginning of the twentieth century. With regard to size, most of them employ be-
tween 100 and 300 employees. Thus, on average, they are much larger than or-
ganizations of the reactive type (solution 2) and also slightly larger than organi-
zations classified as experiential (solution 1). Similar to the experiential type, 
these organizations view themselves as innovative with regard to procurement 
standards and put a high emphasis on the development of novel procurement so-
lutions. However, in sharp contrast to the other solution types, organizations of 
the programmed-type expanded their level of vertical integration over the last 
five years; that is, they increased their reliance on in-house manufacturing sub-
stantially. 
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This notion of change seems closest to the process-oriented ideal type, which 
features patterned and systematic ways of dealing with highly dynamic environ-
ments as described in some parts of the literature on dynamic capabilities (Teece 
et al., 1997; Helfat and Peteraf, 2003). Here, change in operating routines results 
from an intentionally designed program, where the frequency by which the pro-
gram is executed is aligned with the degree of environmental dynamism that the 
organization faces. Similar to the experiential type, and with even greater conse-
quence for these organizations, the frequent sensing, learning, and reconfiguring 
allows seizing opportunities in a proactive way. The results are speedy changes 
in operating routines, which may set the pace for new standards and inventions. 
Their mode of proactive change is aligned closely to a high degree of process 
innovation mind-set, which is reflected in these organizations’ assumptions about 
themselves as process innovators vis-à-vis competitors. 
 
The high levels of codification support the efficient execution of higher-order 
routines. Standardized and prestructured processes provide a frame of reference 
to guide sensemaking and activity patterns when changing the organizational re-
source base (Zollo and Singh, 2004). This seems especially worthwhile when 
such activity patterns are executed at high frequency. However, some literature 
cautions against establishing prestructured and defined operations in highly dy-
namic environments. Codified higher-order routines entail the risk of producing 
inadequate solutions because they might miss environmental signals or over-
standardize proposed change solutions. Moreover, they produce linear adjust-
ments in an environment that requires and rewards non-linear changes 
(Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000; Schreyögg and Kliesch-Eberl, 2007). On the other 
hand, the organizations exhibiting high levels of codification in our sample are 
characterized by comparatively high levels of age, size and an increase in vertical 
integration. It is not surprising for older and larger firms to have prestructured 
and standardized operating procedures (cf. Meilich, 2000). Moreover, the expan-
sion of in-house manufacturing may provide these organizations with accumulat-
ed know-how regarding the efficient change of operating routines, which is ex-
plicated in codified operating procedures. Thus, programmed-type dynamic ca-
pabilities seem to build on and exploit the accumulated experience of older, larg-
er and vertically integrated organizations in executing efficient change in operat-
ing routines (Peteraf et al., 2013). In sum, the programmed type combines the 
efficient execution of higher-order routines found in large and experienced or-
ganizations with the proactive opportunity-seizing of innovative mind-sets. 
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2.4.4 Type 4: Analytic 
Solution 4 is the only solution incorporating “not high environmental dynamism” 
(i.e., less-dynamic industry environments). It therefore represents a completely 
different path to operating-routine change than the other types. More specifically, 
this solution suggests that under less-dynamic environmental conditions, changes 
in operating routines result from highly codified higher-order routines. Procure-
ment staff’s sensing, learning, and reconfiguring activities are guided by codified 
operating procedures prescribing the correct steps and sequences of scanning the 
environment for relevant changes, developing response patterns to such changes, 
and reconfiguring the existing procurement routine. While sensing and reconfig-
uring higher-order routines are seldom executed, the learning routine is run at 
high frequency, implying the frequent modification and enlargement of the or-
ganization’s knowledge based on experience accumulated within the organiza-
tion. We therefore termed this solution an “analytic” configuration of higher-
order routines. 
 
Two organizations are members of the analytic type. With regard to age, these 
organizations are around average. With regard to size, analytic-type organiza-
tions are slightly above average; they employ 140 and 300 employees, respec-
tively. With regard to change in vertical integration, these organizations show 
little adjustment over the last five years. Similar to the experiential and pro-
grammed type, these organizations emphasize process improvements and de-
scribe themselves as innovative with regard to the procurement standards preva-
lent in their industry. 
 
This analytic mode can also be found in conceptual arguments that underline the 
different forms yet similar value of dynamic capabilities for changing operating 
routines when environments are characterized by low dynamism (Eisenhardt and 
Martin, 2000). Low or moderately dynamic environments show more predictable 
changes that occur at a lower rate and extent. While some research questions the 
value of dynamic capabilities under these conditions (Teece et al., 1997; Drne-
vich and Kriauciunas, 2011), recent empirical findings showed that dynamic ca-
pabilities are beneficial under conditions of both high and low environmental 
dynamism (Protogerou et al., 2012). However, as each type of environment pre-
sents fundamentally different threats and opportunities to organizations, such 
findings suggest that the higher-order routines found in low-environmental dy-
namism differ from those in high-environmental dynamism (Winter, 2003; 
Laamanen and Wallin, 2009); that is, they are assumed to be “complicated, pre-
dictable, analytic processes that rely extensively on existing knowledge, linear 
execution and slow evolution over time” (Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000: 1113). 
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Low-execution frequency aligns sensing and reconfiguring with the lower change 
rates in less-dynamic environments, in which an adaptation mode to routine 
change is sufficient. The process innovativeness of analytic-type organizations 
shows that they are not resistant to changes, but rather that they choose an adap-
tive mode of change in line with the demands of their environment. Codified and 
structured higher-order routines present analytic tools that support incremental 
and efficient adjustments to an organization’s operating routines (Davis et al., 
2009). Similar to programmed type dynamic capabilities, analytic-type dynamic 
capabilities are found in organizations featuring high levels of age and size, po-
tentially facilitating the efficient execution of higher-order routines. In sum, the 
analytic type aligns closely with the demands of low environmental dynamism. 
Efficient adaptation is reflected by low execution frequency of sensing and re-
configuring and frequent learning (based on an above-average level of a process-
innovating mind-set) as well as high levels of codification (as characteristic of 
older and larger organizations). 
2.4.5 Findings for Absence of Change in Operating Routines 
While the conceptual literature on dynamic capabilities suggests an asymmetric 
understanding of the outcomes caused by dynamic capabilities (i.e., the absence 
of dynamic capabilities cannot be equated with the non-occurrence of change in 
operating routines [Winter, 2003; Helfat and Winter, 2011]), traditional statistical 
regression approaches imply such symmetry. As Fiss (2011) reiterates, while an-
alyzing the absence of the outcome is part of regression analysis due to the sym-
metry of relationships in such models, occurrence and non-occurrence of an out-
come are explained by the same model. For example, with logit models, the ex-
planation of failure is the inverse of success (Goertz and James, 2012). To further 
explore the potential causal asymmetry in dynamic capabilities, we also conduct-
ed fuzzy-set analyses modeling no operating routine change as an outcome. To 
conduct this analysis, we calibrated all cases (15 SMEs) exhibiting no change in 
their operating routine as full members of the dichotomous set no operating rou-
tine change, while all remaining cases exhibiting non-zero operating routine 
change were coded as full non-members of this set. In line with an asymmetric 
understanding of causality in dynamic capabilities, the consistency scores in the 
truth table for no operating routine change remained considerably below the ac-
ceptable level of 0.75 (cf. Ragin, 2000). The truth table row exhibiting the high-
est consistency score (0.29) contained four cases. Therefore, our data does not 
suggest any consistently identifiable set-theoretic relationship when no operating 
routine change is used as an outcome. While our analysis suggests different types 
of dynamic capabilities under specific environmental conditions as explanations 
of operating routine change, we find no configuration of dynamic capabilities and 
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environmental dynamism that consistently leads to no operating routine change. 
This result indicates that dynamic capabilities are inherently linked to change in 
operating routines. In the following section, we discuss how these types of dy-
namic capabilities fit with different approaches to operating-routine change under 
high and low levels of environmental dynamism. 
2.5 Discussion 
Our exploratory study uncovered and further explored four different types of dy-
namic capabilities exhibiting distinct characteristics and structures that equifinal-
ly cause change in operating routines. In doing so, our study advances our under-
standing of dynamic capabilities as a cause of operating-routine change. In the 
following discussion, we generalize our typology derived in the findings section 
into a tentative framework about how reactive, experiential, programmed and 
analytic types of dynamic capabilities align with different approaches to operat-
ing-routine change under high and low levels of environmental dynamism. This 
framework expands on the notion that the higher-order routines constituting dy-
namic capabilities differ in terms of codification and execution frequency. We 
argued that high levels of codification imply that the higher-order routines consti-
tuting dynamic capabilities are likely to exhibit a standardized and more efficien-
cy-driven approach towards operating routine change, while low levels of codifi-
cation imply that the dynamic capabilities offers a more flexible approach. Exe-
cuting routines of sensing, learning, and reconfiguring at a high frequency re-
sembles an approach of opportunity seeking, while a low-frequency approach is 
likely to lead to a more adaptive approach towards environmental dynamism. 
Furthermore, we argue that each approach to operating routine change emerges in 
different internal organizational contexts characterized by specific organizational 
attributes (i.e., age, size and changes in the level of vertical integration) and lev-
els of process innovation mind-sets. Figure 2.1 (high-dynamic environments) and 
Figure 2.2 (low-dynamic environments) situate each type of dynamic capabilities 
within this framework.9 
  
                                                 
9 Figures 2.1 and 2.2 are based on the original fuzzy-set data matrix and the solution terms depicted in 
Table 2.2. The position of each cluster within the matrix represents the average set-membership score in 
the codification and frequency conditions of all cases explained by the respective solution. The size of 
each cluster reflects the number of cases explained by the respective solution term. 
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Figure 2.1: Types of Dynamic Capabilities in High-dynamic Environments 
 
 
 
As Figure 2.1 depicts, organizations exhibiting experiential dynamic capabilities 
take an opportunity seeking approach towards their highly dynamic environ-
ments, emphasizing flexibility and openness in how operating routines are 
changed. This approach encompasses frequent experiments and little codifica-
tion, thereby broadening the organization’s exposure to diverse experiences. Ac-
cordingly, change in operating routines is likely to be of more exploratory nature, 
encompassing small experiments, “learning-by-doing” and attempts to act as a 
first mover in seizing environmental opportunities (cf. Pisano, 1994; Eisenhardt 
and Martin, 2000). In contrast, organizations featuring reactive dynamic capabili-
ties take an adaptive approach that puts less emphasis on flexibility and openness 
in how operating routines are changed. Under such a regime of higher-order rou-
tines, change in operating routines is likely to be more conservative, mostly 
drawing on and exploiting the experiences of other companies who lead the re-
spective process innovations. Finally, programmed dynamic capabilities empha-
size opportunity seeking and efficiency in higher order routines. Change in oper-
ating routines is likely to be of limited exploratory nature, encompassing frequent 
variations of similar patterns, suggesting attempts of linear and piecemeal ad-
justment to a highly dynamic environment. Interestingly, in high-dynamic envi-
ronments, we do not find a type of dynamic capabilities encompassing efficiency 
and adaptation. As Figure 2.2 below highlights, this quadrant is covered in low-
dynamic environments. 
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Figure 2.2: Type of Dynamic Capabilities in Low-dynamic Environments 
 
 
 
As Figure 2.2 demonstrates, organizations exhibiting analytic dynamic capabili-
ties take an adaptive approach towards their comparatively stable environments, 
emphasizing efficiency and narrow generation of own experience. Accordingly, 
change in operating routines is likely to be of highly conservative nature, devis-
ing well-developed and broadly tested change initiatives. Given such extensive 
“learning-before-doing” (Pisano, 1996: 1097) and limited exposure to explorato-
ry behavioral patterns, operating routine change will primarily encompass incre-
mental innovation and change to address slowly changing circumstances implied 
by low environmental dynamism. 
 
Finally, different internal organizational contexts characterized by specific organ-
izational attributes (i.e., age, size and changes in the level of vertical integration) 
and specific levels of a process innovation mind-set seem to foster different ap-
proaches to operating routine change. This finding is illustrated by the outer ar-
rows in Figures 2.1/2.2, which are based on the descriptive information provided 
in Table 2.2. It seems that the level of an organization’s process innovation mind-
set distinguishes between an adaptation and opportunity-seeking mode towards 
operating routine change. More concretely, the higher the level of process inno-
vation mind-set in an organization, the more likely is an opportunity-seeking ap-
proach. Furthermore, it seems that organizational attributes, such as age, size and 
changes in the level of vertical integration are aligned with a flexibility or effi-
ciency-oriented approach to operating routine change. While younger, smaller 
and disintegrating organizations are more likely to take a flexible stance towards 
routine change, older, larger and vertically integrating organizations are equipped 
with the resources and experience needed to follow an efficiency-approach. 
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2.6 Conclusion and Limitations 
Our contribution to the literature is threefold. First, we advance our understand-
ing of dynamic capabilities as a cause of operating-routine change by empirically 
uncovering four different types exhibiting distinct characteristics and structures. 
For example, while the experiential-type prevalent in high-dynamism environ-
ments focuses on seeking opportunities in a flexible manner, the analytic-type 
occurring in environments characterized by low dynamism relates to more adap-
tive operating-routine change. Against this backdrop, we sketch a framework to 
theorize the internal consistency of the different types of dynamic capabilities 
and their role in organizational stability and change. Second, our research also 
complements existing work on routine change that focuses on endogenous 
change (Pentland et al., 2011; Rerup and Feldman, 2011) and non-routine 
sources of change and novelty (Obstfeld, 2012) by exploring dynamic capabili-
ties as higher-order routines that lead to exogenous change in operating routines. 
Third, in revealing that our analysis does not find types of dynamic capabilities 
causing no-change in operating routines, we substantiate prior theoretical argu-
ments suggesting that dynamic capabilities are indeed a non-linear and non-
symmetric phenomenon, suggesting caution when applying analytical approaches 
that incorporate assumptions of symmetry. 
 
Despite the contribution of our study, we also have to acknowledge its limita-
tions, some of which might provide a fruitful starting point for future research. 
Comparable to other work applying fsQCA (e.g., Fiss, 2011), our analysis entails 
too few cases for each solution term to conduct further statistical analysis of our 
dynamic capabilities typology. While other qualitative studies on dynamic capa-
bilities or change in operating routines incorporate a comparable or smaller num-
ber of organizations (e.g., Brown and Eisenhardt, 1997; Rindova and Kotha, 
2001; Pentland and Feldman, 2008a), any generalizations drawn from our study 
should consider this limitation. We therefore call for future research to corrobo-
rate our findings. Similarly, while the engineering industry in Germany is con-
sidered highly dynamic, other industries face even higher levels of environmental 
dynamism, such as software and biotechnology industries. Therefore, researchers 
that want to replicate the typology derived in this chapter might expand the scope 
beyond the current empirical setting using a sample that includes these industries 
as well. Finally, while our research provides insight into the different ways lead-
ing to changes in operating routines, as presented by distinct types of dynamic 
capabilities, we cannot provide further evaluations of these types. Accordingly, 
our present research provides a fruitful foundation for future research to test the 
different implications each type of dynamic capabilities has for company perfor-
mance and a potential sustainable competitive advantage. 
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3 How Dynamic Capabilities Impact the 
Evolutionary and Technical Fitness of 
Operating Routines under High and Low 
Levels of Environmental Dynamism 
3.1 Introduction 
In recent years, research on strategic management has identified dynamic capa-
bilities as a driver of sustained competitive advantage. Dynamic capabilities ena-
ble companies to constantly adjust their operating routines and adapt to changing 
environmental demands, thus allowing them to outperform their competitors 
(Teece et al., 1997; Winter, 2003; Helfat et al., 2007). While this outcome may 
be true for some organizations, dynamic capabilities are unlikely to constitute a 
guarantor of success for every organization (Ambrosini and Bowman, 2009). De-
spite their undisputed performance-enhancing effects, the systematic investiga-
tion of the conditions under which dynamic capabilities lead to company success 
is still in its infancy (Easterby-Smith et al., 2009; Di Stefano et al., 2010; Vogel 
and Güttel, 2013). In particular, the impact of environmental dynamism on the 
performance effect of dynamic capabilities remains under-investigated (Wang 
and Ahmed, 2007; Barreto, 2010). Environmental dynamism can be defined in 
terms of frequency, magnitude, and irregularity of changes in competition, cus-
tomer preferences, and technology (Miller and Friesen, 1983; McCarthy et al., 
2010). High levels of environmental dynamism reflect conditions of uncertainty, 
unpredictability, and ambiguity, raising severe challenges for companies 
(Galbraith, 1973; Eisenhardt and Tabrizi, 1995). 
 
While the bulk of management research examines companies in highly dynamic 
environments, such as high-tech and IT industries (e.g., Deeds et al., 2000; Wu, 
2007; Bruni and Verona, 2009), the few studies that evaluate different environ-
mental circumstances have shown inconsistent performance effects. Some au-
thors find no moderating environmental effect on the potential performance im-
plications of dynamic capabilities (Drnevich and Kriauciunas, 2011; Protogerou 
et al., 2012), while others provide evidence for this relationship (Pavlou and El 
Sawy, 2006; Romme et al., 2010). Given that the progress of research on dynam-
ic capabilities is seriously hampered by such inconsistent findings in empirical 
research (Barreto, 2010; Vogel and Güttel, 2013), the different conditions of dy-
namic capabilities’ impact on operating-routine performance deserve investiga-
tion to resolve inconsistent research findings and provide guidance for practition-
ers. 
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In this study, we hypothesize and test the impact that dynamic capabilities have 
on two different performance yardsticks of operating routines under high versus 
low levels of environmental dynamism, namely the evolutionary fitness (i.e., 
goal achievement) and technical fitness (i.e., goal achievement in relation to un-
derlying costs). The findings reveal that dynamic capabilities increase the evolu-
tionary fitness of operating routines irrespective of environmental dynamism; 
however, the extent to which dynamic capabilities affect the technical fitness of 
operating routines, determined by the ratio between evolutionary improvements 
and underlying costs, differs considerably depending on environmental condi-
tions. These findings corroborate and extend prior conceptual arguments on the 
impact dynamic capabilities have on firm fitness (Teece et al., 1997; Winter, 
2003; Helfat et al., 2007; Helfat and Winter, 2011). 
3.2 Theory 
3.2.1 Dynamic Capabilities and their Activity Components 
Research on dynamic capabilities seeks to explain companies’ competitive ad-
vantages. In doing so, research on dynamic capabilities extends the resource-
based view (Teece et al., 1997; Helfat and Peteraf, 2003), which states that com-
panies can gain a sustained competitive advantage if the company’s resources are 
valuable, rare, inimitable, and non-substitutable (Penrose, 1959; Wernerfelt, 
1984; Barney, 1991). However, in order to build and maintain enduring competi-
tive advantages, the exploitation of such resources is insufficient because compe-
tition between companies usually erodes the value of resources over time (Teece, 
2007). Dynamic capabilities address this critique. This concept describes and 
explains how companies can build and maintain a sustained competitive ad-
vantage in changing environments. 
 
Within the literature, specific organizational meta-routines (i.e., recurring action 
patterns allowing for a competitively adequate adjustment of a company’s operat-
ing routines) constitute such dynamic capabilities (Collis, 1994; Szulanski, 1996; 
Dosi et al., 2000). While operating routines are geared towards the operational 
functioning of a company and thus describe the way a company earns profits, 
dynamic capabilities encompass meta-routines that are used to create, extend, 
and/or modify these routines (Winter, 2003). Accordingly, this chapter defines 
dynamic capabilities as meta-routines designed to improve a company’s operat-
ing routines by renewing or modifying them. Although we find different concep-
tualizations of the meta-routines that constitute dynamic capabilities in the litera-
ture (Barreto, 2010; Vogel and Güttel, 2013), the most-widely used conceptual-
ization is based on the theoretical work of Teece and Pisano (1994) (Peteraf et 
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al., 2013). This work describes higher-order sensing, learning/seizing, and recon-
figuration/transformation routines as constitutive activities of dynamic capabili-
ties (for a detailed description, see also Teece [2007]). We build on these authors 
and conceptualize dynamic capabilities as manifestations of three regularly recur-
ring activity components: (1) sensing—scanning activities directed towards ob-
serving the environment and identifying relevant changes; (2) learning—
developing new ways of responding to observed environmental changes; and (3) 
reconfiguring—reorganizing existing operating routines. 
3.2.2 Effects of Dynamic Capabilities on Operating Routines 
A meta-analysis by Barreto (2010) shows that the great majority of empirical 
studies substantiate the positive performance effects of dynamic capabilities. Re-
cent studies have shown that dynamic capabilities do not directly lead to an en-
hancement of competitiveness, but instead have an indirect effect by enhancing 
the performance of operating routines (Protogerou et al., 2012). Accordingly, 
recent research measures the effect of dynamic capabilities on operating routines 
of companies (Ray, Barney and Muhanna, 2004; Drnevich and Kriauciunas, 
2011; Protogerou et al., 2012). While these approaches succeed in reducing noisy 
influences that affect the impact of dynamic capabilities, the measures of perfor-
mance in these studies still differ considerably. 
 
Some studies employ evolutionary-fitness measures as yardsticks of routine per-
formance. Evolutionary fitness captures “how well a dynamic capability enables 
an organization to make a living by creating, extending or modifying its resource 
base” (Helfat et al., 2007: 7). These studies examine the effects of dynamic capa-
bilities with respect to the degree that operating routines contribute to goal 
achievement. For example, in their qualitative analysis of the companies Yahoo! 
and Exite, Rindova & Kotha (2001) demonstrate that these companies were able 
to implement organizational changes more effectively than did their competitors 
as a result of employing dynamic capabilities. 
 
Other researchers use technical fitness as yardstick for measuring operating-
routine performance. Technical fitness captures how well a routine “[…] per-
forms its intended function when normalized (divided) by its cost” (Helfat et al., 
2007: 7). Such studies focus on the effect of dynamic capabilities by comparing 
goal achievement with efforts taken (Zott, 2003). A few studies include both evo-
lutionary- and technical-fitness measures but do not conduct a separate analysis 
of evolutionary and technical fitness. Drnevich & Kriauciunas (2011), for exam-
ple, combine several items measuring operating-routine effectiveness and effi-
ciency into a single, integrated performance measure (relative firm performance 
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at the process level); as such, due to their generalized performance measurement, 
the separate effects of dynamic capabilities on evolutionary and technical fitness 
are not evaluable in their study. While these studies in general show a positive 
effect of dynamic capabilities, research remains ambiguous on exactly whether 
and when dynamic capabilities impact the evolutionary and/or technical fitness of 
operating routines. 
3.2.3 Dynamic Capabilities and Environmental Dynamism 
Although dynamic capabilities are said to generally enhance organizational fit-
ness, these performance effects are unlikely to occur for every organization in 
every industry environment (Winter, 2003). Rather, the effects of dynamic capa-
bilities seem to depend on the environmental dynamism which the respective or-
ganizations face (Zahra, Sapienza and Davidsson, 2006; Romme et al., 2010). 
Environmental dynamism includes the external changes an organization encoun-
ters—for example, changes in competition, customer preferences, technology, 
products, and/or changes in legislation (Porter, 1998; McCarthy et al., 2010). 
Hence, industries with rapidly changing environments are characterized by high 
innovation rates (an indicator of product changes) and high R&D expenditures 
(an indicator of technology changes) (Child, 1972; McCarthy and Gordon, 2010). 
Organizations that operate within such high-dynamic environments are therefore 
confronted with uncertainty and ambiguity. Such organizations face the problem 
of adjusting, renewing, and reconfiguring their resource base to respond to 
changing environmental conditions (Teece et al., 1997; Drnevich and Kriauciu-
nas, 2011). In contrast, organizations facing a lower level of environmental dy-
namism do not have to adjust their resources so frequently. Therefore, one might 
expect little or no competitive advantage from dynamic capabilities in organiza-
tions with a low level of environmental dynamism (Augier and Teece, 2009; Bar-
rales-Molina, Bustinza and Gutiérrez-Gutiérrez, 2013). 
 
To date, few studies have tested this low-level environmental dynamism relation-
ship (Wang and Ahmed, 2007; Barreto, 2010; Peteraf et al., 2013). On the organ-
izational level, Fang & Zou (2009) and Wu (2010) demonstrate that dynamic ca-
pabilities can lead to financial success and competitive advantages for organiza-
tions operating under low levels of environmental dynamism, but these two ef-
fects are greater for organizations operating under high levels of environmental 
dynamism. Similarly, Drnevich & Kriauciunas (2011) were able to show a mod-
erating effect of the environmental dynamism on the organizational success po-
tential of companies incorporating dynamic capabilities. On the level of operat-
ing routines, Pavlou and El Sawy (2006) also report a moderating effect of envi-
ronmental dynamism. In contrast, Drnevich & Kriauciunas (2011) could not con-
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firm this effect on operating routines. Similarly, Protogerou et al. (2012) find that 
dynamic capabilities positively impact operating routines as well as overall firm 
performance even in less-dynamic environments, indicating their important role 
irrespective of environmental conditions. Such inconsistent findings indicate a 
need for further studies illuminating the role of environmental dynamism. 
3.3 Hypotheses 
3.3.1 Dynamic Capabilities and the Evolutionary Fitness of Operating 
Routines under High versus Low Levels of Environmental Dynamism 
Operating routine evolutionary fitness refers to achieving operative goals and 
comprises outcomes such as the quality and innovativeness of products or cus-
tomer service quality (Ray et al., 2004; Pavlou and El Sawy, 2006; Helfat et al., 
2007). Dynamic capabilities are expected to enhance the evolutionary fitness of 
operating routines by enabling companies to better detect and take advantage of 
opportunities and threats vis-à-vis their competitors. Companies that employ dy-
namic capabilities execute regular and recurring sensing activities to help them 
more quickly detect and evaluate opportunities and threats in their environment 
than their competitors do (Drnevich and Kriauciunas, 2011). Employing system-
atic sensing activities, companies may discover new and technically significant 
opportunities, uncover latent demand, detect early the moves of both suppliers 
and competitors, and identify risks in a timely manner. While dynamic capabili-
ties not only help companies to identify upcoming opportunities and threats, in-
dicating whether and how to enhance the outcome of their operating routines, 
they also allow firms to implement adequate responses and thereby enhance the 
outcome of their operating routines. By employing organizational learning prac-
tices, companies can develop and evaluate new response patterns. As a way of 
evaluating opportunities and threats, dynamic capabilities expand the potential 
actions a company can take. Thus, companies can better generate adequate re-
sponses and in turn better achieve operating routine’s goals (Helfat et al., 2007). 
Further, as an integral component of dynamic capabilities, reconfiguring activi-
ties imply that companies have access to and can provide the required resources 
if adequate solutions need to be implemented to adjust their operating routines to 
new conditions (Teece et al., 1997). In sum, dynamic capabilities contribute to an 
evolutionary adjustment of existing operating routines, preparing the company 
for changing environmental conditions by way of sensing environmental condi-
tions, learning response patterns, and reconfiguring operating routines. Utilizing 
dynamic capabilities therefore increases the evolutionary fitness of operating rou-
tines. 
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This assertion should be qualified, however. Organizations in low-dynamic envi-
ronments seem to benefit less from the development and maintenance of dynamic 
capabilities than do organizations in dynamic industries. In stable industries, en-
vironmental conditions change more slowly and goals stay in place for compara-
tively longer time frames. Therefore the necessity of adjustments in an organiza-
tion’s operating routines is lower than it is in dynamic environments (Davis et al., 
2009). In contrast, environmental dynamism is likely to evoke discrepancies be-
tween existing routines and competitive requirements (Fredrickson and Mitchell, 
1984). At the same time, dynamic environments afford more opportunities and 
options for developing existing operating routines. Thus, while creating the ne-
cessity to adjust operating routines, dynamic environments also bear potential to 
address these necessities. In this situation, dynamic capabilities function as op-
tions that offer the ability to detect and make use of the opportunities the envi-
ronment creates (Pavlou and El Sawy, 2011). By using dynamic capabilities, or-
ganizations in dynamic environments can pursue business opportunities and mit-
igate threats, expand their respective possibilities for action, and adjust their ac-
tual resource configuration more goal-oriented than can organizations in stable 
environments. Hence, the change in evolutionary fitness of the underlying rou-
tine would be greater in the former than in the latter. 
 
Hypothesis 1: Environmental dynamism positively moderates the relationship 
between dynamic capabilities and the evolutionary fitness (i.e., the goal 
achievement) of operating routines. 
3.3.2 Dynamic Capabilities and Technical Fitness of Operating Routines 
under High versus Low Levels of Environmental Dynamism 
Improvements in the evolutionary fitness of operating routines do not necessarily 
imply an enhancement of the technical fitness of operating routines. This circum-
stance results because a better achievement of qualitative routine goals may incur 
costs that are out of proportion to their evolutionary benefits (Helfat et al., 2007). 
For example, companies could achieve more-demanding operating-routine goals 
by simply devoting more labor and IT resources to the routine (inducing func-
tional costs) or by allowing for short-term changes and ad-hoc problem solving 
(inducing adaptation costs). Accordingly, in the literature, the technical fitness of 
operating routines relates to measures such as time-to-market at a low cost (cf. 
Pavlou and El Sawy, 2011). Dynamic capabilities should enhance the technical 
fitness of operating routines by both optimizing operating routines (thus enhanc-
ing functional technical fitness) and making them more flexible in response to 
unexpected changes (thus enhancing adaptive technical fitness). 
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Functional technical fitness is driven by the optimization of operating routines 
through continuous sensing, learning, and reconfiguring activities (in spite of the 
costs these activities themselves invoke), which implies economizing on func-
tional costs for labor and IT without sacrificing overall operating routine goals. If 
dynamic capabilities are to result in enhanced functional technical fitness’ of op-
erating routines via routine optimization, their benefits must be greater than all 
resulting functional costs (Barreto, 2010). Functional costs include the costs for 
the operating routine as well as the implementation and maintenance of dynamic 
capabilities. On the one hand, costs for labor and IT come about because the op-
erating routine itself is costly. On the other hand, the development, maintenance, 
and use of dynamic capabilities generates costs within a company (Winter, 2003; 
Ambrosini and Bowman, 2009). More specifically, sensing activities result in 
search costs (Zott, 2003); learning activities are costly because companies must 
process and codify experience and solution patterns (Zollo and Winter, 2002); 
reconfiguring activities transfer abstract response patterns into actual change ac-
tivities inducing change costs as well as opportunity costs for business interrup-
tion (Zahra et al., 2006). 
 
The literature on dynamic capabilities points to an overall positive performance 
effect—meaning the benefits of dynamic capabilities should exceed all resulting 
functional costs (Barreto, 2010). Dynamic capabilities help to save resources 
within operating routines and therefore decrease functional routine costs 
(Aragón-Correa and Sharma, 2003). For example, sensing and adopting new 
manufacturing technologies can streamline and accelerate operating routines. 
This reconfiguration releases labor capacity and thereby reduces functional oper-
ating routine costs (Eakin, 2002). Similarly, regular learning activities broaden 
the scope for redesigning company routines and thus provide hints and solution 
for optimizing existing operating routines (Romme et al., 2010). With regard to 
costs for developing and maintaining dynamic capabilities, one can state that 
once established within a company, dynamic capabilities encourage continuous 
routine optimization and reorganization to enhance goal achievement (Zollo and 
Winter, 2002). Therefore, the economic benefits should outweigh the setup and 
maintenance costs of dynamic capabilities. In sum, dynamic capabilities should 
not only enhance the evolutionary fitness of routines but also increase technical 
fitness of operating routines, even when the costs for employing dynamic capa-
bilities are taken into account. 
 
However, because of the high maintenance costs and limited effect in environ-
ments exhibiting low dynamism, dynamic capabilities contribute less to the func-
tional technical fitness under low levels of environmental dynamism (Aragón-
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Correa and Sharma, 2003). High levels of environmental dynamism generate a 
comparatively high erosion of competitive advantages, quickly reducing the val-
ue contribution of existing operating routines (Winter, 2003). Therefore, main-
taining dynamic capabilities is especially profitable for organizations in dynamic 
environments that have to frequently adjust their operating routines (Barreto, 
2010). 
 
Hypothesis 2: Environmental dynamism positively moderates the relationship 
between dynamic capabilities and the functional technical fitness of operating 
routines. 
 
Adaptive technical fitness is driven by the flexibilization of operating routines 
through continuous sensing, learning, and reconfiguring activities. An operating 
routines’ adaptive technical fitness is negatively affected by costs that may arise 
due to unexpected additional costs for short-term changes and ad-hoc problem 
solving (Winter, 2003). Routine flexibilization implies that keeping or enhancing 
operating routine goals does not increase such unexpected ad-hoc costs. Rather, 
through regular sensing, learning, and reconfiguring, dynamic capabilities make 
operating routines more flexible and thus help companies reduce or even avoid 
ad-hoc costs. This setup may result in enhanced adaptive technical fitness of op-
erating routines. 
 
Dynamic capabilities aim to identify opportunities for an organization at an early 
stage, foster the learning of appropriate responses, and drive the reconfiguration 
of operating routines. If organizations do not continuously exercise sensing, 
learning, and reconfiguring activities, they might be more prone to overlook op-
portunities or identify important changes too late and may therefore not react, or 
at least not adequately, to these changes (Teece, 2007). Conversely, dynamic ca-
pabilities can contribute to decreasing ad-hoc costs for reactions to unscheduled 
changes, as regular sensing detects early signals to unexpected changes, learning 
facilitates response patterns and provides alternative solutions in case of failures, 
and reconfiguring enables the prompt yet systematic implementation of such so-
lutions. Accordingly, the activity components of dynamic capabilities may enable 
the necessary flexibility to react to unexpected events. In doing so, cost-
intensive, ad-hoc problem solving and firefighting can be avoided, increasing the 
adaptive technical fitness of operating routines. 
 
The value of dynamic capabilities for enhancing adaptive technical fitness seems 
especially relevant for organizations in highly dynamic environments. Due to 
environmental change requirements such organizations are in danger of falling 
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back to costly ad-hoc solutions unless they use dynamic capabilities to keep their 
processes flexible. In contrast, under conditions of low levels of environmental 
dynamism in which change requirements are low, dynamic capabilities may lead 
to inadequate changes (Teece et al., 1997). Inadequate changes of operating rou-
tines imply suboptimal resource allocations that lower the adaptive technical fit-
ness of operating routines. While lowering costs for ad-hoc solutions, inadequate 
or unnecessary changes of operating routines also put the achievement of routine 
goals at risk. Given low levels of environmental dynamism, costly yet infrequent 
ad-hoc solutions are therefore likely to lead to better operating-routine results and 
thus adaptive technical fitness of operating routines (Winter, 2003). Altogether, 
one can assume that the higher the environmental dynamism within an industry, 
the stronger the impact dynamic capabilities have on the adaptive technical fit-
ness of operating routines. 
 
Hypothesis 3: Environmental dynamism positively moderates the relationship 
between dynamic capabilities and adaptive technical fitness of operating routines. 
3.4 Sample and Method 
3.4.1 Sample Selection and Description 
We conducted a quantitative survey using the purchasing routines in small- and 
medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) in three German industrial sectors—
engineering, rubber and plastics, and paper processing (see also: Schlömer, 2011; 
Schlömer et al., 2013). For several reasons, the empirical setting of industrial 
SMEs and their purchasing routines seems particularly suited to address this 
study’s research interest. In an SME, dynamic capabilities are likely to be of high 
relevance for firm survival and success (Sawers et al., 2008). SMEs usually have 
scarce resource endowments when compared to large organizations. In order for 
SMEs to survive, it is critical that they efficiently use and develop their resource 
base, (Pressey et al., 2009), turning dynamic capabilities into a key driver of 
SME success. 
 
The purchasing routine represents a particularly important operating routine in 
SMEs because today’s firms tend to reduce their level of in-house value creation 
(Zheng et al., 2007). This circumstance makes the investment in costly dynamic 
capabilities both profitable and crucial for firms that want to enhance the perfor-
mance of their purchasing routines. Furthermore, focusing on purchasing routines 
allows for a close alignment between the activity patterns of dynamic capabilities 
and their fitness effects, thereby enhancing the validity of causal attributions be-
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tween dynamic capabilities and their effects, as well as addressing some meas-
urement shortcomings of prior dynamic capabilities research (Zahra et al., 2006). 
 
To promote awareness of our survey, we sent a formal invitation letter with login 
details for an online questionnaire to each SME employing at least 40 people in 
the selected industries in Germany (5,152 in total). Following our initial mailing, 
632 companies (12.3%) logged into the survey site. Following emailed follow-
ups and telephone calls, 200 SMEs returned completed questionnaires that con-
tained less than ten percent missing values. To avoid data loss due to missing 
values, we employed mean substitution (Roth, 1994; Lemieux and McAlister, 
2005). The final sample captures about four percent of the total population in 
Germany and is representative in terms of firm size and industry composition. 
The majority of sampled firms (89.5%) employ between 50 and 499 people, with 
an average of 4.09 people working in a purchasing function (SD = 3.87). 
 
To capture the multiple characteristics of environmental dynamism, we relied on 
constructs to measure R&D expenditure, sales generated with product innova-
tions, and successful completion of innovation projects (Child, 1972; McCarthy 
et al., 2010). In line with prior studies on environmental dynamism and dynamic 
capabilities (Pavlou and El Sawy, 2011; Protogerou et al., 2012), these measures 
capture changes in competition, customer preferences, and technology, which 
imply conditions of uncertainty and unpredictability for the company. In order to 
distinguish and compare results from highly dynamic and less-dynamic indus-
tries, the sample was split into two groups. The first group (120 respondents) 
consists of SMEs operating in the German engineering industry, which represents 
a highly dynamic environment according to the above-mentioned criteria when 
compared to the average of all German manufacturing industries. Engineering 
SMEs in Germany traditionally face “fierce competition between a small number 
of firms which do not want to set their market position at risk […]” (Grotz and 
Braun, 1997: 548). Over the last years, engineering has ranked among the top 
four manufacturing industries in Germany in terms of R&D expenditure, sales 
generated with product innovations, and successful completion of innovation 
projects (Statistisches Bundesamt, 2010; ZEW, 2013). The second group (80 re-
spondents) is characterized by comparatively low levels of environmental dyna-
mism according to the above-mentioned criteria; it ranks well below the average 
of all German manufacturing industries (Statistisches Bundesamt, 2010; ZEW, 
2013). It contains firms from the plastics, rubber, and paper-processing indus-
tries. Companies from these industries usually devote fewer resources to R&D 
and their sales volumes are less dependent on product innovation and the suc-
cessful completion of innovation projects than engineering companies. 
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3.4.2 Survey Development 
We developed a standardized written questionnaire to obtain information about 
the organization, its procurement routine, and its use of dynamic capabilities 
(Schlömer et al., 2013). Following the design of earlier studies, the companies’ 
top managers served as key informants (cf. Danneels, 2008). More specifically, 
we considered the head of the procurement department to be the most-
knowledgeable informant, responsible for the procurement department’s routines 
and possessing in-depth knowledge about the performance of the department. 
 
In order to avoid key-informant bias, we adopted a number of procedural reme-
dies when developing the survey (Podsakoff et al., 2003). In a preliminary quali-
tative study, we thoroughly pre-tested the survey in order to refine questions and 
constructs and to gain valid items and reliable scales, thus avoiding ambiguity 
and vagueness in the final questionnaire (Tourangeau et al., 2000). This study 
entailed interviews with purchasing managers and general managers from 11 
SMEs from the three industries later surveyed. In these interviews, we employed 
a think-aloud protocol to receive structured feedback on the validity and compre-
hensibility of the questionnaire (Sudman et al., 2010). The protocol allowed us to 
substantially refine the questionnaire across interview rounds. To further guard 
against key-informant and social desirability biases, the respondents were guar-
anteed strict confidentiality, asked to answer the questions as honestly as possi-
ble, and reminded that the questions being asked had neither right nor wrong an-
swers. Also, the measures of the independent and dependent variables were spa-
tially and methodologically separated (Podsakoff et al., 2003). For these reasons, 
we feel confident that the respondents provided reliable data on the variables 
gathered in this study. 
3.4.3 Measures 
In developing the items and scales for the measurement of the focal concept, we 
used existing measures, scales, and items wherever possible. However, only a 
limited number of prior empirical studies on dynamic capabilities proved suitable 
(e.g., Newey and Zahra, 2009; Prieto, Revilla and Rodríguez-Prado, 2009). 
Therefore, we decided to integrate existing items from related research contexts 
and adapt them to the concept of dynamic capabilities. The present inquiry also 
has to account for possible time lags between the introduction of dynamic capa-
bilities (independent variables) and their fitness effects (dependent variables) 
(Ambrosini and Bowman, 2009). In line with recommendations of Drnevich and 
Kriauciunas (2011), measures of the independent variables were set retrospec-
tively to the year 2005; that is, five years before the survey was conducted. The 
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dependent variables were measured as an average annual rate of change over the 
last five years (2005 to 2009). 
 
Independent Variables. By focusing on the three observable dynamic capabili-
ties manifestations of higher-order sensing, learning, and reconfiguring routines, 
our study is able to describe and measure dynamic capabilities straightforwardly. 
In order to capture their procedural and recurring character, we relied on items 
proposed by Hambrick (1981) as well as Pfeffer and Leblebici (1973) in their 
empirical studies on organizational routines and activity patterns. However, since 
these items do not originate from the dynamic capabilities literature, they were 
reformulated in order to fit each of the three dynamic capabilities components. 
The reformulations and adaptations were guided by the current dynamic capabili-
ties literature (e.g., Ettlie and Pavlou, 2006; Newey and Zahra, 2009). In order to 
provide survey respondents with a clear understanding of this study’s conceptual 
position, we described each of the three components in managerial language. In 
total, this survey measured dynamic capabilities with six items: The first three 
items relate to the frequency with which each of the three activity components 
(i.e., sensing, learning, and reconfiguring) was executed by the purchasing de-
partment five years ago (daily, weekly, monthly, once a quarter, once a year). 
The remaining three items focused on the percentage of average monthly work-
ing hours the department spent on the execution of sensing, learning, and recon-
figuring activities, and thus enabled us to calculate the average daily working 
hours. Our extensive pre-test showed that procurement department managers are 
able to look into and regularly draw on objective archival data, such as procure-
ment controlling reports, when answering these questions. Based on these 
measures, a multiplicative index (working days per year × working hours per day 
= working hours per year) for each of the three components that manifest dynam-
ic capabilities is calculated. This calculation was done in order to generate a valid 
estimate of the prevalence of dynamic capabilities components in the organiza-
tion based on the actual time spent per year on these activities in the specific pur-
chasing department. The values of these indices were skewed to the right—above 
acceptable limits. In order to use structural-equation modeling appropriately, the 
skewed distribution had to be corrected by applying a logarithmic transformation 
(West, Finch and Curran, 1995). 
 
Dependent Variables. Evolutionary fitness refers to goal achievement (Helfat et 
al., 2007). Therefore, we operationalize evolutionary fitness of operating routines 
as effectiveness; that is, the extent to which the operating routine achieves prede-
fined operational goals (Pavlou and El Sawy, 2006). Drawing on the current pur-
chasing literature, the survey measures effectiveness using three percentage-
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scaled items: to what extent orders arrived on time, to what extent they were the 
expected quality, and to what extent they contained the correct quantity (Shin, 
Collier and Wilson, 2000; Chen, Paulraj and Lado, 2004; Vaidyanathan and De-
varaj, 2008). 
 
In general terms, technical fitness refers to how well a routine performs its func-
tion (Helfat et al., 2007). Therefore, we operationalize technical fitness as operat-
ing-routine efficiency; that is, the ratio of effective output to input (Drucker, 
1967). These variables were measured indirectly by asking whether the surveyed 
firms changed their cost structure. To capture efficiency through routine optimi-
zation (functional technical fitness), we collected information on the average an-
nual percentage change in functional costs, including purchasing department 
costs such as labor, proportional IT, proportional accounting, and equipment 
costs. To capture the company’s efficiency in handling unexpected changes 
(adaptive technical fitness), the survey collected information on changes in costs 
for ad-hoc deliveries (e.g., short-notice changes in supplier’s delivery dates, air-
freight charges resulting from missing spare parts). The respondents were asked 
to answer these questions with respect to their most-important purchased articles 
as well as to discount for industry-wide cost changes. Given that we collected 
data on both operating-routine effectiveness and costs (functional and ad-hoc) 
using percentage scales, each respondent company may judge our scale using 
different baseline values. Therefore, calculating efficiency measures based on a 
ratio would have yielded an invalid efficiency metric. To avoid this validity issue, 
we calculated the functional technical fitness by using the difference between the 
values for effectiveness and functional costs, and the adaptive technical fitness by 
the difference between the values for effectiveness and ad-hoc costs. This trans-
formation provides a metric for efficiency with a symmetric distribution around 
zero and a foundation to derive statements about technical effectiveness—that is, 
the output in relation to the input (costs). 
 
Control variables. To control for other possible influences on the evolutionary 
and technical fitness of purchasing routine, five organization-related control vari-
ables were included in the model. Firm size (measured by the natural logarithm 
of the overall number of employees in relation to the natural logarithm of the 
purchasing departments’ number of employees) may have an impact on operating 
routine performance, since larger firms are more likely to realize economies of 
scale and scope and firm size might impact the evolutionary and technical fitness 
of the operating routine. Firm age (measured by the number of years from found-
ing to 2009) may influence operating routine performance because older firms 
are more experienced and therefore are expected to have more-elaborate operat-
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ing routines. Sales (measured by average annual percentage change in sales dur-
ing the firm’s previous five years) might have an effect on this study’s dependent 
variables because a high volatility in sales volume influences the workload, 
which in turn could have an impact on the evolutionary and technical fitness of 
purchasing routine. The membership and position within a group was measured 
as a dummy variable indicating on the one hand whether the organization is part 
of a conglomerate and on the other whether the company owns a subsidiary 
company. Both variables might impact routine performance because organiza-
tions belonging to a conglomerate or managing other companies can access more 
slack resources to enhance routine fitness than can single firms. 
 
In addition, the model includes six purchasing-related control variables. Purchas-
ing volume (measured by average annual percentage change during the previous 
five years) may influence the purchasing routine performance because firms with 
high purchasing volumes are more likely to realize economies of scale and scope. 
Procurement mode (measured by one survey item asking whether important parts 
are bought as single components or modules) might have an effect on the de-
pendent variables because procuring modules is likely to lower information and 
coordination effort, resulting in both more effective and efficient operating rou-
tine. Routinization of the purchasing routine (measured by two survey items ask-
ing about task variety and two items asking about task analyzability suggested by 
Withey et al. [1983]) might influence routine performance because routinization 
implies learning effects, which in turn leads to higher degrees of goal achieve-
ment (at a lower cost). Perceived relevance of purchasing in the organization 
(measured by a statement indicating whether the purchasing function makes an 
important contribution to organizational performance, which we then dummy-
coded around the mean value) might influence the dependent variables because a 
high level of perceived relevance implies that more resources are allocated to the 
purchasing department, enhancing its evolutionary or technical fitness. Job ten-
ure (measured by years on the job) controls for the respondent’s experience level, 
which may affect the validity of the information provided, since respondent expe-
rience relates to the ability to judge the effectiveness and efficiency of firms’ 
purchasing routine. Finally, vocational training (measured by changes in the pro-
curement department’s expenses for vocational training over the last five years, 
which we then dummy-coded around the mean value) increases the job-related 
skills of the employees. Therefore, vocational training might impact the effec-
tiveness of the procurement routine while also influencing the department’s cost 
structure. 
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3.4.4 Validity and Reliability of Measures 
We conducted principal-component factor analyses for all independent and de-
pendent variables to test for convergent validity of the multi-item constructs. 
Standardized factor loadings for all tested items are above the recommended 
minimum of 0.40, except for one item measuring evolutionary fitness (deliveries 
received on-time), which was thereafter excluded from the analysis (Ford, Mac-
Callum and Tait, 1986). The remaining standardized factor loadings of the items 
are close to or above 0.80. Average variances extracted by the factors are all 
above the recommended minimum of 0.50 (Fornell and Larcker, 1981). 
Cronbach’s alpha is above the recommended minimum of .70 for all constructs 
except for evolutionary fitness (.66) which is, however, still within acceptable 
limits (see Pedhazur and Schmelkin, 1991). Discriminant validity of the con-
structs was tested by determining whether the average variance extracted from 
each construct is higher than the squared correlation between the constructs 
(Fornell and Larcker, 1981). All constructs demonstrate discriminant validity. 
Furthermore, the self-reported measures were cross-validated with data from sec-
ond informants and archival data. These additional validations did not reveal any 
errors in our survey data. We checked for possible non-response bias by employ-
ing an Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) to test for significant differences between 
early and late respondents (cf. Jansen et al., 2012). The assumption is that late 
respondents are more similar to non-respondents than to early respondents 
(Armstrong and Overton, 1977). The ANOVA did not reveal any significant dif-
ference between these two groups for all variables used in our model, indicating 
that non-response bias was not a problem in this study. Overall, the constructs of 
this study demonstrate reliability and validity. 
 
Finally, we controlled for common-method variance with Harman’s one-factor 
test (Podsakoff and Organ, 1986). Conducting exploratory principal-component 
factor analysis of all items in the hypothesized model resulted in ten factors ex-
plaining 68 percent of the variance (12 percent was the largest variance explained 
by one factor). Dependent and independent variables loaded on different factors; 
therefore, common-method variance is unlikely to be a problem. Overall, these 
measures suggest satisfactory psychometric properties of the data. 
3.4.5 Analytical Approach 
We tested our hypothesis by means of structural-equation modeling using maxi-
mum-likelihood estimation. Structural-equation modeling is the appropriate 
methodology to test models incorporating latent variables, such as dynamic ca-
pabilities. While correlations among predictors of such latent constructs may 
cause problems in regression analysis, structural-equation modeling explicitly 
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accounts for such correlations. By using structural-equation modeling, we are 
able to simultaneously incorporate observed and latent constructs into the model 
and account for the potential biases due to random measurement error in the la-
tent constructs. Due to these advantages, structural-equation modeling has been 
used extensively in quantitative dynamic capabilities research (e.g., Song et al., 
2005; Protogerou et al., 2012; Barrales-Molina et al., 2013). 
 
Principal-component factor analyses were used to extract factors for the con-
structs. On this basis, we calculated indices for the dependent variables. At first, 
all control variables were included in the path model. The model also specifies 
paths between evolutionary and technical fitness, since these variables may be 
interrelated. Accordingly, the covariances between evolutionary fitness and the 
two variables measuring technical fitness (functional technical fitness and adap-
tive technical fitness) are included in the present model. In the course of post-hoc 
analyses, we omitted control variables which had no effect on the dependent var-
iables (Byrne, 2010). We also included covariances among firm age, firm size, 
sales, relevance of purchasing, and vocational training as these measures usually 
correlate. This procedure did not change the significance and direction of the es-
timates, but slightly enhanced the fit of our model. In a first analytical step, we 
estimated a baseline model (Model I). In a second step, a model to test our hy-
potheses was estimated. In line with methodological recommendations (Wegener 
and Fabrigar, 2000) and prior empirical research (Protogerou et al., 2012; Bar-
rales-Molina et al., 2013), we conducted a sample split to compare results for 
high versus low levels of environmental dynamism (Model II). 
3.5 Results 
Table 3.1 depicts means, standard deviations and correlations between the varia-
bles used in our model. Table 3.2 reports the parameter estimates for the main 
and the control variables for the baseline model based on the overall sample 
(Model I). Figures 3.1 and 3.2 report the results for high versus low levels of en-
vironmental dynamism (Model II). 
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Table 3.1: Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlations 
  Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1 Sensing 2.22 1.73         
2 Learning 1.12 1.14 .505**        
3 Reconfiguring .95 1.00 .459** .617**       
4 Firm Size -3.54 .67 -.088 -.074 -.129+      
5 Firm Age 51.24 37.74 .062 -.015 .021 -.127+     
6 Sales 5.09 10.66 .100 .036 -.011 -.100 -.164*    
7 Group: Subsidiary .33 .46 -.078 -.004 .062 -.081 .002 -.015   
8 Group: Conglomerate .44 .48 -.008 -.073 -.087 -.072 .128+ .127+ -.002  
9 Purchasing Volume 4.10 4.18 .106 .003 .085 -.124+ -.056 .402** .115 .050 
10 Procurement Mode .24 .40 -.037 -.049 -.115 .031 .000 .124+ .048 -.039 
11 Routinization 3.79 .89 -.026 -.120+ -.172* -.001 .012 .030 -.044 .077 
12 Relevance of Purchasing .60 .49 -.032 -.056 -.002 .038 .080 -.023 -.033 -.020 
13 Job Tenure 8.57 7.92 .082 .168* .123+ .149* .022 .005 -.183** -.050 
14 Vocational Training .34 .47 -.172* -.081 -.115 .073 .056 .070 .087 .059 
15 Evolutionary Fitness 2.67 2.68 .093 .154* .200** -.008 .153* -.043 .035 .029 
16 Technical Fitness (Functional) 2.72 6.23 .082 .105 .116 -.121+ .098 -.081 .083 .046 
17 Technical Fitness (Adaptive) 1.85 4.76 .052 .149* .102 -.036 .061 -.066 .037 -.002 
18 Environmental Dynamism .60 .49 -.129+ -.042 -.078 .306** -.042 -.018 -.010 .011 
Notes: N organizations = 200; ** p ≤ .01 (two-tailed); * p ≤ .05 (two-tailed); + p ≤ .10 (two-tailed). 
Table 3.1: Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlations (continued) 
  9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 
1 Sensing          
2 Learning          
3 Reconfiguring          
4 Firm Size          
5 Firm Age          
6 Sales          
7 Group: Subsidiary          
8 Group: Conglomerate          
9 Purchasing Volume          
10 Procurement Mode .084         
11 Routinization -.070 .008        
12 Relevance of Purchasing .121+ .025 -.023       
13 Job Tenure -.042 -.068 -.095 .204**      
14 Vocational Training .074 .167* .049 .112 .012     
15 Evolutionary Fitness .022 .007 -.045 .186** .114 .058    
16 Technical Fitness (Functional) .016 .037 -.025 .126+ .053 .119+ .621**   
17 Technical Fitness (Adaptive) .100 .037 -.004 .181* .090 .010 .659** .513**  
18 Environmental Dynamism -.031 .007 .075 .021 -.045 .069 -.016 .033 -.107 
 Notes: N organizations = 200; ** p ≤ .01 (two-tailed); * p ≤ .05 (two-tailed); + p ≤ .10 (two-tailed). 
 
As a preliminary result, this study finds that the three activity components of dy-
namic capabilities are positive and highly significant in relation to the latent con-
struct (see Table 3.2). This latent construct, representing dynamic capabilities, 
shows a positive and highly significant path coefficient to the evolutionary fit-
ness of operating routines (β = .25, p = .00). Furthermore, our baseline model 
provides evidence that dynamic capabilities are positively related to the function-
al technical fitness (β = .16, p = .03) and adaptive technical fitness (β = .18, p = 
.02) of operating routines, respectively. With regard to the control variables, re-
sults imply that they play a limited role in explaining both, evolutionary and 
technical (i.e., functional and adaptive) routine fitness. 
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Table 3.2: Baseline Structural Equation Modeling Results (Model I) 
Description of Path  Path Coefficient 
Sensing → Dynamic Capabilities .61*** 
Learning → Dynamic Capabilities .82*** 
Reconfiguring → Dynamic Capabilities .75*** 
Dynamic Capabilities → Evolutionary Fitness .25*** 
→ Technical Fitness (Functional) .16* 
→ Technical Fitness (Adaptive) .18* 
Firm Size → Evolutionary Fitness n.s. 
→ Technical Fitness (Functional) -.15* 
→ Technical Fitness (Adaptive) n.s. 
Firm Age → Evolutionary Fitness .11* 
→ Technical Fitness (Functional) n.s. 
→ Technical Fitness (Adaptive) n.s. 
Sales → Evolutionary Fitness n.s. 
→ Technical Fitness (Functional) -.11+ 
→ Technical Fitness (Adaptive) n.s. 
Group: Subsidiary → Evolutionary Fitness n.s. 
→ Technical Fitness (Functional) n.s. 
→ Technical Fitness (Adaptive) n.s. 
Group: Conglomerate → Evolutionary Fitness n.s. 
→ Technical Fitness (Functional) n.s. 
→ Technical Fitness (Adaptive) n.s. 
Purchasing Volume → Evolutionary Fitness n.s. 
→ Technical Fitness (Functional) n.s. 
→ Technical Fitness (Adaptive) n.s. 
Procurement Mode → Evolutionary Fitness n.s. 
→ Technical Fitness (Functional) n.s. 
→ Technical Fitness (Adaptive) n.s. 
Routinization → Evolutionary Fitness n.s. 
→ Technical Fitness (Functional) n.s. 
→ Technical Fitness (Adaptive) n.s. 
Relevance of Purchasing → Evolutionary Fitness .15* 
→ Technical Fitness (Functional) n.s. 
→ Technical Fitness (Adaptive) .19** 
Job Tenure → Evolutionary Fitness n.s. 
→ Technical Fitness (Functional) n.s. 
→ Technical Fitness (Adaptive) n.s. 
Vocational Training → Evolutionary Fitness n.s. 
→ Technical Fitness (Functional) .12* 
→ Technical Fitness (Adaptive) n.s. 
Notes: *** p ≤ .001 (two-tailed); ** p ≤ .01 (two-tailed); * p≤ .05 (two-tailed); + p ≤ .10 (two-tailed); 
 n.s.: not significant (two-tailed). 
 
To test the moderating effects of environmental dynamism, we applied a group 
split by using the existing dummy variable on environmental dynamism 
(Arbuckle, 2003). Before running the analysis, we tested the equivalence of our 
measurement model across the two groups (Williams, Edwards and Vandenberg, 
2003; Byrne, 2010; Hair et al., 2010). We found our measurement model to be 
invariant across groups (∆χ² [∆df] = 3.69 [2]; p = .16), allowing us to proceed 
with analyzing the moderation hypotheses based on the invariant measurement 
model (Song et al., 2005; Byrne, 2010). We analyzed the moderation hypotheses 
by comparing the path coefficients between the latent dynamic capabilities con-
struct and the dependent variables for high versus low levels of environmental 
dynamism (Bagozzi and Dholakia, 2006). 
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Hypothesis 1. Hypothesis 1 stated that dynamic capabilities are more likely to 
foster evolutionary fitness under conditions of high levels of environmental dy-
namism than they are under conditions of low levels of environmental dyna-
mism. As Figures 3.1 and 3.2 demonstrate, our analyses do not support this con-
jecture. While dynamic capabilities have a significant positive impact on evolu-
tionary fitness at high levels of environmental dynamism (β = .28, p = .01), they 
also significantly increase evolutionary routine fitness at low levels of environ-
mental dynamism (β = .22, p = .08). 
 
Figure 3.1: Structural Equation Modeling Results for High Levels of Environmental Dynamism 
(Model II) 
 
 Notes: This simplified version of the model omits invariant measurement model coefficients, error terms, control variables, 
  and covariances among the dependent variables. ** p ≤ .01 (two-tailed); * p≤ .05 (two-tailed). 
 
 
Figure 3.2: Structural Equation Modeling Results for Low Levels of Environmental Dynamism 
(Model II) 
 
 Notes: This simplified version of the model omits invariant measurement model coefficients, error terms, control variables, 
  and covariances among the dependent variables. + p≤ .10 (two-tailed); n.s.: not significant (two-tailed). 
 
Hypotheses 2 and 3. Hypothesis 2 posits a moderating effect of environmental 
dynamism with regard to functional technical fitness, while Hypothesis 3 propos-
es a moderating effect of environmental dynamism with regard to adaptive tech-
nical fitness. As Figures 3.1 and 3.2 demonstrate, our analyses do not find that 
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dynamic capabilities impact either the functional technical fitness (β = .12, p = 
.32) or the adaptive technical fitness (β = .09, p = .45) of operating routines at 
low levels of environmental dynamism. In contrast, under conditions of high en-
vironmental dynamism, dynamic capabilities show the expected impact on the 
functional technical fitness (β = .20, p = .04) and the adaptive technical fitness (β 
= .24, p = .05) of operating routines. The data thus fully support Hypotheses 2 
and 3. 
 
The fit of the baseline Model I and the split-sample Model II were assessed using 
goodness-of-fit statistics. To examine model fit, most literature suggests applying 
diverse goodness-of-fit statistics (Hair et al., 2010). Overall, based on the usual 
cut-off points (Browne and Cudeck, 1992; Hooper, Coughlan and Mullen, 2008), 
the fit indices for the models analyzed (as presented in Table 3.2 and Figures 
3.1/3.2) can be considered acceptable (see Table 3.3). 
 
Table 3.3: Model Statistics 
Model GFI IFI RMSEA Chi² d.f. Normed Chi² 
Model I: Overall Sample 0.94 0.88 0.09 84.97 35 2.42 
Model II: Subsamples 0.91 0.88 0.06 125.36 73 1.72 
3.6 Discussion 
This study provides a possible explanation for the inconclusive results docu-
mented in the existing literature with regard to environmental dynamism and the 
performance effects of dynamic capabilities. The findings suggest that the impact 
of environmental dynamism on the relationship between dynamic capabilities 
and operating-routine performance depends on whether the underlying costs of 
evolutionary gains are considered. More specifically, dynamic capabilities en-
hance evolutionary fitness of operating routines in both high and low levels of 
environmental dynamism. However, when the costs of increased evolutionary 
fitness are taken into account, environmental dynamism makes a difference. Un-
der low levels of environmental dynamism, dynamic capabilities seem of little 
value and accordingly show no impact on the technical fitness of operating rou-
tines, whereas under high levels of environmental dynamism they lead to higher 
technical fitness of operating routines. 
 
These findings question the general role of environmental dynamism as a neces-
sary precondition or constitutive element of dynamic capabilities (Teece et al., 
1997; Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000; Barreto, 2010) and also as a boundary condi-
tion (Drnevich and Kriauciunas, 2011). This study therefore urges a more differ-
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entiated view of environmental dynamism. High levels of environmental dyna-
mism constantly create new opportunities for firms. Under such circumstances, 
firm agility, defined as the ability to sense and respond quickly to opportunities, 
becomes a major necessity for performance (Roberts and Grover, 2012). Dynam-
ic capabilities support a firm in recognizing and seizing favorable opportunities. 
They allow for frequent and recurring adjustments of operating routines through 
routinely setting triggers of opportunity seeking (Newey and Zahra, 2009). In this 
sense, dynamic capabilities can be viewed as creating favorable circumstances 
for firms to seize and respond to opportunities in the business environment. Inde-
pendent of environmental dynamism, employing dynamic capabilities may result 
in a better evolutionary fitness. However, because provisioning of options does 
not come without cost, the value of dynamic capabilities increases with the num-
ber of opportunities the environment offers (Pavlou and El Sawy, 2011). Func-
tional costs that firms incur for the development and maintenance of dynamic 
capabilities therefore particularly pay off under high levels of environmental dy-
namism. At the same time, high levels of environmental dynamism provide more 
opportunities for operating-routine redesign to realize functional cost savings. 
Together, dynamic capabilities lead to higher functional technical fitness when 
operating under high levels of environmental dynamism. In a similar vein, a 
greater necessity exists for maneuvering and quickly adapting to short-term 
changes in high levels of environmental dynamism. Since dynamic capabilities 
help avoid costly ad-hoc solutions without sacrificing overall routine goals, this 
process is likely to result in advanced adaptive technical fitness. In contrast, 
when operating under lower levels of environmental dynamism, fewer opportuni-
ties exist for operating-routine optimization and quick responses are not nearly as 
critical. The balance between evolutionary fitness and cost becomes suboptimal, 
diminishing, or even obliterating for both functional and adaptive technical effi-
ciency. 
3.7 Conclusion and Limitations 
In order to resolve the mixed findings on the role of environmental dynamism in 
the current dynamic capabilities literature, our work suggests that empirical stud-
ies with a focus on the characteristics and goal achievement of operating routines 
are likely to find only limited impact of environmental dynamism (e.g., Pro-
togerou et al., 2012). Instead, studies that take underlying costs into account tend 
to find that environmental dynamism positively moderates the relationship be-
tween dynamic capabilities and performance (e.g., Pavlou and El Sawy, 2006). In 
general, our empirical findings provide supportive evidence to Heft et al. (2007), 
who theoretically highlight the potentially antithetic effects of dynamic capabili-
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ties on evolutionary- and technical-performance yardsticks. More specifically, 
our findings suggest that researchers should consider these potentially counter-
vailing outcomes: While dynamic capabilities may improve the fitness of an or-
ganization in general, such increased fitness may be achieved by enhancing the 
goal achievement of operating routines or by reducing the cost incurred by oper-
ating routines. Depending on whether the organization faces either low or high 
levels of environmental dynamism, the impact of dynamic capabilities on the 
evolutionary and technical fitness of operating routines differs. 
 
Despite the contributions of our study, we also want to highlight some limitations 
that might provide a fruitful starting point for future research. Although the engi-
neering industry is characterized as a dynamic, competitive environment in Ger-
many, other industries face even greater uncertainties and more-rapid market 
shifts, such as software and biotechnology industries. Therefore, researchers 
might want to test the hypotheses derived in this chapter using a sample that in-
cludes these industries as well. Furthermore, this study relied on a dichotomous 
distinction of environmental dynamism. While this approach allowed us to col-
lect data in specific industries, thereby increasing case comparability, this sam-
pling prohibited us from taking a more fine-grained perspective on the influences 
that environmental dynamism has on dynamic capabilities. Hence, further re-
search should elaborate the nuanced consequences that different intensities of 
environmental dynamism have for the deployment and performance of dynamic 
capabilities. 
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4 When Do Written Rules Persist in Routines? 
4.1 Introduction 
Organizational routines are inherently important for the continued existence and 
performance of any organization (Stene, 1940; Cyert and March, 1963; Nelson 
and Winter, 1982) and have been found in diverse organizational tasks, such as 
hiring new employees (Feldman, 2000) and treating patients in hospitals (e.g., 
Edmondson et al., 2001). They refer to “repetitive, recognizable patterns of inter-
dependent actions, carried out by multiple actors” (Feldman and Pentland, 2003: 
95). To ensure consistency and efficiency in routine performances, many organi-
zations implement written rules as substitutes for direct supervision (Weber, 
1922; Blau, 1955; Okhuysen and Bechky, 2009). Written rules prescribe how 
employees should carry out organizational routines (Schulz, 2008). Examples of 
such written rules include the strict behavioral scripts governing customer-
interaction routines in Apple stores (Kane and Sherr, 2011) or care pathways 
governing clinical-treatment routines in hospitals (Vanhaecht et al., 2006). Or-
ganizations often undertake considerable effort to achieve persistent enactment of 
these written rules by routine participants; however, recent routine research 
demonstrates that—once implemented—rules and organizational routines fre-
quently drift apart (e.g., Suchman, 1983; Ciborra, 2000; Bruns, 2009). Persistent 
rule enactment is critical for organizations to function, as failure to do so may 
lead to poor performance, organizational delegitimization, and even the death of 
employees and patients (Weick, 1990; Inoue and Koizumi, 2004; Anand et al., 
2012). This chapter seeks to address the question of when and why rules are per-
sistently enacted in organizational routines. 
 
Research focusing on routines as generative systems has recently developed ex-
planations for why routine performances and written rules drift apart, despite 
well-designed rules and a successful initial implementation. This research stress-
es the ability of routine participants to improvise as they perform the routine and 
to reflect upon their experiences afterwards, thereby causing endogenous routine 
change and eventually a drift between written rules and organizational routines 
(Ciborra, 2000; Feldman and Pentland, 2003; 2008b). Expanding on this theoret-
ical stance, researchers have provided qualitative and quantitative empirical evi-
dence that many organizational routines change endogenously (e.g., Feldman, 
2000; Pentland et al., 2011) and that once successfully implemented written rules 
may fail to persist (e.g., Bruns, 2009; Van de Klundert, Gorissen and Zeemering, 
2010; Anand et al., 2012). In being so focused on the specific actions of specific 
routine participants in specific organizations, this research has largely ignored 
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conditions and mechanisms that operate on multiple levels above and below the 
routine but nevertheless affect the enactment of written rules (cf. Parmigiani and 
Howard-Grenville, 2011; Salvato and Rerup, 2011). Apparently, we know sur-
prisingly little about which conditions foster the persistent enactment of written 
rules within organizational routines (Reynaud, 2005; Tyler and Blader, 2005; 
D'Adderio, 2008). 
 
We address this research gap by exploring the phenomenon of persistent rule en-
actment, theoretically and empirically building on the generative-systems per-
spective of routine research (e.g., Feldman and Pentland, 2003; Howard-
Grenville, 2005). We build on this perspective by conceptualizing the enactment 
of written rules within organizational routines as ongoing accomplishments of 
routine participants (characterized by a specific level of professional experience) 
who perform organizational routines to address tasks (characterized by specific 
levels of task complexity and frequency). We expand established routine research 
to a multilevel framework by taking the institutional context (characterized by 
specific levels of pressure demanding the enactment of written rules) into ac-
count. We argue that configurations of these four explanatory conditions—
institutional pressure, routine participants’ professional experience, task com-
plexity, and task frequency—constitute a situation in which routine participants 
will be more or less inclined to persistently enact written organizational rules.  
 
To empirically explore when and why routine participants will persistently enact 
written rules, we conduct a comparative case analysis of the persistent enactment 
of care pathways—a specific type of a written organizational rule prescribing a 
clinical-treatment routine—in university hospitals. This setting is favorable given 
the competitive pressures that most hospitals face and the common interest of 
hospital managers and medical professionals in treating patients in an effective 
and efficient manner (cf., Cochrane, 1972; Bohmer, 2009). While one would ex-
pect care pathways to be persistently followed when carrying out the respective 
treatment routines, previous research has demonstrated that medical profession-
als’ adherence to care pathways drops dramatically a few years after the initial 
implementation in their departments (e.g., Rood et al., 2005; Van de Klundert et 
al., 2010). As hospitals are professional organizations where most routine partic-
ipants act as autonomous professionals and are subject to comparatively little 
managerial control, studying rule persistence in this context provides a conserva-
tive setting for our inquiry (cf. Perrow, 1972; Freidson, 2001; Bohmer, 2009). 
Our empirical analysis relies on qualitative and quantitative data from 19 treat-
ment routines and care pathways in 10 internal-medicine departments of universi-
ty hospitals in Germany. We employ fuzzy-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis 
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to explore which configurations of institutional, organizational, and task condi-
tions are necessary and/or sufficient for care pathways to persist in a hospital de-
partment’s treatment routines. 
 
Our study provides two key contributions. First, we identify three multilevel con-
figurations where written rules persisted in an empirical setting characterized by 
high levels of improvisation and little managerial oversight: When institutional 
pressure is high, written rules will persist in routines addressing tasks of high 
complexity (“reducing risk”) or when highly experienced routine participants 
execute tasks at high frequency (“securing status”). When institutional pressure is 
low, written rules will persist in routines when routine participants have low lev-
els of experience and face high task volumes of low complexity (“surviving 
stress”). Second, our study advances a multilevel framework that highlights that 
rule persistence depends on the interaction of conditions incorporating the organ-
izational routine and the external and internal organizational context. We con-
clude that written rules persist when they function as a resource to routine partic-
ipants and provide routine participants with confirming experience when enact-
ing the written rule. Therefore, theories of organizational routines need to be 
broadened to include the interplay of multilevel dynamics to explain persistence 
of written rules in organizational routines. 
4.2 Theory 
4.2.1 Organizational Routines as Endogenously Changing Entities 
Research on organizational routines has recently focused on the internal dynam-
ics of routines in order to explain their capacity to change endogenously 
(Parmigiani and Howard-Grenville, 2011). Endogenous routine change emerges 
from the interplay of the performative and ostensive aspect of organizational rou-
tines (Feldman and Pentland, 2003; Pentland and Feldman, 2005). The performa-
tive aspect captures the “real actions, by real people, in specific times and places” 
(Feldman and Pentland, 2008b: 302), whereas the ostensive aspect captures the 
“abstract, generalized idea of the routine” (Feldman and Pentland, 2003: 101). 
The performative and ostensive aspect of routines have a reciprocal relationship, 
whereby the former creates, maintains, and modifies the latter, which in turn is 
used to guide, account for, and refer to the former. This mutually constitutive 
iteration between performative and ostensive aspect provides the foundation for 
routine participants to introduce and retain variations in a routine, eventually 
causing endogenous routine change (Feldman and Pentland, 2003; 2008b; Pent-
land et al., 2012). 
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4.2.2 Written Rules as Enacted Artifacts in Organizational Routines 
When participating in organizational routines, employees are frequently required 
to enact written organizational rules (Leidner, 1993; D'Adderio, 2008; Schulz, 
2008). Written organizational rules are codified, ideal-type representations of 
organizational routines (Pentland and Feldman, 2005). Care pathways are an ex-
ample of such rules. A care pathway is a document that describes in words and 
graphics which medical parameters are to be monitored, what medications are to 
be given, and which specialists are to be consulted after a patient has been given 
a specific diagnosis (Bohmer, 2009). While they are implemented to keep indi-
viduals’ activities and organizational routines “on track” (Schulz, 2008: 228; see 
also: Avadikyan et al., 2001), the enactment of written rules is not a deterministic 
process (Suchman, 1983; Taylor, 1993; Reynaud, 2005). 
 
Written rules relate to the ostensive and performative aspect; however, they rep-
resent a distinct entity (Pentland and Feldman, 2005): On the one hand, rules ar-
ticulate how patterns of interaction should form in principle; thus, they shape the 
routine participant’s abstract notion (i.e., the ostensive aspect) of an organiza-
tional routine (D'Adderio, 2008). On the other hand, an observer may notice a 
resemblance between a specific routine performance (i.e., the performative as-
pect) and a specific rule when routine participants enact that rule. Against this 
background, we understand a written rule to be persistently enacted when a 
knowledgeable observer is unable to detect a frequent and substantial violation of 
a written organizational rule across routine performances (cf. Taylor, 1993; Tyler 
and Blader, 2005; Desai, 2010). Non-persistence of written rules may occur due 
to the interplay among written rule, ostensive structure, and performative agen-
cy—the latter being characterized by improvisatory freedom and interpretive 
flexibility. Even if a written rule becomes firmly enacted during the initial im-
plementation phase, processes of endogenous routine change may subsequently 
cause profound divergence between a written organizational rule and the organi-
zational routine’s ostensive and performative aspect (Orlikowski, 2000; Feldman, 
2004; Anand et al., 2012). The enactment of a firmly implemented rule may 
therefore discontinue across the iterations of an organizational routine. 
 
Failure to persistently enact written rules may result in coordination problems 
among routine participants that cause organizational routines to break down 
(Weick, 1990; Vardi and Weitz, 2004). To ensure that routine participants adhere 
to the rule, organizations engage in formal monitoring activities and incentivize 
actors to follow rules (O'Reilly, 1989; Kohn, 1999). While prominent in the eco-
nomic literature, managerial monitoring and incentivizing have been found to 
have limited effect in organizations (Gouldner, 1954; Streatfield, 2001). For ex-
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ample, Tyler and Bladder (2005) show, using two empirical studies on employee 
rule adherence in various types of organizations, that the influence of incentive- 
and monitoring-based, command-and-control approaches to achieve employee 
rule adherence is inferior to self-regulatory approaches. This outcome is especial-
ly true for professional organizations, where most routine participants are auton-
omous professionals who are obliged to follow professional norms (Freidson, 
2001). For example, a medical worker “[…] traditionally enjoys a collective au-
tonomy over the content and conditions of medical practice” (Doolin, 2002: 373). 
Such autonomy causes an asymmetry of power between professionals and man-
agers that allows professionals to play a dominant role in enacting or neglecting 
written organizational rules (Ferlie et al., 2005). This autonomy is in line with 
research on the micro-evolutionary processes of organizational routines, which 
suggests that routines are resistant to external changes initiated by management 
or other outside interferences (Loch et al., 2013). 
 
In the following section, we therefore focus on conditions that previous research 
has connected to the self-regulatory enactment of written rules in organizations. 
In doing so, we argue that the institutional context in which routine participants 
are embedded complements task- and organization-based conditions. While these 
conditions originate at multiple ontological levels, they provide explanations of 
rule persistence that draw on the processes connecting the ostensive and per-
formative aspect. To explore what configurations of these conditions contribute 
to persistent enactment of written rules in organizational routines, we conducted 
an empirical inquiry employing fsQCA as a configurational method. 
4.2.3 Rules as Enablers in Guiding, Accounting, and Referring to 
Performative Aspects 
4.2.3.1 Institutional Embeddedness of Routine Participants: Social Sanctioning 
Actors participating in a routine may enact written rules because they consider 
them to be reliable guides of appropriate behavior (March, 1994). What is con-
sidered appropriate depends on the social expectations that apply to an actor in a 
given context. Social expectations matter, as “[…] identities and their conten-
tions come all wrapped in larger structures and processes that predate them” 
(White, 1992: 6). For example, physicians are expected to provide patients with 
high-quality medical treatment according to current medical standards. These 
standards are usually developed in collective efforts incorporating medical practi-
tioners and scientists. Students of medicine learn these standards in their training, 
while more experienced practitioners are required by law to attend continuing 
education where current standards are taught. If practitioners fail to meet these 
standards, they are subject to legal sanctions (Ulsenheimer, 1996). 
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The social expectations that apply to an actor are reflected by the institutional 
pressure that an institutional field exerts. The institutional pressure provides an 
indication of what is “desirable, proper, or appropriate” (Suchman, 1995: 574) 
and describes the social context against which routine participants have to ac-
count for their performances. Drawing on a written rule legitimized in the institu-
tional field provides an indication of actors’ “conformity to a specific standard or 
model” (Ruef and Scott, 1998: 880), thereby securing routine participants’ status 
as legitimate actors in a field (Thomas, Walker and Zelditch, 1986). In contrast, 
deviating from written rules legitimized in the institutional field is likely to at-
tract scrutiny and contempt by other actors embedded in the same field and put 
routine participants at risk of social sanctions (cf. Meyer and Rowan, 1977). 
These sanctions may, for instance, include the withdrawal of certificates by ac-
creditation bodies and professional associations or the loss of public endorsement 
(Deeds, Mang and Frandsen, 2004: 12). Further, routine participants who fail to 
comply with institutionalized expectations may face social disapproval in their 
work environment such as “snide comments” and isolation by peers (Kellogg, 
2009: 679). To dispel any doubts regarding the appropriateness of their conduct, 
routine participants are likely to consider a legitimized written organizational rule 
for a particular routine when accounting for, seeking guidance for, or referring to 
specific routine performances. 
 
While these arguments suggest that the enactment of written rules simply con-
forms to institutional demands, research on organizational routines emphasizes 
that local practice (e.g., persistent enactment of written rules) is strongly influ-
enced by routine participants’ coordination efforts when engaging in the task ad-
dressed by the organizational routine (Pentland, 1992; Jarzabkowski et al., 2012; 
Dionysiou and Tsoukas, 2013). Therefore, we also consider the extent to which 
written rules may solve local coordination issues for routine participants. 
4.2.3.2 Organization of Routine Participants: Collective Coordination 
Given that organizational routines are constituted by interdependent actions of 
multiple actors, coordination mechanisms are crucial for the functioning of or-
ganizational routines (Jarzabkowski et al., 2012; Miller et al., 2012). Coordina-
tion refers to “fitting together the activities of organization members” (Argote, 
1982: 423). Coordination among routine participants draws on an intersubjective 
understanding of how individual actions relate and contribute to the organiza-
tional routine (Reagans, Argote and Brooks, 2005; Dionysiou and Tsoukas, 
2013). This knowledge of the routine and the internal organizational context 
links tasks and responsibilities to required competencies and the expertise of oth-
er routine participants, thereby facilitating coordinated execution of the organiza-
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tional routine (Feldman and Rafaeli, 2002; Miller et al., 2012). The participants’ 
professional experience reflects this part of the ostensive aspect, as it contains a 
repertoire of past routine iterations, providing the basis for behavioral guidance, 
and accounting for and referring to performative aspects (Turner and Fern, 2012). 
 
Written rules may become persistently enacted when they make it easier for rou-
tine participants to relate to each other and to participate in coordinated action. 
Written rules may fulfill this coordinating function because they define responsi-
bilities for tasks, help allocate resources, and facilitate agreement among organi-
zational actors (Faraj and Xiao, 2006; Okhuysen and Bechky, 2009). Given that 
any kind of personal coordination is time-consuming because it involves direct 
and frequent communication (Van de Ven, Delbecq and Koenig, 1976), written 
rules may provide useful templates for guiding, accounting for, and referring to 
performative aspects when actors cannot draw on their own professional experi-
ence for reliable conceptions of appropriate conduct (cf. Hutchins, 1995). 
4.2.4 Rules as Enablers in Creating, Maintaining, and Modifying Ostensive 
Aspects 
Routine performances create, maintain, or modify the ostensive aspect (Feldman 
and Pentland, 2003). Whether and how routine performances shape the ostensive 
aspect depends on the experience that routine participants derive from the per-
formance. Experience in enacting a specific written rule creates, maintains, or 
modifies the routine participants’ ostensive aspects to either incorporate or reject 
the written rule as a part of the generalized representation of the routine 
(Pentland and Feldman, 2005; 2008a). Routine participants should be less in-
clined to enact written rules when past routine performances incorporating these 
written rules fail to achieve the intended outcome and when the failure to achieve 
the outcome can be attributed to the enactment of the written rule (Feldman, 
2000; Desai, 2010). The extent to which written rules are likely to foster positive 
or negative task experiences depends on the frequency and the complexity10 of the 
executed task (cf., Levitt and March, 1988). As Zollo and Winter (2002: 347) 
argue, with greater task frequency, actors are more likely to “have retained their 
impressions as to what worked and what didn't work in the previous experienc-
es.” Accordingly, the task frequency creates the baseline against which routine 
participants develop their ostensive aspect of the routine. The more frequently an 
organizational routine is performed to address a given task, the more elaborate 
the ostensive aspect that routine participants develop in enacting a written rule. 
                                                 
10 We define the complexity of a task addressed by an organizational routine as the number and sequence 
of actions employed in accomplishing the task as well as how those sequences vary across time 
(Pentland et al., 2011). 
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Whether routine participants will gather positive or negative experiences in ap-
plying the rule depends, among other contingencies, on the rule’s effectiveness as 
a coordination device. With regard to the coordinating function of written rules, 
previous research has demonstrated that the extent to which written rules func-
tion as coordinating devices depends on the complexity inherent in the task ad-
dressed by the organizational routine (Davis et al., 2009). Written rules are con-
sidered inappropriate coordination devices when tasks involve a large number of 
exceptions (March and Simon, 1958; Thompson, 1967; Van de Ven et al., 1976). 
With increasing task complexity, routine participants will experience an in-
creased number of exceptions. Given that only a limited number of exceptions 
can be covered by written rules, routine participants will soon be confronted with 
ad-hoc coordination and uncertainty regarding the validity of their assessments 
(Galbraith, 1973; Milliken, 1987). Overall, these arguments suggest that task fre-
quency and task complexity jointly influence how routine participants will enact 
written rules. Depending on these experiences, the routine performances carried 
out according to written rules will create, maintain, or modify the routine partici-
pants’ ostensive aspects and thereby influence the persistent enactment of rules in 
organizational routines. 
 
These preceding arguments suggest four explanatory conditions (institutional 
pressure, routine participants’ professional experience, task complexity, and task 
frequency) that influence whether actors draw on a written rule while carrying 
out an organizational routine. However, whether written rules are persistently 
enacted depends on the routine dynamics that emerge from the mutual interplay 
of the ostensive and performative aspect given the empirical configuration of 
these conditions. To identify configurations of the aforementioned conditions 
that foster the persistent enactment of written organizational rules in organiza-
tional routines, we conducted an exploratory comparative case study. To analyze 
our data, we applied fsQCA as a method that enables the identification of equifi-
nal and multilevel explanations. In the following section, we introduce the empir-
ical setting in which we conducted our case studies. 
 
4.3 Sample and Method 
4.3.1 Research Approach 
Drawing on our theoretical development, we designed an investigation to under-
stand when and why written rules become persistently enacted in organizational 
routines. We focused on care pathways as an example of organizational rules that 
are supposed to be persistently enacted. In hospitals, care pathways are one of the 
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most-common written organizational rules for performing treatment routines 
(Timmermans and Almeling, 2009). Care pathways typically define “[…] a 
number of steps to be taken when specified conditions are met: how general prac-
titioners should proceed when they suspect a new case of diabetes, what steps a 
nurse should follow in preventing decubitus ulcers […]” (Timmermans and Berg, 
2003: 25). Care pathways are designed to provide medical professionals with 
current and evidence-based medical knowledge to facilitate coordination between 
treatment-routine participants and provide a means to evaluate whether a specific 
iteration of a treatment routine was consistent with medical standards (Bohmer, 
2009). Care pathways are usually subject to extensive scientific scrutiny; similar 
to other treatment protocols, they are typically accompanied by and grounded in 
high-quality evidence regarding the standard to be achieved as well as the medi-
cal and economic outcomes expected following their implementation (see Rotter 
et al., 2010; Vanhaecht et al., 2011). Such research is readily available to clini-
cians, since it is published in numerous medical journals and advanced by institu-
tions such as The Cochrane Collaboration. Therefore, we believe the enactment 
of care pathways within treatment routines is a theoretically adequate and practi-
cally relevant research context within which to examine the persistent enactment 
of written organizational rules. 
 
Given the lack of an encompassing theoretical framework explaining the persis-
tent enactment of organizational rules, as well as our research interest exploring 
configurations of conditions that contribute to this phenomenon, we used a case-
based method (Morgan and Smircich, 1980). We conducted a pilot study in 
which we interviewed 14 chief physicians from a broad spectrum of disciplines 
working in university and non-university hospitals and discussed changes in 
treatment routines that they supervised after the introduction of lump-sum reim-
bursements in Germany. These interviews demonstrated a great diversity of 
terms and associations linked to “care pathways” and their persistence in treat-
ment routines, a situation requiring a more reflective mode of data collection than 
would have been possible using a large-scale survey. We selected cases on the 
basis of a theoretical sampling procedure (Eisenhardt, 1989). To generate in-
sights on how institutional, organizational, and task conditions affect the persis-
tent enactment of organizational rules, we searched for hospitals that operated 
under similar economic conditions and regulatory regimes but differed consider-
ably with regard to our explanatory conditions. University hospitals, as maxi-
mum providers of medical care, appeared particularly suited to provide cases rel-
evant to our research interest. While university hospitals face competitive pres-
sures similar to those of regular hospitals, they also represent a clearly defined 
population that is subject to identical economic challenges and regulatory re-
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gimes (Reinhold et al., 2009). Because of their extensive experience with medical 
research studies, university hospitals are accustomed to designing and updating 
workable care pathways. Hence, the organizations that constitute our sample are 
well versed in designing and implementing clinical pathways in treatment rou-
tines. Differences across cases in the persistent enactment of written rules are 
therefore due to the effect of routine dynamics following initial implementation. 
By focusing on the university hospitals’ internal-medicine departments, which 
offer a broad but comparable spectrum of treatment routines, we expect varia-
tions in the institutional, organizational, and task conditions to account for the 
persistent enactment of care pathways. 
4.3.2 Sample and Data Collection 
This research was conducted as part of a larger qualitative study of work organi-
zation in hospitals. We approached the nursing directors of all 32 German uni-
versity hospitals to gain access to their internal-medicine departments. Following 
this initial approach, 16 hospitals agreed to provide access. Our data collection 
draws on archival data provided by hospitals’ mandatory quality reporting, the 
medical database MedLine (2012), and interview data from the respective de-
partments.11 To avoid common-method bias (Podsakoff and Organ, 1986), we 
only used the interviews to inquire which care pathways implemented in the re-
spective departments had persisted and which had not. Our explanatory condi-
tions were operationalized and measured on the basis of publicly available data 
on the hospital departments. Most of this data was found in the quality reports 
issued by the hospitals (Gemeinsamer Bundesausschuss, 2012). Because these 
reports belong to the official reporting data demanded by German hospital law (§ 
137 Abs. 3 Satz 1 Nr. 4 SGB V), we are confident that this data is reliable and 
valid. 
 
We arranged interviews with physicians, nurses, and case managers to learn 
about the enactment of care pathways in their departments. To reduce the possi-
                                                 
11 While there are potential drawbacks to collecting data via interviews, data collection via participant 
observation or archival data was not feasible in this study setting. In order to detect the persistent en-
actment of a care pathway across all explanatory conditions, a large number of observed treatment rou-
tine iterations across time would have been required. In order to detect differences between specific 
treatment actions and written care pathways, these observations would have to be conducted by knowl-
edgeable medical personal. This mode of data collection would have been extremely resource consum-
ing, given the number of actions and cycle times of a single treatment routine execution (Pentland and 
Feldman, 2008b). Furthermore, given the complexity of such an observation, errors or incomplete doc-
umentation would have been likely. While relying on archival data would have bypassed many of the 
problems linked to observations (Pentland et al., 2011), matching the medical documentation of indi-
vidual patients with written care pathways was not legally feasible due to strict data-protection stand-
ards. Against this backdrop, and considering that our inquiry does not intend to study or compare indi-
vidual treatment routine performances and how these eventually deviate from care pathways, we judged 
data collection via interviews to be appropriate. 
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ble biases that may have influenced our respondents’ assessments, we took a 
number of precautions: First, to reduce cognitive biases and errors resulting from 
faulty memory, our questions focused on past facts and behavior, not their beliefs 
and intentions (Golden, 1992). Second, to avoid social-desirability response bias, 
we assured all interviewees of their complete anonymity and communicated that 
all identifying information was to be removed upon transcription of the inter-
views. Participation in our interviews was voluntary. Third, wherever possible, 
we interviewed at least two people—including at least one of each healthcare 
profession—per department (e.g., nephrology) to ensure reliable statements. In a 
few cases, we were also granted access to the case managers of the respective 
departments for validation purposes. In addition, we had a generally high agree-
ment rate among interviewees from the same department. Given that our inter-
views documented instances in which care pathways had not persisted, despite 
university hospitals being experienced designers and users of medical protocols, 
we have confidence in the validity of our data-collection method. 
 
We conducted 48 semi-structured interviews in total, including 22 background 
interviews with nursing directors and hospital quality-of-care managers, as well 
as 26 semi-structured interviews with healthcare professionals from internal-
medicine departments. Approximately half of these university hospitals’ internal-
medicine departments either had not attempted to introduce care pathways in 
their internal-medicine departments or employed simpler standard operating pro-
cedures and were therefore excluded from further analysis. In one case, our inter-
view partner was able to provide us with information on two departments, as she 
had been a member of two medical teams. The interviews were conducted in 
German—the native language of the interviewers and all interviewees. Because 
of the work-intensive environment, interview duration ranged between 20 and 
104 minutes. On average, interviews lasted fifty minutes. In nine cases, we had to 
interrupt the interview because patients required our interviewee’s attention. Giv-
en that our data collection was part of a larger research project, our interviews 
focused on care pathways as one of several facets of work organization in hospi-
tals. 
4.3.3 Measures 
Outcome. Persistent enactment of care pathways was measured using our inter-
view data. In all interviews, we specifically asked which diagnoses/procedures in 
the interviewee’s department are practiced on the basis of care pathways, as well 
as from which care pathways practitioners regularly and substantially deviate. 
We also asked which diagnoses/procedures are associated with care pathways 
that have been fully implemented in the past yet are no longer enacted. Our inter-
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views sought to identify which care pathways had become an element of daily 
practice beyond the initial implementation period. With the exception of brief 
conversations, which we documented with written notes, all interviews were rec-
orded digitally and transcribed for further analysis (Bryman, 2008). Based on the 
interview data, we derived a list of treatment routines for which care pathways 
had been implemented and noted whether or not their implementation had per-
sisted. 
 
Explanatory Conditions. Institutional pressure at field level was measured by 
the number of citations of the most-frequently-cited scientific article on care 
pathways applicable to the respective treatment routine. While we lack a com-
monly accepted measure for institutional pressure, we are confident that the 
number of citations represents a valid proxy, since practitioners draw on this re-
search to inform their practice and are held accountable to this current state of 
knowledge (Timmermans and Berg, 2003). The more widely disseminated an 
article that describes and tests a specific care pathway in the professional and 
scientific community constituting the institutional field, the harder it is for practi-
tioners to justify treatment routines that are not aligned with that guideline 
(Bohmer, 2009). Furthermore, if the most-cited article on a care pathway for the 
respective treatment routine is very frequently referenced in subsequent articles, 
the prevailing opinion on the use of care pathways can be assumed to be rather 
homogenous. The more homogenous a field’s expectations are, the stronger the 
pressure towards conformity becomes, in this case the enactment of care path-
ways (Oliver, 1991). Our search for scientific publications was conducted via 
MedLine (2012) using an array of search terms.12 Random samples of the cited 
articles were inspected to ensure that findings were largely in favor of the respec-
tive care pathway. 
 
Professional experience. The level of experience within the department executing 
the respective treatment routine was calculated using the ratio of specialist doc-
tors (“Fachärzte”) to all other clinicians within the department in question.13 Spe-
cialists have mastered the highest level of medical training available, having un-
                                                 
12 As search terms, we used all synonyms for care pathways described by the European Pathway Organi-
zation (2012): “clinical pathway*”, “clinical care pathway*”, “care pathway*”, “critical pathway*”, 
“care path*”, “integrated care pathway*”, “case management plan*”, “care map”. Furthermore, we re-
stricted our search to articles published in English or German. 
13 While care pathways usually prescribe all relevant treatment steps for a specific disease and these steps 
also may include nursing work, the present study focuses on medical doctors as routine participants. 
This decision naturally excludes nurses and other service personnel from our analysis. However, given 
that our study intends to explain the persistence of rules in a context where application of rules is not 
mandated by working contracts—and medical doctors in Germany represent the only participants of a 
treatment routine who exert legally sanctioned discretion regarding the treatment of patients—excluding 
nurses and other service personnel from our analysis seems warranted. 
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dergone five to seven additional years of practical training, and are therefore 
highly experienced in performing medical treatment routines (Maclachlan, 1997; 
Egan and Jaye, 2009). Thus, we assume the ratio of specialists to all other clini-
cians within a department validly captures the average level of professional expe-
rience present in a department. 
 
Task complexity. Task complexity was calculated using the average complexity 
of the medical cases treated using the corresponding treatment routine. We col-
lected this information from the so-called G-DRG (German Diagnosis Related 
Groups) weights that are typically assigned to each treatment routine. These cost 
weights indicate the relative complexity of a certain diagnosis-related group and 
are updated annually to provide the basis for health insurance providers’ reim-
bursement rates for clinical treatments (Pierdzioch, 2008). The weights are de-
termined by InEK, a public organization set up by the German government 
(Schreyögg, Tiemann and Busse, 2006: 272). As a first step, we matched the 
medical procedures constituting the respective routine with the related G-DRG 
codes and validated these matches using expert ratings provided by the head of 
the accounting department of one of the largest German hospitals. In a second 
step, we weighted the respective G-DRG weights according to their relative oc-
currence in the German hospital field to account for the patient composition re-
ceiving the respective treatment. We then calculated the average weight of the 
respective G-DRG codes per treatment routine. These values constitute our data 
on task complexity. We decided to use G-DRG weights as a measure because G-
DRGs are by law designed to capture treatment complexity (KHEntG § 9 Abs. 
1). 
 
Task frequency. The frequency of a task was measured by the number of treat-
ments performed by the hospital department within one reporting year. 
 
Table 4.1 depicts the raw data collected for each treatment routine.  
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Table 4.1: Cases and Raw Data 
Case ID University Hospital Internal Medicine Department Treatment Routine 
1 I Nephrology Renal Transplant Evaluation 
2   Renal Dialysis 
3  Cardiology Cardioversion 
4 II Nephrology Renal Transplant Evaluation 
5   Renal Puncture 
6   Shunt 
7  Cardiology Angiography 
8 III Oncology Plasmacytoma 
9 IV Cardiology Angina Pectoris 
10 V Nephrology Arterial Hypertension 
11   Renal Biopsy 
12   Renal Insufficiency 
13 VI Oncology Bone Marrow Transplantation 
14  Nephrology Arterial Hypertension 
15   Renal Biopsy 
16 VII Gastroenterology Peritoneal Puncture 
17   Pleural Punctuation 
18   Trans-Arterial Chemo Embolization 
19   Mini-Laparoscopy 
 
Table 4.1: Cases and Raw Data (continued) 
Case ID Institutional Pressure 
Professional 
Experience 
Task 
Complexity 
Task 
Frequency Care Pathway 
1 13 1.25 2.27 10 Persistent 
2 11 1.25 1.35 8900 Persistent 
3 0 1.21 0.49 164 Persistent 
4 13 0.50 2.27 16 Persistent 
5 0 0.50 0.91 1 Non-Persistent 
6 0 0.50 0.95 85 Persistent 
7 1 0.50 0.92 6307 Persistent 
8 0 0.63 1.09 228 Non-Persistent 
9 76 1.01 0.55 623 Persistent 
10 2 0.56 0.53 83 Persistent 
11 1 0.56 0.91 218 Persistent 
12 11 0.56 1.35 242 Persistent 
13 7 1.25 15.70 216 Persistent 
14 2 0.86 0.53 56 Non-Persistent 
15 1 0.86 0.91 155 Persistent 
16 0 0.64 0.76 610 Persistent 
17 0 0.64 0.67 101 Persistent 
18 11 0.64 1.11 81 Persistent 
19 6 0.64 1.06 366 Persistent 
4.3.4 Analytical Approach 
We employed fuzzy-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (fsQCA) to explain 
the persistence of written organizational rules using the four explanatory condi-
tions discussed in our theory section. While researchers have recently begun em-
ploying fsQCA to test theory (e.g., Fiss, 2011; Bell, Filatotchev and Aguilera, 
2013), the method was originally developed and applied to smaller data sets to 
elaborate theory (Greckhamer et al., 2013). We argue that fsQCA has a number 
of advantages for the present study. FsQCA treats each case as a complex con-
figuration of causal factors with a specific outcome and analyzes which set of 
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relations is necessary and sufficient for the outcome to occur (Ragin, 1987; 
2000). A conception of causation based on necessary and sufficient conditions is 
particularly suitable to explore how conjunctions of mechanisms are connected to 
an outcome (e.g., institutionalist and coordinative mechanisms interacting in 
causing persistent enactment of written rules). Furthermore, fsQCA allows 
equifinal explanations because this method does not assume that there is only one 
constellation of features among all observed cases that causes the outcome (Fiss, 
2011). Emergent processes, such as the processes causing persistent enactment of 
written rules in organizational routines, are typically equifinal in form 
(Crutchfield, 2008). The analytical focus of fsQCA meets our objective to ex-
plore emergent processes that cause persistent enactment of rules in organiza-
tional routines. Finally, fsQCA techniques are suitable for analyzing multilevel 
data structures (Rohlfing, 2011; Crilly, 2013). Given the multiple ontological 
levels inherent in our conceptualization of the enactment of rules in routines, 
fsQCA as a multilevel method represents the appropriate method for the present 
inquiry. 
 
We followed standard procedures in preparing and conducting our fsQCA (e.g., 
Ragin, 2000; Fiss et al., 2013). To ensure transparency, our analysis is based on 
the standard software package fsQCA version 2.5 (Ragin and Davey, 2009), 
which proceeds stepwise through each analytical moment. Analysis with fsQCA 
requires us to first transform variables into sets: the explanatory and outcome 
variables are therefore to be renamed and structured in set-theoretic terms (e.g., 
the variable “task frequency” was labeled “high task frequency”) (Ragin, 2000). 
The extent to which cases are members of these sets is used by fsQCA to explore 
the causal structure between explanatory conditions and outcomes. Set-
membership values result from calibrating the raw data with three qualitatively 
meaningful thresholds: full membership, full non-membership, and the crossover 
point. These thresholds are derived from external standards, such as pre-existing 
qualitative and quantitative scientific knowledge, to calibrate each attribute in a 
manner that best captures a difference in kind for the particular set membership 
(Ragin, 1987; 2000). We elaborate below how we calibrated the outcome as well 
as the explanatory conditions. 
 
Persistent Enactment of Care Pathways. We calibrated the outcome (persistent 
enactment of care pathway) dichotomously. Set-membership values were as-
signed to outcomes based on a simple logic: the persistent enactment of care 
pathways following an initial implementation phase must imply a fuzzy-set 
membership value of 1 because lower values would falsely indicate qualities of 
non-persistence. Therefore, all treatment routines exhibiting persistent enactment 
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of care pathways were assigned set-membership values of 1, whereas treatment 
routines exhibiting non-persistence of care pathway enactment were assigned set-
membership values of 0. An example for a persistent enactment of care pathways 
is provided by Case 1 in our dataset. Here, patients who were about to receive a 
renal transplant were persistently treated according to a written care pathway that 
was implemented about nine years ago. While our interviewee admitted that ex-
ceptional cases required physicians to deviate from the pathway to allow for flex-
ible routine performances ensuring patient safety, he pointed out that the pathway 
for the evaluation of renal transplant patients was enacted in everyday practice 
because “especially in the case of a transplantation, it is reasonable to reflect up-
on the preparation procedures. Also, because [the pathway] coordinates interac-
tion.” Accordingly, Case 1 was coded 1 for the persistent enactment of care 
pathways. Non-persistent enactment of a care pathway, on the other hand, can be 
observed in Case 14, where a care pathway for the treatment of arterial hyperten-
sion had been implemented but failed to persist. As our interviewee put it: “Hy-
pertension is being [treated] according to the maxim: ‘Well, I am pretty familiar 
with that, I am just going to do that [my way].’” Case 14 was coded 0 on the out-
come condition. 
 
Institutional Pressure. Our calibration of “high institutional pressure” draws on 
exogenous threshold values for full membership, full non-membership, and the 
crossover point. The full-membership threshold and the crossover point were de-
rived by conducting an additional MedLine search on care pathways limited to 
the respective specialty area (e.g., nephrology). We analyzed the search results 
for the most-cited article published in the respective subject area. Given our theo-
retical assumptions on institutional pressure, this number indicates full set mem-
bership for a specific department type. In line with this rationale, we set the 
threshold for full non-membership in the set to 0.5 citations.14 The crossover 
point was derived by inspecting the distribution of the MedLine citation records 
for a value break among the citation clusters (Crilly, Zollo and Hansen, 2012). 
 
Professional Experience. We calibrated the set “high professional experience” 
using our basic population. More specifically, we calculated our measure for ac-
tors’ professional experience (specialist/non-specialist) for all internal-medicine 
departments in the sample (e.g., nephrology) across all university hospitals in 
Germany. We derived threshold values for full membership, full non-
membership, and the crossover point for each department type by visually in-
specting the data for value breaks between clusters (Crilly et al., 2012). 
                                                 
14 Setting the threshold to 0 was not possible, as the sample includes cases exhibiting no citations on care 
pathways. Thresholds cannot be placed on values covered by empirical data (Ragin, 2000). 
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Task Complexity. Calibration of the set “high task complexity” was based on the 
German hospital reimbursement system. This system assigns the DRG value 1 to 
treatments of average complexity (InEK, 2012). Accordingly, a measured routine 
complexity of 1 provides a highly appropriate qualitative anchor for the set’s 
crossover point. Lacking theoretical criteria indicating threshold values for full 
membership and full non-membership, we decided to derive these anchors by 
inspecting the distribution of the average DRG values reported by all German 
hospitals for obvious value breaks (Crilly et al., 2012). 
 
Task Frequency. The set “high task frequency” was calibrated using basic popu-
lation information. Again, we relied on the official quality reports of all German 
university hospitals. Based on this information, we first gathered data on the 
number of treatment-routine executions (e.g., renal biopsy) in the respective de-
partments per report year. To derive threshold values for full membership, full 
non-membership, and the crossover point, we inspected these distributions for 
value breaks (Crilly et al., 2012). We assume that these breaks indicate qualita-
tive differences in the levels of treatment frequencies (Crilly et al., 2012).  
 
Table 4.2 provides an overview of the thresholds used for calibrating the raw da-
ta. While the four explanatory conditions and the outcome of each case are cali-
brated to fuzzy-set membership values (see Table 4.3), further analysis in fsQCA 
requires the researcher to first derive the truth table. 
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Table 4.2: Thresholds of the Explanatory Conditions 
Condition 
Full 
Membership 
Crossover 
Point 
Full 
Non-Membership 
High Institutional Pressure 
                        Cardiology 76 15 0.5 
             Gastroenterology 27 5.5 0.5 
                        Nephrology 13 6.5 0.5 
                            Oncology 26 3.5 0.5 
High Professional Experience 
                        Cardiology 1.3 0.8 0.37 
             Gastroenterology 1.8 1.2 0.71 
                        Nephrology 1.3 0.95 0.6 
                            Oncology 1.4 0.9 0.45 
High Task Complexity 1.8 1 0.7 
High Task Frequency 
Angina Pectoris 650 400 216 
Angiography 6935 3780 875 
Arterial Hypertension 143 66 43 
Bone Marrow Transplantation 185 144 50 
Cardioversion 325 132 70 
Mini-Laparoscopy 240 70 20 
Peritoneal Puncture 487 281 83 
Plasmacytoma 178 130 30 
Pleural Punctuation 77 38 22 
Renal Biopsy 195 116 50 
Renal Dialysis 6300 3700 900 
Renal Insufficiency 157 85 18 
Renal Puncture 50 18 5 
Renal Transplant Evaluation 51 32 9 
Shunt 30 16 4 
Trans-Arterial Chemo Embolization 40 19 3 
 
Table 4.3: Fuzzy-set Data Matrix 
ID 
High Institutional 
Pressure 
High Professional 
Experience 
High Task 
Complexity
High Task 
Frequency 
Persistent Enactment
of Care Pathway 
1 0.95 0.93 0.99 0.05 1 
2 0.89 0.93 0.79 1.00 1 
3 0.04 0.92 0.01 0.62 1 
4 0.95 0.02 0.99 0.11 1 
5 0.04 0.02 0.29 0.00 0 
6 0.04 0.02 0.38 1.00 1 
7 0.05 0.11 0.31 0.92 1 
8 0.03 0.14 0.58 1.00 0 
9 0.95 0.78 0.01 0.94 1 
10 0.10 0.03 0.01 0.66 1 
11 0.06 0.03 0.29 0.98 1 
12 0.89 0.03 0.79 1.00 1 
13 0.61 0.89 1.00 0.99 1 
14 0.10 0.32 0.01 0.21 0 
15 0.06 0.32 0.29 0.81 1 
16 0.04 0.03 0.08 0.99 1 
17 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.99 1 
18 0.68 0.03 0.60 1.00 1 
19 0.52 0.03 0.57 0.99 1 
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Deriving the Truth Table. The next step in performing an fsQCA involves the 
construction of a truth table to identify configurations of conditions associated 
with an outcome (see Table 4.4). The truth table describes all logically possible 
combinations of explanatory conditions and the outcome using a present (1)—
absent (0) dichotomy (Ragin, 1987; 2008a). 
 
Table 4.4: Truth Table 
Row 
High 
Institutional 
Pressure 
High 
Professional 
Experience 
High Task 
Complexity 
High Task 
Frequency Cases15 
Consistency 
of Sufficiency for 
Outcome16 
1 1 0 1 1 12, 18, 19 0.98 
2 1 1 1 1 2, 13 0.98 
3 1 1 1 0 1 0.97 
4 1 0 1 0 4 0.96 
5 0 1 1 0 -- 0.94 
6 1 0 0 1 -- 0.93 
7 1 1 0 1 9 0.91 
8 0 0 0 1 6, 7, 10, 11, 15, 16, 17 0.91 
9 0 1 1 1 -- 0.89 
10 0 0 1 1 8 0.82 
11 0 1 0 1 3 0.81 
12 1 0 0 0 -- 0.73 
13 1 1 0 0 -- 0.72 
14 0 1 0 0 -- 0.70 
15 0 0 1 0 -- 0.61 
16 0 0 0 0 5, 14 0.37 
 
Inspecting the truth table (Table 4.4) and the fuzzy-set data matrix (Table 4.3) 
could provide information on cases with identical causal conditions yet contra-
dictory outcomes. As inspection of the tables demonstrates, this issue does not 
arise in our current data set. We can therefore use the truth table as presented 
above for further analysis of the cases without the need to add additional ex-
planatory conditions to address such inconsistencies. 
 
Necessary and Sufficient Conditions of the Persistent Enactment of Care 
Pathways. Causal analysis in fsQCA builds on the notion of necessary and suffi-
cient conditions. Since procedures uncovering sufficient conditions cannot be 
relied on to uncover necessary conditions, we analyzed necessary and sufficient 
conditions separately, beginning with the necessary conditions (Schneider and 
Wagemann, 2010). Logically, necessary conditions are always present if the out-
come is present, and there must not be an instance in which the outcome is pre-
                                                 
15 The cases listed in each truth table row are still members of fuzzy sets; they have only been sorted to 
the corner in the dichotomous vector space that provides the best fit based on the rounding rules out-
lined above. 
16 While the consistency value for sufficiency also provides an indicator for inconsistent outcomes, this 
measure is particularly relevant for exploring the sufficient conditions later on in the analysis. 
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sent and the condition absent (Schneider and Wagemann, 2007). By convention, 
a consistency value of at least 0.9 is required for indicating necessary conditions 
(Goertz, 2006). To test for necessary conditions, we applied the “necessary con-
ditions” procedure provided by fsQCA 2.5 to the fuzzy-set data matrix (Table 
4.3). In scrutinizing the results of the analysis, we found that the consistency val-
ues of all conditions (as well as their negations) are well below 0.9, suggesting 
that fuzzy-set membership values of the explanatory conditions across all cases 
are lower than outcome-membership values (Ragin, 2006). Therefore, none of 
the conditions was considered necessary for the persistent enactment of care 
pathways in treatment routines. We continued our analysis by testing for suffi-
cient conditions. 
 
For a sufficient condition, the outcome is always present if the condition is pre-
sent; and there must not be an instance in which the condition is present and the 
outcome absent (Schneider and Wagemann, 2007). This rationale implies that 
fuzzy-set membership values of sufficient conditions (or conjunctions of condi-
tions) are equal to or lower than outcome membership values (Ragin, 2000). To 
analyze the data for sufficient conditions, we first deleted configurations not as-
sociated with any of the 19 cases from the truth table (Schneider and Wagemann, 
2007). We then specified a consistency threshold to select the configurations reli-
ably associated with our outcome. The consistency value, which can range from 
0 to 1, captures the extent to which the fuzzy-membership values of a row corre-
spond to the assertion that the row is sufficient for the outcome (Ragin, 2006). 
Rows that fall below the consistency threshold are considered as failing to corre-
spond consistently to the sufficiency criterion. Hence, the outcome value of that 
row will be coded as 0. Conversely, all rows achieving or surpassing the criterion 
are coded as 1—the row is consistently sufficient for the outcome. One guideline 
is to select a threshold that corresponds to a break observed in the distribution of 
consistency scores (Crilly et al., 2012). Following this approach, we applied a 
consistency threshold (0.90) that is stricter than the consistency threshold (0.75) 
suggested by Ragin (2006). Following the preparation of the truth table, seven 
rows were coded as full members of the outcome set “Persistent Enactment of 
Care Pathway.” 
 
The Quine-McClusky algorithm provided by the fsQCA 2.5 software package 
uses Boolean algebra to reduce the truth-table rows to less-complex expressions. 
In this minimization procedure, complex configurations are reduced in favor of 
logically equivalent but less-complex solution terms (Schneider and Wagemann, 
2007). In the course of the minimization procedure, the fsQCA 2.5 software al-
lows for three types of solutions. Whereas the parsimonious and intermediate 
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solutions incorporate logical remainders to varying extents, the complex solution 
incorporates only statements about situations that occur empirically (Ragin, 
2000) and therefore represents the most conservative approach (Vis, 2012). Ac-
cordingly, our analysis relies on the complex solution.17 The findings are pre-
sented below. 
4.4 Findings 
In Table 4.5 we present the configurations of conditions associated with the per-
sistent enactment of care pathways. We present these results using the estab-
lished notation style suggested by Ragin and Fiss (2008). Black circles indicate 
the presence of a condition, while crossed circles indicate the absence of a condi-
tion. Blank spaces indicate a “don’t care” situation in which the condition may be 
either absent or present. 
 
Table 4.5: Complex Solution of Sufficient Conditions for Outcome 
Solution 
Condition 1 2 3 
High Institutional Pressure W W m 
High Professional Experience  W m 
High Task Complexity W  m 
High Task Frequency  W W 
Consistency .99 .95 .91 
Raw Coverage .35 .17 .40 
Unique Coverage .18 .05 .31 
Cases Covered18 1, 2, 4, 12, 13, 18, 19 2, 9, 13 
6, 7, 10, 11, 
15, 16, 17 
Overall Solution Consistency .94 
Overall Solution Coverage .71 
 
The complex solution (Table 4.5) indicates three sufficient equifinal solutions 
explaining the outcome of persistent care-pathway enactment. Solution 1 states 
that the presence of high institutional pressure and high task complexity are suf-
ficient for the persistent enactment of care pathways to occur, whereas Solution 2 
states that the presence of high institutional pressure in conjunction with both 
high levels of professional experience and high task frequency are sufficient for 
this outcome. Solution 3 states that the absence of high institutional pressure in 
conjunction with the absence of high levels of professional experience, the ab-
sence of high task complexity, and the presence of high task frequency, are suffi-
cient for care pathways to persist. The overall solution consistency (0.94) and 
                                                 
17 The parsimonious and the intermediate solution are available upon request. 
18 Cases 8, 3, 5, 14 were excluded from the analysis because the truth table rows containing these cases 
failed to meet the consistency threshold (0.90). 
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individual solution consistency terms (0.99, 0.95 and 0.91) are well above the 
minimum consistency (0.80) recommended by Ragin (2008b). This result indi-
cates that there is an appropriate correspondence between our empirical data and 
the set-theoretic relationships captured in the solution terms (Fiss et al., 2013). 
The relevance of the different solution terms is expressed by the coverage scores, 
which are calculated from the percentage of cases that represent a given solution 
term within the outcome (Ragin, 2006). As indicated by the solution coverage, all 
three solutions together account for approximately 71 percent of the fuzzy-set 
membership values in the outcome. While this result implies that most of the 
outcome is explained by the solution terms, it also indicates some degree of un-
explained idiosyncrasy. As indicated by the unique coverage measures, which are 
lower than the solution coverage, some cases are explained by all three solution 
terms. This result indicates that equifinality is present in this phenomenon. 
4.5 Discussion 
Our research provides a foundation for understanding what happens to organiza-
tional rules after their initial implementation in an organization. Previous re-
search on organizational routines has provided evidence that routines and rules 
frequently drift apart (Ciborra, 2000; Bruns, 2009; Anand et al., 2012), thereby 
calling into question the persistence of “once-routinized” rule implementations 
(e.g., Van de Klundert et al., 2010). In the present analysis, we observed organi-
zational rules that were implemented within the very same hospital department 
and persisted in one instance (Case 15) and did not persist in the other (Case 14). 
Interestingly, the non-persistent written rule in this department was persistently 
enacted in another hospital department (Case 10). With these patterns in mind, 
attributing the varying outcomes to differences in change-management practices 
seems implausible, especially as our empirical setting exhibits long-standing ex-
perience with the design and implementation of written rules (e.g., from conduct-
ing clinical studies). 
4.5.1 Exploring Rule Persistence in Organizational Routines 
Our analysis found no necessary condition explaining written rule persistence in 
routines. This finding casts a critical light on traditional phase models of organi-
zational change and stability (e.g., Lewin, 1951) that emphasize single, key di-
mensions as drivers of organizational change (Tsoukas and Chia, 2002). Howev-
er, our analysis revealed three equifinally sufficient explanations for the occur-
rence of rule persistence. In the following section, we demonstrate how and why 
these configurations of conditions foster rule persistence. To clarify the central 
mechanism of each configuration fostering persistent rule enactment, we provide 
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short descriptive labels for each configuration that name the types of situations in 
which rules are persistently enacted 
4.5.1.1 Situation 1: Reducing Risk 
The first solution states that high institutional pressure and high task complexity 
are sufficient for the persistent enactment of care pathways to occur, irrespective 
of task frequency and the professional experience of routine participants. Case 1 
illustrates well how and why high institutional pressure interacting with high task 
complexity can foster the persistent enactment of written rules in treatment rou-
tines. In this specific case, a care pathway for a renal transplant evaluation rou-
tine has been persistently enacted. Institutional pressure to carry out a renal 
transplant evaluation routine according to written care pathways is high. With 13 
publications focusing on care pathways for a renal transplant evaluation, Case 1 
is subject to the second-highest level of institutional pressure in our sample. In 
addition to a close scrutiny by peers and institutional stakeholders, routine partic-
ipants in Case 1 are confronted with high task complexity that increases the risk 
of adverse outcomes. High task complexity results from the high number of in-
terdependent actions that constitute this treatment routine (e.g., surveying the 
patient’s as well as the donor’s health status, controlling for possible infections, 
and monitoring for immune suppression). Completing a renal transplant evalua-
tion routine requires the coordination of specialists (e.g., transplantation sur-
geons, dietitians, and psychologists [cf. Levin et al., 2008]) and patients with an 
unstable and potentially life-threatening health condition (Cohen and Galbraith, 
2001). 
 
While written rules represent a comparatively inefficient coordination device for 
such complex tasks, routine participants are confronted with strong social expec-
tations from their peers to strictly and verifiably adhere to current medical stand-
ards when conducting highly complex tasks prone to adverse medical outcomes. 
High institutional pressure creates strong social expectations for actors to account 
for their performances. Such institutionalized expectations may prescribe the ap-
propriateness of rule enactment; corresponding written rules provide a detailed 
check for evaluating the appropriateness of and thereby accounting for routine 
performances. In this constellation, social contempt becomes more likely if rou-
tine participants find themselves unable to account for their actions. In such sit-
uations, written rules protect routine participants from accusations of inappropri-
ate conduct when failing at the complex task. Participants who fail to live up to 
social expectations risk sanctions from institutional stakeholders (e.g., loss of 
certifications) as well as disapproval by peers. In this configuration, written rules 
are likely to become persistently enacted across routine iterations, as they support 
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routine participants in reducing their risk of failure in a situation in which failure 
is more likely due to high task complexity and linked to severe social sanctions 
due to high institutional pressures. Written rules reduce routine participants’ risk 
by continuously guiding present routine performances while also providing relia-
ble means of accounting for past routine performances. 
4.5.1.2 Situation 2: Securing Status 
The second solution states that high institutional pressure in conjunction with 
high levels of routine participants’ professional experience and high task fre-
quency are sufficient for the persistent enactment of care pathways, irrespective 
of task complexity. Case 9 provides a particularly illustrative example of this 
configuration of conditions. In Case 9, a care pathway is persistently enacted in 
the treatment routine for angina pectoris, a common state of chest discomfort re-
sulting from a restriction in blood supply to the heart. In our sample, the institu-
tional pressure to employ care pathways is highest for this treatment routine, with 
76 articles arguing for the use of a written pathway when treating patients with 
angina pectoris. With a high ratio of specialist physicians relative to residents, 
the routine participants in this department exhibit high levels of professional ex-
perience. Hence, these routine participants obtain the status of medical experts 
who are expected to constantly deliver high-quality medical care and have to ac-
count for their performances accordingly. Further, with 623 cases of angina pec-
toris in a year, actors in this department are confronted with almost two cases per 
day. Here, deviance from well-established standards is more likely to be detected 
by peers and external stakeholders, as high task frequency allows for a reliable 
distinction between singular divergence and systematic deviance from estab-
lished care pathways. Taken together, the situation described in Case 9 of our 
sample illustrates how three different levels of explanatory conditions jointly fos-
ter the persistent enactment of care pathways. 
 
In this configuration, rules are likely to become persistently enacted across rou-
tine iterations, as they support routine participants in securing their professional 
status in a situation in which their high professional experience puts them under 
particular pressure to continuously respond to the strong social expectations that 
prescribe the enactment of written rules as appropriate behavior, while high task 
frequency increases the chances that deviant behavior will be detected. Written 
rules help to secure routine participants’ status by providing a means to guide 
routine performances, thereby visibly complying with the institutional pressures 
that weigh particularly strong on highly experienced routine participants. Further, 
the persistent enactment of written rules secures routine participants’ status by 
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supporting them when accounting for their routine performances in adverse out-
comes. 
4.5.1.3 Situation 3: Surviving Stress 
The third solution states that low levels of professional experience in conjunction 
with low institutional pressure, low task complexity, and high task frequency is 
sufficient for the persistent enactment of care pathways. Case 17 is a good exam-
ple of how this configuration fosters the persistent enactment of a care pathway. 
Here, the treatment routine for pleural punctuation, an invasive procedure to re-
move fluid or air from the pleural space, was persistently carried out according to 
a care pathway. Performed 101 times a year, pleural punctuation is a common 
treatment in the department of Case 17. With an average DRG-weight of only 
0.67, this procedure is of particular low complexity and is generally “found to be 
a safe procedure” (Mynarek et al., 2004: 519). Accordingly, the reimbursement 
rates for pleural puncture are significantly lower compared to medical treatments 
of average complexity. In this situation, routine participants are forced to guide 
their performances in a way that ensures economic efficiency. With almost twice 
as many residents as specialist physicians in this department, routine participants 
are unable to draw on personal experience or constant guidance from experienced 
colleagues and supervisors to identify the most-efficient way to execute a pleural 
puncture. Here, the persistent enactment of care pathways serves as a substitute 
for personal coordination and thus supports routine participants in guiding per-
formances to achieve high levels of task efficiency. 
 
For several reasons, the complete absence of publications referring to a pathway 
for pleural punctuation is further evidence that this procedure is often a locally 
developed pathway. Field-level pressures to enact care pathways are usually 
based on the idea of the medical superiority of pathways. In the department of 
Case 17, the dominant rationale for persistently enacting a pathway for a pleural 
punctuation is efficiency. Hence, in this case the enactment of a pathway would 
not comply with the institutional demands of the medical field. Overall, the rela-
tively inexperienced routine participants in this department draw on care path-
ways to compensate for their low levels of professional experience. Accordingly, 
written rules allow them to consistently execute the frequently occurring and rel-
atively easy pleural punctuation routine in the most-efficient manner possible. 
 
In this situation, routine dynamics are likely to foster persistent rule enactment, 
as routine participants with limited professional experience can draw on written 
rules for guidance and reflection on their experiences. Low levels of professional 
experience in a department imply that most routine participants have not devel-
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oped elaborate ostensive aspects to guide their routine performance. Written rules 
may help inexperienced actors compensate for their lack of ostensive elaboration 
and provide security in choosing task-adequate courses of action. Rules are likely 
to become persistently enacted because they allow participants to guide, account 
for, and refer to routine performances. The low task complexity in this situation 
places routine participants under the pressure of addressing the respective task in 
the most effective and efficient manner, as tasks of this kind are easily compre-
hensible and highly analyzable. While those tasks as such do not bear the risk of 
a great medical failure, a lack of professional experience raises the risk of ineffi-
ciently executed treatment routines and puts routine participants under stress. 
 
Under conditions of high task frequency, inexperienced actors are more likely to 
inefficiently execute treatment routines and, as a consequence, must justify their 
routine performances more often. Having performed a routine in accordance with 
a written rule will aid inexperienced routine participants in accounting for the 
actions taken. The enactment of rules will minimize sanctions for failing at rela-
tively easy tasks, as adhering to written rules implies that routine participants 
performed a routine not only to the best of their knowledge but also to the best of 
general knowledge within the department. In this configuration, rules are likely 
to become persistently enacted across routine iterations, as they support routine 
participants in surviving stress. The persistent enactment of rules serves as a re-
source to routine participants that allows them to survive stress, because rules 
guide inexperienced routine participants with weakly developed ostensive aspects 
while at the same time supporting inexperienced actors in accounting for their 
performance whenever undesired outcomes arise in these frequent routine per-
formances. 
4.5.2 A Configurational Model of Rule Persistence 
Across the three sufficient conditions of persistent care-pathway enactment, we 
find that written rules persist when rule participants draw on written rules as a 
resource in a given situation. Written rules become resources when they enable 
routine participants to perform an organizational routine. To perform an organi-
zational routine, participants have to successfully coordinate their individual ac-
tions (Jarzabkowski et al., 2012; Dionysiou and Tsoukas, 2013). Furthermore, 
routine performances must be considered legitimate by peers. To achieve both 
coordination and legitimization, routine participants can draw on written rules. 
Written rules can serve as guides to coordinate routine performances, as sources 
to account for routine performances, and as labels when referring to routine per-
formances. Written rules therefore may serve as resources for routine participants 
when engaging in the processes that link the ostensive to the performative aspect 
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of an organizational routine. Routine performances create, maintain, or modify 
the ostensive aspects of routine participants. 
 
In our theory section, we argued that the persistent enactment of written rules is 
also contingent on the experiences that routine participants derive from each rou-
tine performance incorporating the written rule. Our findings demonstrate that 
written rules only become a resource when specific situations make guiding, re-
ferring to, and accounting for routine performances more challenging to routine 
participants because of increased coordination needs or strict behavioral expecta-
tions reflected by the institutional environment. For example, in Solution 3 (“sur-
viving stress”) routine participants are likely to quickly integrate the enactment 
of a written rule into their representation of the routine (i.e., the ostensive aspect), 
as they frequently execute a routine that addresses a treatment of little complexi-
ty. In this situation, the rule will most likely work as an efficient coordination 
device while also compensating for the routine participant’s lack of professional 
experience. Given this configuration of conditions, routine participants are likely 
to experience frequent and positive feedback from enacting a care pathway, con-
tributing to the persistent enactment of the written rule in future performances of 
the organizational routine. Figure 4.1 depicts our configurational model of rule 
persistence. 
 
Figure 4.1: Configurational Model of Persistent Rule Enactment 
 
 
This model shows how the interplay between the ostensive and performative as-
pect of a routine fosters persistent rule enactment. Based on our empirical analy-
sis, we distinguish between rule resourcing and rule experiencing as an anteced-
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ent to rule persistence. Rule resourcing takes place whenever routine participants 
find themselves in a situation in which they enact a written rule, as it provides a 
resource in guiding, accounting for, and referring to routine performances. De-
pending on the experiences that follow from each routine performance incorpo-
rating the written rule, the performative aspect (which includes the enactment of 
a written rule) creates and maintains an ostensive aspect that includes rule enact-
ment as an important element of routine participants’ shared representation of the 
routine. 
 
Going back to our empirical data, we find that in solutions 1 and 2, routine par-
ticipants find themselves in a situation in which they face social pressures to con-
form to what is deemed appropriate conduct in the eyes of field-level stakehold-
ers as well as peers, while at the same time are confronted with task characteris-
tics that increase the risk associated with failure to do so. In solution 3, routine 
participants find themselves under high pressure to perform routines efficiently 
while lacking experience to guide their performance. In all three configurations, 
the way in which routine participants’ ostensive aspect guides, accounts for, and 
refers to their performance needs to satisfy multilevel demands encompassing 
institutional, organizational, and task conditions to ensure appropriate conduct 
and efficient coordination. Our analysis therefore underscores that the dynamics 
of organizational routines not only depend on internal organizational contexts 
(Howard-Grenville, 2005) but also on external institutional contexts. Further-
more, our finding of three equifinal solutions supports the notion established by 
some researchers that organizational routine dynamics are subject to equifinal 
processes. Only a few single-case studies have indicated that multiple ontological 
levels influence routine dynamics (e.g., Howard-Grenville, 2005; Rerup and 
Feldman, 2011). Equifinality in routine dynamics has been mostly implied by 
existing research but rarely studied empirically (Pentland et al., 2010: 933). 
4.6 Conclusion and Limitations 
The persistent enactment of rules can be explained by their function as a resource 
linking the ostensive to the performative routine aspect and the experiences de-
rived from the routine performances incorporating the written rule. Our analysis 
substantiates but also extends the generative-systems perspective on organiza-
tional routines. It substantiates the generative-systems perspective in demonstrat-
ing that both conditions influencing rule resourcing (related to processes of guid-
ing, accounting for, and referring to performative aspects) as well as conditions 
influencing rule experience (related to creating, maintaining, and modifying os-
tensive aspects) interact in fostering the persistent enactment of written rules. Our 
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analysis also extends previous research in the generative-systems tradition. It 
does so by demonstrating that the persistent enactment of written rules is not only 
subject to specific performances by specific actors in specific situations, but also 
follows from the interaction of conditions incorporating the institutional, organi-
zational, and task level. This finding should remind researchers theorizing about 
routines as generative systems to consider the different contexts in which rou-
tines are performed. Failure to do so might result in incomplete descriptions and 
interpretations of phenomena. We suggest that theories of organizational routines 
need to be broadened to include multilevel dynamics to explain the persistence of 
written rules in organizational routines. Based on our empirical analysis of per-
sistent rule enactment, we propose a configurational model of rule persistence 
that incorporates external and internal organizational context. Accordingly, our 
work expands the generative-systems perspective on routines by contributing 
theory and data that explicitly address context as an oftentimes neglected influ-
ence (Parmigiani and Howard-Grenville, 2011). In conclusion, we propose a 
“routines-in-situations perspective” to explain routine dynamics and rule persis-
tence. 
 
This study aims to explain an empirical phenomenon—the persistent enactment 
of organizational rules—for which the relevance for organizational survival and 
performance has been extensively documented by organizational research (cf., 
Heugens and Lander, 2009). However, we still lack research that examines the 
persistent enactment of written organizational rules in organizational routines. 
While our inquiry addresses this research gap, our sample includes a relatively 
small number of organizational routines. Although other qualitative studies on 
organizational routines incorporate a comparable or smaller number of routines 
(e.g., Feldman, 2000; Howard-Grenville, 2005), any generalizations drawn from 
our study should consider this limitation. For example, we cannot claim that our 
sufficient solutions apply to every type of written rule enacted for every routine 
in every form of organization. Another potential limitation is that all organiza-
tional routines in our sample are executed within internal-medicine departments 
at German university hospitals. However, the calibration procedure included in 
our fsQCA analysis mitigates this shortcoming, since the set membership values 
were not defined according to our sample’s means, but rather according to exog-
enous standards (e.g., population means). This design reduces the necessity of 
employing a representative sample for generalization (Fiss, 2011). Therefore, our 
findings should also apply to treatment routines in other hospital departments or 
non-university hospitals. 
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Since hospitals are an extreme in terms of knowledge-intensive and competitive-
service organizations, they offer substantial learning opportunities for compara-
ble service organizations (cf., Adler, 2003). That said, we refrain from generaliz-
ing our findings to organizational routines that are executed within industrial or-
ganizations, settings which provide an interesting area for further research. Fur-
thermore, our study draws on data aggregated across individual routine partici-
pants. Given that organizational routines are usually performed within a social 
context constituted by more or less experienced actors, we consider our measure 
appropriate for the present study. We would welcome future research to expand 
on our findings and employ ethnographic methods to study the interaction of 
multiple actors and their interaction processes causing the persistence of rules in 
routines more closely. Such research seems particularly promising when consid-
ering the impact of prior ethnographic work on hospitals (Kellogg, 2009) and the 
initial implementation of written rules in routines (Lazaric and Denis, 2005; 
Reynaud, 2005). 
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5 Overcoming Creative Failure for Creativity: 
The Importance of Socio-emotional and 
Informational Team Resources for Sustained 
Employee Creativity 
5.1 Introduction 
Employee creativity, defined as the production of novel and useful ideas, is wide-
ly regarded an important driver of organizational innovation, competitiveness, 
and ultimate survival (Amabile, 1988; Oldham and Cummings, 1996; George, 
2007). Researchers have therefore sought to identify those factors that spur or 
thwart employee creativity (Amabile, 1983; George, 2007; Zhou and Shalley, 
2008). One such factor may be creative failure—the rejection of employees’ ide-
as because they are insufficiently novel or useful (Amabile et al., 2005; Zhou, 
2008). Because of the risky and uncertain nature of creativity (Weick, 1995a; 
Simonton, 1999; Fleming, 2001; Kelley and Littman, 2001; Sutton, 2001; March, 
2010), creative failure is common and relevant for employees who seek to be 
creative. In light of this fact, and the notion that prior failure experiences have 
been identified as having a significant impact on subsequent behavior in areas 
such as learning (Edmondson et al., 2001) and performance (Brunstein, 2000), it 
is surprising that we know little about the relationship between creative failure 
and subsequent creativity. 
 
The present chapter addresses this issue. We bring together ideas from the fail-
ure, creativity, and teams literatures to argue that the team social context in par-
ticular influences whether prior creative failure triggers or stifles employees’ 
subsequent creative performance behavior (i.e., activities concerned with gener-
ating ideas) and succeed in producing creative outcomes (i.e., ideas that are new 
and useful). Specifically, we posit that if employees experiencing creative failure 
work in teams that are psychologically safe (i.e., teams that are safe for interper-
sonal risk taking; Edmondson [1999]), such employees receive the encourage-
ment and support needed to overcome potential threats to self-efficacy beliefs 
and threat-rigidity reactions, resulting in sustained creative performance behavior 
and creative outcomes. Additionally, we propose that, beyond socio-emotional 
support, teams that are safe for interpersonal risk-taking may also encourage em-
ployees with failure experiences to seek out advice and information from, and 
confide in, their team colleagues. Provided that teams hold distributed and unique 
expertise (Wegner, 1987), these informational resources may help employees to 
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better understand the causes of their failed creative efforts and further fuel subse-
quent creativity (Richter et al., 2012). 
 
Following calls for objective creativity measures (Amabile and Mueller, 2008), 
examination of cross-level interactions on creativity (Shalley et al., 2004), and 
longitudinal creativity research (Zhou and Shalley, 2008), we contribute to the 
creativity and teams literatures in various ways. We first and foremost contribute 
to the literature on employee creativity by elucidating the link between creative 
failure and subsequent creative performance behavior and creative outcomes. By 
adopting a person-in-situation perspective (Hirst et al., 2009), we also provide 
answers to the question of how employees can overcome prior creative failure. 
Given that prior research has traditionally treated psychological safety and trans-
active memory system as predictors of team level outcomes (Edmondson, 1999; 
Ren and Argote, 2011), we extend this perspective by highlighting the relevance 
of these factors as cross-level moderators for individual-level outcomes. Finally, 
we provide advice to managers about how to create team environments that sus-
tain employee creativity. 
5.2 Theory: Creative Failure and Creativity 
Creative failure is a common experience for employees who seek to be creative. 
Although creative performance behavior may eventually lead to novel and useful 
ideas, it typically encompasses an enduring struggle with bad ideas, mistakes, 
and setbacks (Amabile, 1988; Kanter, 1988). Research on employee suggestions, 
one form of creative performance behavior (Amabile, 1983; Mumford and Gus-
tafson, 1988; Montag et al., 2012), for example, found that over 40 percent of 
employees’ creative efforts result in failure experiences, as suggestions are re-
jected due to insufficient newness or usefulness (Frese et al., 1999; Arthur and 
Huntley, 2005; Ohly, Sonnentag and Pluntke, 2006). 
 
The impact of such failure experiences on subsequent creativity is controversial. 
On the one hand, creative failure may serve as a motivational impetus stimulating 
employees’ subsequent creative performance behavior and outcome. Because 
failure may increase the perceived difficulty of a subsequent task, and difficult 
tasks associated with positive outcomes may present attractive challenges 
(Bélanger et al., 2013), failure may provoke an increase in effort in order to 
achieve positive outcomes (Brehm et al., 1983; Wright and Brehm, 1989). From 
this perspective, creative failure signals a positive challenge for developing ideas 
that are novel and useful (cf. Locke and Latham, 1990). In a similar vein, failure 
may provoke intra-individual tensions and negative emotions that motivate indi-
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viduals to overcome these adverse internal states by creating novel and useful 
outcomes (Runco, 1994). For example, Amabile et al. (2005) reported suggestive 
evidence from a small sample of employees that experiences of frustration due to 
repeated failure spurred the development of creative thoughts in order to resolve 
the problem at hand. The authors suggest that frustration resulting from failure 
may enhance employees’ motivation to triumph over failure and increase their 
creative performance behavior. In line with these findings, one employee from 
the company we studied recalled that discovering a solution for an inefficiency 
within a particular segment of an operating routine he is responsible for almost 
became a “question of honor” for him, after the two suggestions he made to solve 
the problem had been rejected. Experiencing creative failure may therefore foster 
creativity via enhanced persistence and motivation. 
 
On the other hand, creative failure may thwart creativity. Failure experiences 
may call into question employees’ ability to accomplish creative tasks, and 
thereby lower creative self-efficacy beliefs (cf. Tierney and Farmer, 2011). Re-
duced self-efficacy and threat-rigidity reactions likely discourage further en-
gagement in creative performance behavior (Amabile, 1983). This argument is in 
line with research on learned helplessness (i.e., loss of faith in one's ability to 
conquer adversity), suggesting that harmed self-efficacy and decreased control 
expectations reduce the likelihood that individuals engage in efforts to change 
unpleasant circumstances despite promising opportunities (Seligman, 1975; 
Mikulincer, 1994). Additionally, creative failure may be perceived as a threat to 
an individual’s interests, such as maintaining self-esteem or solving a pressing 
problem in an important operating routine. In their analysis of human reactions 
towards threatening situations, Staw et al. (1981) argue that individuals may re-
spond to threats such as failure experiences by exhibiting threat-rigidity reactions 
characterized by limited information processing and constriction of control. Em-
ployees who show threat-rigidity reactions usually avoid activities that trigger 
potentially unfamiliar changes (Ocasio, 1995). Such conservative and risk-averse 
behavior is likely to thwart subsequent creative effort because creativity involves 
risk-taking and uncertainty (Simonton, 1999; Fleming, 2001). In line with this 
reasoning, another participant clearly stated that rejections cause frustration and 
doubt, and recalled several employees who, after having received rejections, felt 
resigned and stopped submitting ideas to the suggestion system for several years. 
 
In sum, we believe that creative failure may either spur or thwart creativity. In 
order to elucidate this relationship, we will argue in the following sections that 
the socio-emotional and informational resources provided by employees’ proxi-
mal work team may affect whether employees turn prior creative failure into sub-
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sequent creative performance behavior and outcome. We will develop these ideas 
into the hypotheses that the relationship between employee creative failure and 
subsequent creativity is moderated by team psychological safety and team trans-
active memory system. 
5.3 Hypotheses 
5.3.1 Moderating Effect of Team Psychological Safety 
The proximal work team represents an almost ubiquitous social environment 
where employee creativity is enacted (Hirst et al., 2009), and in which help-
seeking is a commonly employed problem-solving strategy (Hargadon and 
Bechky, 2006; Mueller and Kamdar, 2011). Teams may represent a resource for 
the provision of social support and advice and thus help employees to engage in 
creativity after having made experiences of creative failure. Specifically, fellow 
team members may provide social support to employees that reveal failure expe-
rience and encourage them to continue engaging in creativity, which may in-
crease their self-efficacy beliefs and lower threat-rigidity reactions. One employ-
ee in the organization that we studied, for example, explained that rejections 
cause frustration because the development of suggestions is effortful. However, 
he also reported that his fellow teammates, with whom he had openly discussed 
his failure experience, successfully encouraged and motivated him to continue 
developing and submitting suggestions. 
 
However, employees will not necessarily share prior creative failure experiences 
with their fellow team members. As research on teams in varying organizational 
contexts shows, employees may hesitate to reveal failures to coworkers to avoid 
potential damage to their image, such as being seen as incompetent, or a sense of 
threat that confessing failure may result in embarrassment (Edmondson, 1996; 
Edmondson, 1999; Edmondson et al., 2001; Lee et al., 2004). Whether individu-
als reveal failure experiences in order to receive team support and resources to 
cope with failure experiences therefore depends on the social norms and conse-
quences related to reporting and discussing failure experiences within the team 
(Schein and Bennis, 1965; Weick and Sutcliffe, 2007). 
 
In teams with a climate of psychological safety—defined as the “shared belief 
that the team is safe for interpersonal risk taking” (Edmondson, 1999: 354)—we 
expect employees to feel safe to engage in interpersonal risk taking and confident 
that the team will not embarrass, reject, or punish them for admitting failure ex-
periences. Psychological safety helps employees to confront data that disconfirm 
their expectations or hopes without engendering defensiveness (Schein, 1985), to 
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seek help from coworkers, and to discuss failure openly (Edmondson, 1996; Ed-
mondson, 1999). Highlighting the role of psychological safety for coping with 
prior creative failure, one employee from the company we studied emphasized 
that openly discussing rejections is no problem in his team. He argued that his 
teammates show respect for the effort made irrespective of the outcome. This 
context helped him “to get the rejection off his chest” without having to fear em-
barrassment and allowed him to continue making suggestions. Psychological 
safety neither implies friendship among team members, nor suggests an absence 
of problems. Rather, it indicates that team members relax their impression man-
agement and openly discuss failure because the team harbors a climate where 
others will respond positively to self-exposition, for instance through provision 
of encouragement or advice (Edmondson, 1999). 
 
In contrast, low levels of psychological safety suggest that team members are 
focused on impression management due to fear of embarrassment (Edmondson, 
1999). Another employee from the company we studied reported that he deliber-
ately avoided talking about suggestions and rejections with his work team, as 
these conversations usually turn into a source of mischief. Such environments 
convey a sense of threat, resulting in increased caution and reduced motivation to 
disclose personal failures (Edmondson, 1999; Edmondson, 2004). Given that 
feelings of shame lie at the core of fear of failure (McGregor and Elliot, 2005), 
individuals may be too embarrassed to discuss experiences of failure with 
coworkers in team environments with little safety for interpersonal risk taking. In 
teams with low levels of psychological safety, revealing failure may increase 
chances of being framed as incompetent and powerless (Edmondson, 1996; Lee, 
1997; 2002). 
 
We therefore expect that team psychological safety moderates the relationship 
between creative failure and creativity. Specifically, we propose that in teams 
with low levels of psychological safety employees may either avoid to share fail-
ure experiences in order to evade putting themselves at risk of being socially 
sanctioned (cf. Milliken, Morrison and Hewlin, 2003). Conversely, we expect 
that employees who work in teams that are psychologically safe will openly dis-
cuss failure experiences without negative consequences. In such teams, the en-
couragement and social support provided by team colleagues likely serves to 
minimize threat-rigidity reactions and bolster employees’ self-efficacy beliefs, 
resulting in increased creativity (Edmondson, 1999; Madjar, 2008). Thus, teams 
that are psychologically safe may help employees to reframe failure as an attrac-
tive challenge that spurs subsequent creative performance behavior and outcome. 
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Although we propose a positive moderating effect of team psychological safety 
on the relationship between creative failure and subsequent creative performance 
behavior and outcome, we do not expect this effect to be linear. Specifically, we 
believe that once a certain threshold of psychological safety is reached that al-
lows an employee to reveal his or her failure experience, additional increases in 
psychological safety comfort the employee to reveal more personal feelings re-
garding his or her failure experiences—but will result in little additional effects 
on his or her creative performance behavior and outcome. We thus propose a di-
minishing positive moderating effect of psychological safety on the relationship 
between creative failure and subsequent creativity, such that in team environ-
ments with medium to high levels of psychological safety there will be a more 
positive relationship between prior creative failure and subsequent creative per-
formance behavior and creative outcome than in teams with low level of psycho-
logical safety. 
 
Hypothesis 1 (H1): Team psychological safety has a positive but diminishing 
moderating effect on the relationship between prior creative failure and subse-
quent (a) creative performance behavior and (b) creative outcome. 
5.3.2 Interaction between Transactive Memory System and Psychological 
Safety 
Although we expect the social support that employees receive to alleviate their 
ability to overcome prior creative failure for subsequent creativity, we believe 
that social support is not the only relevant resource that may be provided in team 
contexts that are sufficiently psychologically safe. Specifically, team members 
may not only offer encouragement and social support but also provide useable 
knowledge and information that may help employees to understand why creative 
failure occurred, and foster richer and broader perspectives on new and potential-
ly valuable ideas. Another employee from the organization that we studied illus-
trated this mechanism. He reported that having suggestions rejected is particular-
ly frustrating when it is hard to understand the fallacies that caused the submis-
sion to be rejected. He further explained that talking about the reasoning provid-
ed for the rejection with fellow team members helped him to understand the mis-
takes that he had made and substantially improved his subsequent submissions. 
 
The quality of the informational support provided by team members for employ-
ees with failure experiences, however, likely also varies across teams, and may 
depend on how knowledge is stored within a team’s collective knowledge struc-
ture. This distribution of unique knowledge across members of a team is captured 
by the notion of a team’s transactive memory system, which refers to the shared 
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‘meta-knowledge’ of distributed expertise (i.e., of who knows what) in a team 
(Wegner, 1987). A transactive memory system provides a team with a system for 
distributing, storing and retrieving knowledge based on team members’ individu-
al areas of expertise, where team members serve each other as memory aids 
(Brandon and Hollingshead, 2004; Kozlowski and Ilgen, 2006: 85). A transactive 
memory system allows team members to access and use distributed information 
and expertise that they do not possess individually by locating and soliciting this 
information from team colleagues (e.g., Libby, Trotman and Zimmer, 1987; Faraj 
and Sproull, 2000). Previous research has demonstrated that groups may develop 
a transactive memory system to efficiently share cognitive loads (Wegner, Giuli-
ano and Hertel, 1985; Wegner, 1987; Liang, Moreland and Argote, 1995). 
 
Although transactive memory systems have previously been applied to team lev-
el outcomes (for reviews, see Lewis and Herndon, 2011; Ren and Argote, 2011), 
access to distributed expertise may similarly facilitate the development of novel 
ideas by individual employees (Richter et al., 2012). Specifically, employees 
working in teams with a well-developed transactive memory system may benefit 
from creative failure through provision of uniquely held information and exper-
tise (e.g., by reviewing operating routine setups and suggesting alternative hy-
potheses, or by providing domain-specific advice [Larson, 2010; Lewis and 
Herndon, 2011]). Because a well-developed transactive memory system may 
serve employees to identify the causes of prior failure and thus to develop novel 
perspectives and insights, teams with well-developed transactive memory sys-
tems bear the potential to foster the creative activities of employees with creative 
failure experiences. 
 
However, the mere availability of a well-functioning transactive memory system 
in and of itself may not help employees to understand the reasons for their prior 
creative failure and develop new perspectives on what is needed to come up with 
new and valuable ideas. Rather, employees will only benefit from their team’s 
transactive memory system in learning from prior creative failure, if they reveal 
prior failure experiences to the team. Whether or not employees with creative 
failure experiences capitalize on the informational benefits of a transactive 
memory system will therefore depend on the level of team psychological safety 
realized within the team. Consequently, we propose a three-way interaction be-
tween team psychological safety, team transactive memory system and employ-
ees’ prior creative failure on their subsequent creativity. Specifically, we propose 
that when psychological safety exceeds the threshold for employees to openly 
share their failure experiences, the informational benefits of a transactive 
memory system will have a positive moderating effect on the relationship be-
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tween employees’ creative failure experiences and their subsequent creative per-
formance behavior and creative outcome. 
 
Hypothesis 2 (H2): In teams with a sufficient level of psychological safety, the 
relationship between prior creative failure and subsequent (a) creative perfor-
mance behavior and (b) creative outcome will be positively moderated by team’s 
transactive memory system. 
5.3.3 Mediating Effect of Creative Performance Behavior 
Creative outcomes are the potential result of creative performance behavior 
(Amabile et al., 2005; Montag et al., 2012). We therefore expect that the interac-
tive effects of team contextual factors and prior creative failure on creative out-
come will be mediated by creative performance behavior. 
 
Hypothesis 3 (H3): Creative performance behavior will mediate the interactive 
effects of psychological safety, transactive memory system, and creative failure 
on creative outcome. 
 
Figure 5.1 summarizes our study hypotheses. 
 
Figure 5.1: Study Hypotheses 
 
 
5.4 Sample and Method 
5.4.1 Sample Selection and Description 
We collected data from one site of a large German chemical company. In line 
with the notion that employee creativity is crucial for firm competitiveness and 
survival in the chemical industry (Rammer, 2007), our sample company encour-
ages employees to come up with creative ideas for improving products, services, 
and production processes by means of a suggestion system that has been in place 
for over thirty years. Representatives of the company told us that their suggestion 
system has been in place for this long time because the ideas submitted have a 
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significant positive economic impact for the company. All suggestions made by 
employees are evaluated by management representatives and representatives 
from the workers’ council (cf. Arthur and Aiman-Smith, 2001). Accordingly, the 
evaluation of ideas is strictly disconnected from the suggestion submitter. Each 
suggestion is scrutinized through a formalized decision process that is designed 
to produce a rational estimate of the company’s potential profit from implement-
ing the suggestion. Employees receive the evaluation of their suggestions in their 
private company mail. If an idea is considered new and valuable and thus accept-
ed for implementation, employees are rewarded by receiving a premium reflect-
ing the idea’s economic benefit for the company. Suggestions made at the time of 
this study were complex and included proposals about how to increase the effi-
ciency of operating routines (e.g., to reduce the amount of mercury needed and 
emitted in the production process), how to increase the flexibility of site logistic 
routines (e.g., a change in weighting procedures for return shipments of raw ma-
terials), and how to increase the effectiveness of chemical-analysis routines (e.g., 
higher precision in chlorine analysis). As several employees confirmed, develop-
ing such suggestions typically takes a considerable amount of time and effort. 
 
To ensure support for our research, we had meetings with the company’s senior 
managers and employee representatives, presented our research design and ques-
tionnaire, and offered a summary of the main study findings upon study comple-
tion to the management. This procedure gave us access to the 51 teams compris-
ing 299 employees working in the production and service areas of the company 
site under study. While production teams are responsible for running and improv-
ing chemical and other operating routines, service teams are responsible for run-
ning and improving the infrastructural routines. For example, service teams ar-
range the logistic activities required to transport needed raw materials to the pro-
duction site and chemical products to customers. 
 
Employee participation in our study was anonymous, voluntary, and not incentiv-
ized. In total, 267 employees (89.3% response rate) from 48 teams returned ques-
tionnaires. We used Dawson’s (2003) selection rate to exclude groups with low 
group-level response rates from further analyses. Following earlier research 
(Richter et al., 2006), we chose a selection rate ([N-n]/Nn) of .32 as cut-off point, 
which suggests that the data from our sample correlated with true scores to .95 or 
higher. In total, six teams did not meet this cut-off point and were excluded from 
further analysis. The final sample thus included 42 production and service teams 
(218 respondents). On average, teams had eight members (SD = 3.25), and em-
ployees had worked on their jobs for 14 years (SD = 10.49). Respondents were 
on average 44 years old (SD = 9.42). 204 (94%) employees had completed pro-
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fessional schooling, and 24 (11%) master craftsmen training. 196 (90%) re-
spondents were male. 
 
In addition to the survey, we were allowed to use archival data on the suggestions 
made by those employees that took part in our study. Specifically, based on a 
matching process employing an anonymized code issued by the company, we 
received information on the suggestions made by employees in a two-year 
timespan, as well as information on whether the suggestions were rejected or ac-
cepted, and the bonus payments that were granted for every suggestion that was 
accepted. For testing our hypotheses, we could thus rely on archival data indicat-
ing prior creative failure, subsequent creative performance behavior, and the re-
sulting creative outcome, in two subsequent years (year 1, year 2). The modera-
tors, as well as several control variables, were based on survey data that were 
collected in the first half of year 2. All survey items used were translated and 
back-translated following the procedures described by Brislin (1980). Prior to the 
main study, we additionally discussed the entire survey with managers and em-
ployee representatives and conducted a qualitative pre-test with employees that 
did not participate in the main study. This pre-test consisted of a think-aloud pro-
tocol to receive structured feedback on the validity and comprehensibility of the 
questionnaire (Sudman et al., 2010). Following a consultation with employee 
representatives, the final pen-and-paper survey was distributed to all team mem-
bers by the researchers. Finally, we conducted several in-depth interviews with 
employees from different teams in order to cross-validate the interpretation of 
our findings. 
5.4.2 Measures 
Dependent Variables. We followed recent calls for using objective indicators of 
creativity (e.g., Amabile and Mueller, 2008) and relied on archival data from the 
firm’s suggestion system to capture our dependent variables. Consistent with pri-
or work (Oldham and Cummings, 1996; Montag et al., 2012), we measured crea-
tive performance behavior by counting the suggestions an employee submitted in 
year 2. Following Liao et al. (2010), we captured employee creative outcome by 
the sum of bonus payments employees received for accepted suggestions submit-
ted in year 2. 
 
Independent Variable and Moderators. To capture creative failure, we counted 
the number of rejections each employee received for his or her submissions in 
year 1. Following earlier research (Nembhard and Edmondson, 2006; Detert and 
Burris, 2007; Tucker, Nembhard and Edmondson, 2007), we relied on a short-
ened and context-adapted version of Edmonson’s (1999) scale to assess psycho-
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logical safety. The items we used are: “Members of this team are able to bring up 
problems and tough issues”, “No one on this team would deliberately act in a 
way that undermines my efforts”, “It is difficult to ask other members of this 
team for help (reverse-coded)”, and “If you make a mistake on this team, it is 
often held against you (reverse-coded)” Answers ranged from 1, “strongly disa-
gree,” to 5, “strongly agree”. Items formed a single scale (Cronbach’s alpha = 
.72). We measured teams’ transactive memory system using Lewis’s (2003) 15-
item scale ranging from 1, “not at all correct,” to 5, “completely correct.” A sam-
ple item is, “I know which team members have expertise in specific areas.” Con-
sistent with prior research (Lewis, 2004; Gino et al., 2010) the items formed a 
single scale (Cronbach’s alpha = .78). 
 
As psychological safety and transactive memory are both considered team-level 
constructs, we assessed levels of inter-rater agreement within teams, as well as 
significant variance between teams (Bliese, 2000). Inter-rater agreement analyses 
by means of median rwg(j) tests across teams (James, Demaree and Wolf, 1984; 
LeBreton and Senter, 2008) revealed adequate within-team agreement for psy-
chological safety (.82) and transactive memory system (.95). One-way ANOVAs 
further revealed significant between-team variance for psychological safety (F = 
2.68, p = .00) and transactive memory system (F = 2.98, p = .000). This result 
was confirmed by intra-class correlation coefficients for psychological safety 
(ICC[1] = .24, ICC[2] = .63) and transactive memory (ICC[1] = .29, ICC[2] = 
.66), which are acceptable for teams as small as the ones in our sample (James, 
1982; Bliese, 2000; Klein et al., 2000). Overall, results suggest that the aggrega-
tion of both measures to the team level is justified. 
 
Controls. In all analyses, we controlled for several individual and team-level var-
iables that have previously been associated with employee creativity and team 
processes (see Zhou and Shalley, 2008, for an overview). At the individual level, 
we controlled for employees’ age, gender, job tenure, and risk propensity. We 
measured risk propensity with a six–item scale developed by Hao et al. (2005). A 
sample item is: “I am willing to take significant risk if the possible rewards are 
high enough.” Response categories ranged from 1, “strongly disagree,” to 5, 
“strongly agree”. Items formed a single scale (Cronbach’s alpha = .70). Addi-
tionally, we controlled for employees’ prior creative performance behavior and 
creative outcome by including the number of suggestions made, as well as the 
number of suggestions accepted, and the bonus payments employees received for 
their accepted suggestions in year 1. 
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At the team level, we controlled for team size, team job tenure, and whether the 
team operates in a production or service setting. Additionally, we included a 
dummy variable indicating whether the team participated in a quality circle pro-
ject which had been introduced in the beginning of year 2, as quality circles may 
shift the focus from individual-level to team-level suggestions. Finally, we con-
trolled for prior experiences with the suggestion system on a team level by in-
cluding the number of team members that submitted ideas and the number of 
team members that had ideas accepted in year 1. 
5.5 Results 
Table 5.1 displays the descriptive statistics and correlations among individual-
level (Level 1) as well as among team-level (Level 2) variables. Similar to prior 
research using suggestion systems with voluntary employee participation (e.g., 
Oldham and Cummings, 1996; Frese et al., 1999; Arthur and Aiman-Smith, 
2001; Ohly et al., 2006), we find that, on average, one-third (.40 for year 1; .30 
for year 2) of the employees in our sample submit a suggestion every year. Also 
consistent with prior research (Frese et al., 1999; Arthur and Huntley, 2005; Ohly 
et al., 2006), we observe that a considerable percentage of the suggestions made 
by employees are rejected due to insufficient newness or usefulness. 
 
Table 5.1: Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlations 
Variables Mean SD 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 
Level 1: Individual Level            
1. Job Tenure 13.74 10.49          
2. Age 44.30 9.42 .486**         
3. Gender .10 .30 -.076 -.189**        
4. Risk Propensity 2.69 .75 -.065 -.138* .078       
5. Creative Performance Behavior (yr. 1) .40 1.22 .052 -.161* -.085 .059      
6. Accepted Suggestions (yr. 1) .24 .68 .040 -.143* -.072 .061 .863**     
7. Creative Failure (yr. 1) .14 .58 .042 -.145* -.079 .045 .882** .552**    
8. Creative Outcome (yr. 1) 57.80 260.17 .087 .001 -.055 -.124 .554** .718** .285**   
9. Creative Performance Behavior (yr. 2) .30 .95 -.025 -.117 -.073 .075 .488** .406** .431** .178**  
10. Creative Outcome (yr. 2) 54.89 354.97 -.035 -.086 -.043 -.029 .263** .286** .204** .215** .538**
Level 2: Team Level            
1. Team Size 7.76 3.25          
2. Production Team .55 .50 -.157         
3. Team Members: Submissions (yr. 1) .79 .65 .126 .070        
4. Team Members: Accepted Sub. (yr. 1) .69 .64 .080 .084 .894**       
5. Quality Circle .52 .51 .182 .187 .353* .211      
6. Team Job Tenure 13.58 5.83 .033 -.120 .225 .185 .185     
7. Psychological Safety 4.10 .56 -.121 .211 .248 .235 .130 -.164    
8. Transactive Memory System 3.75 .36 -.079 -.101 .179 .250 -.075 -.162 .659**   
Notes: N employees = 218, N teams = 42; ** p ≤ .01 (two-tailed); * p ≤ .05 (two-tailed). 
 
Across years 1 and 2, we observe significant correlations between our measures 
for creative performance behavior (r = .488, p = .00) and creative outcome (r = 
 C H A N G I N G  O R G A N I Z A T I O N A L  R O U T I N E S  
124 
.215, p = .00). This correlation suggests that including the lagged-dependent var-
iables into our analysis may be necessary to rule out potential biases due to unob-
served heterogeneity (Katila and Ahuja, 2002; King and Lenox, 2002; O'Brien, 
2003). Within year 1, however, we also find strong correlations between creative 
failure and our lagged-dependent variable creative performance behavior (r = 
.882, p = .00). This correlation follows from the fact that the number of rejected 
submissions is a subset of the total number of submissions made by an employee 
in the respective year. Including such highly correlated variables in one model 
may potentially result in multicollinearity issues, such as large standard errors 
and unstable coefficients (Belsley, Kuh and Welsch, 2005; Wooldridge, 2009). 
While we included employees’ creative performance behavior (year 1) into our 
analyses to address potential unobserved heterogeneity in our results, we ruled 
out potential instability of our results due to multicollinearity by conducting addi-
tional tests. Specifically, we followed earlier research (Echambadi, Campbell and 
Agarwal, 2006; Yue, Luo and Ingram, 2013) and tested for the stability of our 
results by re-running our models with different sets of control variables, one of 
which excluded creative performance behavior (year 1) and the number of team 
members with suggestion submissions (year 1). These additional tests clearly 
demonstrated that the findings presented below are stable. Also, considering that 
we employed a software package (HLM, version 7.01) that is particularly suscep-
tible to multicollinearity (Choi, 2007; Aryee et al., 2008) when running all our 
models, we are confident that our findings are not affected by multicollinearity. 
Finally, we observe a significant correlation between the moderator variables 
addressed in our study––psychological safety and transactive memory system (r 
= .659, p = .00)––and thus checked for their discriminant validity by means of 
confirmatory factor analyses. These analyses suggest that a model with psycho-
logical safety and transactive memory as separate but correlated factors (χ² = 
181.77, df = 108; TLI = .90; CFI = .94) demonstrates good overall, as well as a 
significantly better fit than a one-factor solution (χ² = 235.81, df = 107; TLI = 
.82; CFI = .90; ∆χ² [∆df] = 54.04 [1]; p = .00). 
 
To check whether our data require multilevel analyses, we examined whether 
significant variance in creative performance behavior and creative outcome re-
sided between teams. We first calculated a null model and the corresponding ICC 
(1) (Aguinis, Gottfredson and Culpepper, 2013). Results suggest that 29 percent 
(ICC1 = .29, p = .01) of the variance in creative performance behavior, as well as 
five percent (ICC1 = .05, p = .00) of the variance in creativity, resided at the 
team level. We then examined whether significant between-group variance resid-
ed in the slopes describing the relationships between prior creative failure and 
subsequent creative performance behavior, as well as creative outcome. Such 
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variance would suggest examination of cross-level moderators. Results of a ran-
dom-slope model analysis (Aguinis et al., 2013) revealed significant team-level 
variance in the creative failure-creative performance behavior slope (u1 variance 
= 4.42, χ2 [15] = 196.73, p = .00), as well as the creative failure–creative outcome 
slope (u1 variance = 10.01, χ2 [15] = 1221.90, p = .00), thus suggesting examina-
tion of cross-level interaction effects. 
 
To test our hypotheses, we specified slopes-as-outcomes models (Hofmann, 
1997), group-mean-centered individual-level variables, except for the dummy 
variables (Hofmann and Gavin, 1998; Enders and Tofighi, 2007), and standard-
ized our team-level variables prior to calculating cross-level interaction terms. 
Following earlier research (Hirst et al., 2009; Breugst et al., 2012), we resorted to 
a model specification that includes linear as well as quadratic one-way and two-
way interaction terms, and tested our hypotheses based on a final model for every 
dependent variable. This is due to three reasons: First, we hypothesized a dimin-
ishing moderating effect of team psychological safety on the relationship be-
tween prior creative failure and subsequent a) creative performance behavior and 
b) creative outcome. Second, we proposed a positive moderating impact of team 
transactive memory system provided that teams have sufficient levels of psycho-
logical safety. Third, as higher order interactions whose true effects are nonzero 
have to be included to avoid biasing the estimation of lower order terms (Aiken 
and West, 1991; Jaccard and Turrisi, 2003), we had to test our hypotheses in one 
model. Table 5.2 shows the models and the results of our analyses. 
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Table 5.2: HLM Results for Effects of Cross-Level Interactions of Psychological Safety and 
Transactive Memory System with Creative Failure (yr. 1) on Employee Creativity (yr. 2), 
Employee Creative Performance Behavior (yr. 2), and the Mediation Model 
  
Model 1:  
Creative Performance 
Behavior19 
Model 2: 
Creative Outcome20 
Model 3: 
Mediation Model 
  Coefficient s.e. Coefficient s.e. Coefficient s.e. 
Intercept -2.45** .48 .14 .20 .17 .20 
Level 1 Controls   
Job Tenure -.03 .02 .00 .00 .00 .00 
Age -.05 .03 .00 .00 .00 .00 
Gender (Dummy) -.62 .67 -.07 .07 -.05 .07 
Risk Propensity .15 .33 .01 .03 -.02 .01 
Creative Outcome (yr. 1) .00 .00 .00* .00 .00* .00 
Creative Performance Behavior (yr. 1) -2.44 1.97 -3.09* 1.50 -1.74** .42 
Number of Accepted Suggestions (yr. 1) 3.08 1.93 3.58** 1.35 1.84** .42 
Creative Performance Behavior (yr. 2) (Mediation)   .66** .08 
Level 1 Main Effect   
Creative Failure (yr. 1) 4.12 2.32 3.82 2.17 2.47* .95 
Level 2 Controls   
Team Size -.06 .08 -.05* .03 -.05** .02 
Production Team -.81 .52 .56* .24 .23 .16 
Team Members: Submissions (yr. 1) .44 .57 .16 .20 .67* .25 
Team Members: Accepted Suggestions (yr. 1) .25 .46 .13 .16 -.39* .16 
Quality Circle (Dummy) .32 .52 -.30 .19 .00 .11 
Team Job Tenure -.08 .05 .04 .02 .03* .01 
Psychological Safety 2.10 1.13 .40 .27 .14 .31 
Psychological Safety² -.04 .39 -.29 .16 -.12 .16 
Transactive Memory System -1.70 .99 .40 .39 .28 .26 
Two-Way Interaction Terms   
Psychological Safety x Transactive Memory System .15 .37 .03 .12 -.12 .15 
Psychological Safety² x Transactive Memory System -.22 .35 -.24* .12 -.12 .12 
Creative Failure (yr. 1) x Psychological Safety 9.74* 3.89 4.66* 1.89 .08 1.48
Creative Failure (yr. 1) x Psychological Safety² -4.05* 1.82 -1.90* .94 -.59 .73 
Creative Failure (yr. 1) x Transactive Memory System 2.02 3.77 3.38 2.51 2.41 1.38
Three-Way Interaction Terms   
 
Creative Failure (yr. 1) x Psychological Safety x  
Transactive Memory System 2.50* 1.22 1.41* .60 .35 .51 
 
Creative Failure (yr. 1) x Psychological Safety² x  
Transactive Memory System -1.91* .78 -1.44* .69 -.64 .50 
Notes: ** p ≤ .01 (two-tailed); * p ≤ .05 (two-tailed). 
 
Hypothesis 1. Hypothesis 1 (a) proposed that psychological safety has a positive, 
but diminishing moderating effect on the relationship between prior creative fail-
ure and subsequent creative performance behavior (Hypothesis 1 [a]) and crea-
tive outcome (Hypothesis 1 [b]). In support of our hypotheses, Table 5.2 reveals 
a significant positive effect of the interaction between psychological safety and 
prior creative failure on subsequent creative performance behavior (γ = 9.74, p = 
.02, Model 1), whereas the effect of the interaction between psychological safety² 
and prior creative failure is negative and significant (γ = -4.05, p = .03, Model 1). 
                                                 
19 To estimate Model 2, we used a Poisson sampling model with log-link function and constant exposure 
(Raudenbush and Bryk, 2001) and allowed for the estimation of a level-1 dispersion parameter, because 
our measure for creative performance behavior is a count variable whose variance is smaller than as-
sumed by the traditional Poisson distribution (Gardner, Mulvey and Shaw, 1995). 
20 To increase the interpretability of our results, we standardized the creative outcome (yr. 2) before test-
ing our hypotheses (Liao et al., 2010). 
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Similarly, Table 5.2 reveals a significant positive effect of the interaction be-
tween psychological safety and prior creative failure on subsequent creative out-
come (γ = 4.66, p = .02, Model 2), whereas the effect of the interaction between 
psychological safety² and prior creative failure is negative and significant (γ = -
1.90, p = .05, Model 2). Thus, Hypothesis 1 (a) and 1 (b) were supported.  
 
Table 5.3: Results of Simple Slope Analyses for Hypothesis 1 
 
Creative 
Performance Behavior 
Creative 
Outcome 
Simple Slope Simple Slope 
Psychological 
Safety 
Low -5.39+ -.69 
Medium 4.12* 3.82* 
High 5.53* 4.53* 
Notes: * p ≤ .05 (one-tailed); + p ≤ .10 (one-tailed). 
 
We further analyzed these findings by means of simple slope analyses (Aiken 
and West, 1991; Preacher, Curran and Bauer, 2006). As depicted in Table 5.3, 
these analyses provided additional support for Hypotheses 1 (a) and 1 (b). Simple 
slope analyses revealed significant positive relationships between prior creative 
failure and subsequent creative performance behavior, as well as creative out-
come, at medium and high levels of team psychological safety. In contrast, we 
did not find a positive relationship between prior creative failure and subsequent 
creative performance behavior or subsequent creative outcome under conditions 
of low psychological safety. Figures 5.2 and 5.3 provide illustrative plots for our 
simple slope analyses. 
 
Figure 5.2: Interaction of Creative Failure (yr. 1) and Creative Performance Behavior (yr. 2) in 
Teams at Low, Medium and High Psychological Safety 
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Figure 5.3: Interaction of Creative Failure (yr. 1) and Creative Outcome (yr. 2) in Teams at Low, 
Medium and High Psychological Safety 
 
Hypothesis 2. Hypothesis 2 stated that team transactive memory system has a 
positive moderating effect on the relationship between prior creative failure and 
creative performance behavior (Hypothesis 2 [a]) and creative outcome (Hypoth-
esis 2 [b]) when team psychological safety exceeds the threshold for revealing 
failure. Table 5.2 provides first evidence for these hypotheses. Specifically, our 
analyses reveal a significant positive effect of the three-way-interaction term that 
includes prior creative failure, team psychological safety and transactive memory 
system on subsequent creative performance behavior (γ = 2.50, p = .05, Model 
1), and on creative outcome (γ = 1.41, p = .03, Model 2). Additionally, our anal-
yses reveal significant negative effects of the quadratic three-way interaction 
term comprising prior creative failure, team psychological safety², and team 
transactive memory system on creative performance behavior (γ = -1.91, p = .02, 
Model 1), as well as on creative outcome (γ = -1.44, p = .05, Model 2). 
 
We further probed Hypotheses 2 (a) and (b) by means of simple interaction and 
simple slope analyses (Cohen et al., 2003; Richter et al., 2012). As depicted in 
Table 5.4, these analyses do not confirm Hypothesis 2(a) but provide confirming 
evidence for Hypothesis 2 (b). 
 
Table 5.4: Results of Simple Interaction and Simple Slope Analyses for Hypothesis 2 
 
Creative 
Performance Behavior (yr. 2)
Creative 
Outcome (yr. 2) 
Simple 
Interaction Simple Slope 
Simple 
Interaction Simple Slope 
Psychological 
Safety 
Low
Low TMS
-10.15+ 
-1.72 
-4.48* 
.93 
High TMS -9.06+ -2.32 
Medium
Low TMS
2.02 
3.38+ 
3.38+ 
2.59* 
High TMS 4.85+ 5.05* 
High
Low TMS
3.64 
4.21* 
3.29* 
3.34* 
High TMS 6.86+ 5.72* 
Notes: * p ≤ .05 (one-tailed); + p ≤ .10. (one-tailed). 
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Specifically, we did not observe significant moderating effects of transactive 
memory system on the relationship between prior creative failure and subsequent 
creative performance behavior at medium or high levels of psychological safety 
(Hypothesis 2 [a]), but (marginally) significant positive moderating effects of 
transactive memory system on the relationship between prior creative failure and 
subsequent creative outcome at medium, and high levels of psychological safety 
(Hypothesis 2 [b]). As depicted in Table 5.4, as well as Figures 5.4 and 5.5, these 
results are supported by simple slope analyses. 
 
Figure 5.4: Interaction of Creative Failure (yr. 1), Transactive Memory System (TMS) and Psycho-
logical Safety on Creative Performance Behavior (yr. 2) 
 
 
Figure 5.5: Interaction of Creative Failure (yr. 1), Transactive Memory System (TMS) and Psycho-
logical Safety on Creative Outcome (yr. 2) 
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well as on the relationship between prior creative failure and subsequent creative 
outcome at a low level of psychological safety, which are also confirmed by sim-
ple slope analyses. We return to this unexpected finding in the discussion section. 
 
Hypothesis 3. Hypothesis 3 stated that creative performance behavior will medi-
ate the effects proposed by our first two hypotheses. We tested this mediation 
hypothesis by adopting the procedure described by Mathieu and Taylor (2007). 
The first two criteria demand that the hypothesized effects are significant for the 
mediator as well as the dependent variable. As demonstrated above, both criteria 
are met by our data. The third and fourth criteria required for a mediation effect 
are also met. Specifically, the mediation model (Table 5.2, Model 3) reveals a 
significant relationship (γ = .66, p = .00), between creative performance behav-
ior, our mediator, and creative outcome, our dependent variable (criterion 3). 
Furthermore, we find that the previously significant two-way interaction effects 
of prior creative failure and psychological safety (γ = .08, p = .96), prior creative 
failure and psychological safety² (γ = -.59, p = .42), as well as the three-way in-
teraction effects comprising prior creative failure, psychological safety, and 
transactive memory system (γ = .35, p = .50), and prior creative failure, psycho-
logical safety², and transactive memory system (γ = -.64, p = .20) are substantial-
ly reduced in magnitude and become non-significant, when entering creative per-
formance behavior––our mediator––to the equation (criterion 4). 
 
Following earlier research (Van Der Vegt and Bunderson, 2005; Cho and Ham-
brick, 2006; Bakker and Xanthopoulou, 2009), we cross-verified this result by 
applying Sobel (1982) tests. Confirming our mediation hypothesis, Sobel tests 
revealed significant indirect effects of our interaction terms on creative outcome 
that are mediated by creative performance behavior. Specifically, we found sig-
nificant indirect effects for the interaction terms comprising prior creative failure 
and psychological safety (Z = 2.45, p = .01), prior creative failure and psycholog-
ical safety² (Z = -2.02, p = .04), creative failure, psychological safety, and trans-
active memory system (Z = 2.32, p = .02), and prior creative failure, psychologi-
cal safety², and transactive memory system (γ = -2.07, p = .04) on creative out-
come that are mediated by creative performance behavior. 
5.6 Discussion 
In support of our hypotheses, the results of our analyses paint a picture of how 
team resources may help employees to overcome creative failure for sustained 
creativity. Specifically, the creativity of employees with failure experiences ben-
efited from teams with medium to high levels of psychological safety. As pro-
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posed, we additionally observe that in teams with a sufficient level of psycholog-
ical safety for revealing failure, employee creative outcome was further enhanced 
by the distributed expertise across employees’ fellow team members. These find-
ings have implications for theory and practice concerning employee creativity in 
team contexts. 
5.6.1 Theoretical Implications  
Although failure is a common experience for employees who engage in the risky 
and uncertain nature of creative activity, prior research has barely focused on the 
impact that creative failure may have on employees’ subsequent creative perfor-
mance behavior or outcome. As such, our research contributes first and foremost 
to the literature on creativity. By showing that a team’s socio-emotional and in-
formational resources shape the relationship between creative failure and creativ-
ity, we highlight the importance of the social context for employees to overcome 
creative failure. Given the importance of the social context for the creative fail-
ure-creativity relationship, an interesting extension of this work may be to exam-
ine the role of employees’ social network relations with colleagues inside or out-
side their teams (e.g., Perry-Smith, 2006) to overcome creative failure for sus-
tained creativity. 
 
Although this research has been concerned with creative failure in particular, we 
believe our findings may similarly inform research on failure in other content 
domains, such as failure to reach performance targets (Shepherd, Patzelt and 
Wolfe, 2011). Specifically, our findings point to the relevance that resources 
within the proximal team environment may have for employees who seek to im-
prove their performance after failure experiences. Because previous studies have 
been overly concerned with individual difference variables at the expense of con-
textual variables (e.g., Bélanger et al., 2013), failure research may benefit from 
consideration of team contextual variables that may affect the failure – perfor-
mance relationship. 
 
Our study also more directly contributes to research on team psychological safety 
and transactive memory systems. Prior studies have predominantly focused on 
examining the effects of both team level constructs on collective team level out-
comes (e.g., Edmondson, 1999; Ren and Argote, 2011), and thereby neglected 
how shared team environments influence processes and outcomes on an individ-
ual level. By showing that employees in team environments that differ with re-
spect to psychological safety and team transactive memory system differ in their 
responses to creative failure, we illustrate how employees may benefit from team 
socio-emotional and informational resources. Future research on teams and crea-
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tivity may similarly adopt such a person-in-situation perspective to employee 
creativity (cf. Hirst et al., 2009; Hirst et al., 2011) in order to facilitate our under-
standing of the complex interplay between individual differences and the team 
context. Conversely, future research on transactive memory system and psycho-
logical safety may more explicitly consider differential effects on individual em-
ployees. 
 
Before we discuss the managerial implications of our findings, we additionally 
like to zoom in on the unexpected finding that transactive memory systems nega-
tively affected creative performance behavior and creative outcome at low levels 
of psychological safety. A plausible post-hoc explanation of this finding could be 
that in work teams with high levels of distributed knowledge, the ability of em-
ployees to cope with failure rests to an even larger extent on the informational 
resources provided by colleagues. In a situation characterized by a low level of 
team psychological safety, which prevents employees from capitalizing on team 
informational resources, this may further decrease the probability that employees 
overcome prior creative failure for subsequent creativity. This finding points to 
an underexplored direction for future research, namely the conditions under 
which transactive memory systems can have detrimental effects on employee 
outcomes. 
5.6.2 Managerial Implications 
Managing creativity in organizations bears the challenge to keep employees mo-
tivated to stay creative in the face of prior creative failure. The present study pro-
vides clear managerial advice with respect to the design of work teams for en-
hanced employee creativity. Our results suggest that managers should create suf-
ficiently high levels of psychological safety within their teams, in order to facili-
tate the creative efforts of those employees who experienced creative failure. 
Moreover, our findings suggest that creating a well-functioning transactive 
memory system in and of itself may not be enough to spur the creativity of em-
ployees with failure experiences. Rather, managers should be aware of the neces-
sity to develop both their team’s socio-emotional and informational resources to 
optimally support the creative efforts of their employees. 
5.7 Conclusion and Limitations 
Overall, we believe that the current study has several strengths that help to pro-
vide a reasonable test for our hypotheses. First, we drew on multiple data-sources 
(survey and archival data) in measuring key study variables, which minimizes 
common source biases (Podsakoff et al., 2003). Second and related, we drew on 
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objective indicators of creativity (Montag et al., 2012) in order to eliminate rater 
biases that are common in creativity research (Amabile and Mueller, 2008). 
Third, drawing on a longitudinal design allowed us to rule out potential endoge-
neity issues related to reverse causality and unobserved heterogeneity thus 
providing us with greater confidence with respect to the causal interpretation of 
our results than conventional cross-sectional designs do (cf. Shadish, Campbell 
and Cook, 2010). And finally, we tested our conceptual model using appropriate 
analytical methods that matched the nested and multilevel nature of our data. De-
spite these notable strengths, our study has some limitations that point to addi-
tional avenues for future research. 
 
Although desirable, it was not possible for us to gather information regarding the 
type of creative failure that caused idea acceptances or rejections. As such, we 
were not able to analyze whether failure characteristics (e.g., ignorance of operat-
ing routine interdependencies or ignorance of technical properties) might have 
spurred or thwarted employees’ subsequent engagement in creative performance 
behavior. Furthermore, the company we studied communicated creative failure 
using private letters exclusively. Future research may examine characteristics of 
the feedback media used to transmit messages on creative failure (e.g., personal 
communication or private letters). Complementing our research that focused on 
the role of team resources for overcoming creative failure, and accounted for 
(unobserved) individual differences by controlling for employees’ risk propensity 
and including measures for lagged creativity in the analyses, further research 
might also shed more light on the potential role of individual-level variables for 
the relationship between prior creative failure and subsequent creativity. Specifi-
cally, it might be fruitful to empirically address the role of affect and creative 
self-efficacy as potential mediators of the relationship between prior creative 
failure and subsequent creativity. 
 
Creative failure is inherent to the risky and uncertain nature of creative activity. 
Our findings suggest that creative failure may either spur or thwart subsequent 
creative performance behavior and outcome, subject to the socio-emotional and 
informational resources available in employees’ proximal work teams. As such, 
our research provides scholars and managers with new insights regarding how 
creative failure can be turned into creative performance behavior and outcome. 
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6 How Managers Talk about their Consumption 
of Popular Management Concepts: Identity, 
Rules, and Situations 
6.1 Introduction 
Managers are routine users of popular management concepts21 such as Total 
Quality Management and Lean Production (Watson, 1994; Abrahamson, 1996; 
Kieser, 1997). Their engagement with abundant yet ambiguous advice dates back 
(at least) to the early consultant models of Frederick Winslow Taylor (1911) (cf. 
George, 1972). Ever since, popular concepts have been promoted as well-tested 
principles of good management (Kieser, 1997). Reports of increased organiza-
tional performance following concept adoption (cf. Womack, Jones and Roos, 
1990; Hammer and Champy, 1993; Siebers et al., 2008), as well as the interna-
tional diffusion and transient popularity of concepts (Abrahamson and Fairchild, 
1999), sparked an extensive research interest over the last few decades (Clark, 
2004; Heusinkveld et al., 2011). Early research in particular centered on manag-
ers’ motives for adopting popular ideas (Abrahamson, 1996; Bikhchandani, 
Hirshleifer and Welch, 1998; Strang and Macy, 2001; Sturdy, 2004). 
 
While this research has significantly advanced our understanding of why manag-
ers adopt popular concepts, we still know little about what happens to popular 
concepts after they have been adopted by an organization (Heusinkveld et al., 
2011; Røvik, 2011). In observing this shortcoming, researchers recently shifted 
their attention towards the consumption and usage of popular concepts within 
organizations (e.g., Gabriel, 2002; Nicolai and Dautwiz, 2010; Corbett-Etchevers 
and Mounoud, 2011). These researchers are particularly interested in depicting 
concept consumers as “involving a variety of different groups with their own 
specific backgrounds, local problems and interests” (Heusinkveld et al., 2011: 
144). Focusing on the consumption of concepts moves the actors responsible for 
the enactment of a popular concept within an organization to the forefront of in-
quiry (cf. Corbett-Etchevers and Mounoud, 2011). We contribute to this emerg-
ing stream of research by analyzing the discourses that result when managers talk 
about how popular management concepts are enacted within their organizations. 
While consuming concepts involves many actors within an organization, our 
study focuses on managerial discourses. Managers are not only held responsible 
for what happens with popular concepts after their adoption, but also have to ac-
                                                 
21 Throughout this chapter, we refrain from applying the term “management fashion”. Because our work 
does not build on the sociology of fashion, we chose to use the more neutral term “popular management 
concept”. 
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count for the consumption of concepts to a wide audience of stakeholders. Mana-
gerial accounts therefore provide a promising vantage point from which to ex-
plore the local problems and interests that underlie the consumption of popular 
concepts within organizations. This chapter makes two contributions to the re-
search on popular management concepts. First, we establish the logic of appro-
priateness as a fruitful perspective for understanding the underlying rationale for 
the managerial consumption of concepts. The logic of appropriateness explains 
human reasoning based on matching actions to situations by means of identity-
based rules (March and Olsen, 1989; March, 1994). We argue that this perspec-
tive on human reasoning is capable of incorporating the local translation of popu-
lar concepts (Czarniawska and Sevón, 2005) and accurately reflects the indeter-
minateness of organizational change following the adoption of popular concepts 
(March, 1981). When studying the consumption of concepts, the logic of appro-
priateness therefore seems superior to the deterministic logic of consequence per-
spective on human reasoning—a perspective that still dominates management 
literature. 
 
Second, we provide a better understanding of how managers account for concept 
consumption. We do so by presenting and analyzing four discourses that we 
identified after conducting an empirical inquiry among top managers in Germa-
ny. In applying the logic of appropriateness to these data, we find that these nar-
ratives are based on norms of managerial identity and socially defined rules about 
how rationality is realized in typical management situations. These findings urge 
researchers to pay close attention to the central yet situational character of mana-
gerial rationality when studying the consumption of concepts. Hence, by pursu-
ing the appropriateness perspective, we provide a broader view than does existing 
research about the rationales that circumstantiate the managerial consumption of 
concepts. 
6.2 Theory: Managers’ Rationales for Consuming Popular 
Concepts 
How do managers rationalize, to themselves and others, their consumption of 
popular management concepts? To answer this question, researchers sometimes 
apply theories that can be summarized as following a logic of consequence (cf. 
March, 1994: 2). This perspective suggests that managers act based on the antici-
pated consequences of alternative choices: the logic of their actions is assumed to 
be consequential and preference based. Seen from this perspective, managers 
explain, or rationalize, their consumption of management concepts based on the 
advantageous consequences that are expected to result from their proper imple-
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mentation. Being an alleged source of superior management techniques, these 
popular concepts suggest that, when applied properly, they can close perfor-
mance gaps of an organization (Teece, 1980; Abrahamson, 1996; Jackson, 2001). 
Social scientists often support this notion, providing mostly quantitative evidence 
that specific concepts “undoubtedly ma[k]e a contribution to the rationalization 
of managerial practice” (Nicolai and Röbken, 2005: 418). For example, Huselid 
(1995) argues, based on a sample of nearly 1000 firms, that concepts related to 
high performance work practices have a significant positive influence on corpo-
rate financial performance and employee metrics such as turnover and produc-
tivity. Seemingly “backed up by rigorous research but also company practice” 
(Clark and Greatbatch, 2004: 413), popular concepts are designed to appeal to a 
consequential approach to management (cf. Røvik, 2002; Heusinkveld, 2004; 
Sturdy, 2004). Theories applying a logic of consequence do not neglect the no-
tion that concepts have to be implemented in the organization before taking ef-
fect—but from a consequential perspective, the implementation of a management 
concept is foremost a matter of aggregating the individual and group interests 
affected by the concept via processes such as bargaining and coalition formation 
(cf. March and Olsen, 1989; March and Olsen, 1998). 
 
While research following the logic of consequence perspective on human behav-
ior offers valuable insights into the adoption and usage of popular concepts in a 
parsimonious way (e.g., Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer and Welch, 1992; Bloom and 
Van Reenen, 2007), we think that the assumption of consequential models of 
managerial behavior unduly limits our understanding of the managerial reasoning 
behind concept consumption. While most managers are indeed used to “ex-
plain[ing] their own actions in terms of their alternatives and the consequences of 
those alternatives for their preferences” (March, 1994: 3), we doubt that manag-
ers’ consumption of popular concepts can be adequately understood without fur-
ther considering the social context in which the concept is put into use. Context 
matters when exploring managers’ consumption of popular concepts, and we be-
lieve there are at least two related arguments that support our assertion. First, 
management concepts cannot be installed and put to use like machinery. There is 
always a need for what Czarniawska and Joerges (1996) call “local translation”: 
management concepts require local adaptation to the particular needs of an or-
ganization (Benders and Van Veen, 2001). Empirical evidence for the translation 
and adaptation of concepts is provided by Røvik (1996) and Giroux (2006), who 
investigate the changing meaning of concepts as they travel in and out of organi-
zations, how the content of an idea changes when it moves from one context to 
another and how it changes over time. Even if most people in an organization 
share a relatively homogeneous understanding about the core of a concept, the 
H O W  M A N A G E R S  T A L K  A B O U T  T H E I R  C O N S U M P T I O N  O F  
P O P U L A R  M A N A G E M E N T  C O N C E P T S  
137 
actual use of a concept differs according to the situation in which it is applied 
(Nicolai and Dautwiz, 2010). If the practices constituting a legitimate enactment 
of a popular concept vary over time, between and even within organizations, it 
remains quite unclear which iteration represents the concept. In other words, if 
managers can customize and adapt the elements of a management concept, and 
do so differently within an organization, it becomes difficult to objectively meas-
ure and compare outcomes, such as costs and benefits. In such situations, this 
information can only be collected and evaluated for the manager’s immediate 
scope of supervision where the popular concept is put to use. The need to trans-
late and adapt a popular concept to a specific context in order to be able to judge 
its consequences is at cross-purposes with a logic of consequence, where a popu-
lar concept is assumed to consist of a fixed set of specific practices (“superior 
management techniques”) that allow a manager to account for his or her con-
sumption of a popular concept on the basis of standardized means–end relation-
ships. 
 
The second reason that context matters is that the way a popular concept is actu-
ally put to use in an organization is to a large extent outside a manager’s control 
(cf. Brunsson and Olsen, 1997). In this regard, research on organizational change 
and innovation has shown that “[organizations] rarely change in a way that ful-
fills the intentions of a particular group of actors” (March, 1981: 563). While 
processes of aggregating individual and group interests might shape the initial 
decision to adopt a popular concept (as suggested by the logic of consequence), 
“many uncertainties cannot be resolved until an innovation actually has been 
tried in practice” (Nelson and Winter, 1977: 61). Instead of following the wishes 
and intentions of management, the people engaged in the routines of the organi-
zation shape the use of these concepts when they carry out their daily tasks 
(Lozeau et al., 2002; Feldman and Pentland, 2003). Feldman (2004) provides an 
illuminating case study on the limits of managerial intentionality when imple-
menting organizational change. She analyzed a managerially driven intervention 
in an existing organizational routine where “there was a high degree of readiness 
and, indeed, enthusiasm for the change” (ibid: 306). Nevertheless, the managerial 
intentions as described in her case failed to materialize because resistance to 
change emerged when “the consequences of the change [...] became apparent 
gradually over several years” (ibid). This study suggests that even though change 
might be welcome, repeated patterns of interaction seldom change according to 
managerial intentions. How a popular concept is put to use in an organization in 
the long run is less about aggregating individual and group interests of those af-
fected by the change than it is the result of collective evolutionary processes 
whose outcomes can hardly be determined by the manager (cf. Van de Ven and 
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Sun, 2011). As a result, we suggest that managers are less mechanical at imple-
menting and using concepts in the way that the logic of consequence requires. 
 
Taken together, we argue that a logic of consequence as a perspective for inter-
preting managerial accounts for consuming concepts is limiting because it over-
estimates the influence that managers have on the actual use of a concept within 
the organization. Furthermore, this interpretation is blind to the need for “custom 
adaptation, domestication and reconfiguration to make them [popular concepts] 
meaningful and suitable within specific organizational contexts” (Ansari et al., 
2010: 67f.). The managerial consumption of popular concepts thus seems to be 
subject to the same complex social processes and heterodox influences that char-
acterize all managerial behavior (Cohen, March and Olsen, 1972; Mintzberg, 
2004; Nicolai and Dautwiz, 2010). Interpreting the consumption of concepts as 
following a logic of consequence does not adequately address the complexities of 
managing. Thus, we argue that the logic of appropriateness is a more suitable 
explanation for elucidating the rationales for consuming popular management 
concepts because it takes account of the social context in which managers act. 
Interpreting managers’ rationales using the logic of appropriateness framework 
does not view these accounts as based on exogenous preferences and calculated 
consequences as a logic of consequence does, but rather as matching rationales to 
situations by means of identity-based rules (cf. March, 1994). Seen from this per-
spective, accounts draw on necessity, not preference (March and Olsen, 1989; 
Messick, 1999). In illustrating this alternative approach to human reason, March 
and Olsen (2008: 689) suggest that actors are driven by rules of appropriate or 
exemplary behavior, organized into institutions. The appropriateness of rules in-
cludes both cognitive and normative components (March and Olsen, 1995: 30-
31). Rules are followed because they are seen as natural, rightful, expected, and 
legitimate. Actors seek to fulfill the obligations encapsulated in a role, an identi-
ty, a membership in a political community or group, and the ethos, practices and 
expectations of its institutions. Embedded in a social collectivity, they do what 
they see as appropriate for themselves in a specific type of situation. Following 
this kind of reasoning, the situation faced by an actor guides the set of possible 
and appropriate accounts given the identity that an actor follows. By placing the 
individual in a social context, the appropriateness perspective highlights the in-
teraction between situational factors and the identity an actor adopts. Therefore, 
the logic of appropriateness is better able to capture the complex social context 
managers deal with than is the logic of consequence. Identity—the core around 
which the self of an individual is organized—provides the conceptual basis of the 
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logic of appropriateness framework (March, 1994: 62).22 Adopting an identity 
implies imposing a socially constructed order upon one’s self: “identities and 
their contentions come all wrapped in larger structures and processes that predate 
them” (White, 1992: 6). Such larger structures and processes are, for example, 
socially defined roles that shape what pertains to a specific identity an individual 
decides to follow (March, 1994; Weber, Kopelman and Messick, 2004). Such 
socially defined roles “create expectations about how a person or group of people 
ought to think, feel, and behave. They tend to be defined externally (e.g. in for-
mal job descriptions or informal codes of conduct) but are internalized by indi-
vidual group members [...]” (Haslam, 2001: 2). While there are business schools 
and job descriptions for managers, management is neither science nor profession, 
but rather a craft; hence the social expectations connected to a managerial identi-
ty are learned on the basis of social interaction and management experience (cf. 
Mintzberg, 2004; Khurana, 2007). People following the identity of a manager are 
expected to be rational (Townley, 2002). Rationality is the basic social criterion a 
manager must comply with (Kärreman, Sveningsson and Alvesson, 2002; Caban-
tous, Gond and Johnson-Cramer, 2008). From the logic of consequence perspec-
tive, rationality is related to universal communication, measurability, predictabil-
ity and controllability (Van Hees and Verweel, 2006: 16). However, viewed from 
the logic of appropriateness perspective, rationality is a matter of language, not of 
calculation (March and Olsen, 2008: 691). Managers are accepted as rational ac-
tors when they are able to account for their actions in a convincing manner 
(Weick and Browning, 1986; Czarniawska-Joerges, 1997). Effective managers 
are therefore able to replace uncertainty and not-knowing by certainty and know-
ing (Streatfield, 2001: 127). Through such discursive processes of “differentiat-
ing, fixing, naming, labeling, classifying, and relating” (Chia, 2000: 513) organi-
zational rules, strategies and actions come into existence (Weick, 2004; Abolafia, 
2010). 
 
Being able to effectively use language to account for managerial action is any-
thing but trivial, given that management is about “the messy stuff—the intracta-
ble problems, the complicated connections [...]” (Mintzberg, 2004: 13). While 
managers are ideally expected to have things “under control” and to evaluate 
themselves as well as their peers using such rational norms, the ideal is widely 
sought but rarely attained (Koot, 2006: 116). The situations managers face in 
their daily work challenge managers because these situations are often unclear, 
                                                 
22 Identity theory in itself is a complex and large field of research in organization studies (for an overview 
see Alvesson, Ashcraft and Thomas, 2008). As we focus on analyzing managers’ accounts for the con-
sumption of management concepts by the logic of appropriateness, we focus on the research closely re-
lated to March’s (1994) notion (for a critical review of the logic of appropriateness, see Goldmann 
[2005] ; Sending [2002]). 
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unstable or contradictory (Jackall, 1988; Watson, 1994; Thomas and Linstead, 
2002). There is no single line of argument that managers can rely on, as “no dis-
course is sufficiently strongly backed up by material and social support to offer a 
powerful grip over the subject” (Sveningsson and Alvesson, 2003: 1167). 
Against this backdrop, we argue that managerial narratives provide a suitable 
pathway to analyze how managers account for the consumption of concepts, be-
cause “giving voice to the perspectives and practices of consumers may reveal 
more of their roles, discourses and logics and of how management ideas are part 
of the social world of organizations more generally (Gabriel, 2002)” 
(Heusinkveld et al., 2011: 142). 
6.3 Sample and Method 
Because research on popular management concepts to date has not broadly elabo-
rated on the consumption of popular concepts within organizations, we conduct-
ed an exploratory study. We adopt an interpretative perspective in order to step 
into the managerial frames of reference and better understand concept consump-
tion (Golden-Biddle and Locke, 2006; Yanow, 2006). As a method of data col-
lection, we interviewed managers, visited their offices and production sites, and 
collected promotional and other material. While interviews are a widely accepted 
approach to data collection in interpretive studies, they are always laden with 
expectations and interests of both interviewer and interviewee (Alvesson, 2003). 
Although we approached our interview partners with a knowledge-producing 
logic that was influenced by our prior reading of management concepts literature, 
we strictly avoided any statements indicating our theoretical approach as re-
searchers. A guideline structured our loosely framed, yet issue-focused inter-
views. Our interviews began with questions designed to gather information about 
the individual respondent and his or her general understanding of management 
concepts. (For example, one of our questions was, “Are you familiar with the 
term ‘management concept’?” If yes, we followed up with the question, “What 
does this term mean to you?”) By raising such questions, we ensured that our 
interviewees shared a sufficient common understanding of the relevant construct 
in our inquiry. Also, we were interested in the general application of management 
concepts within the manager’s organization. (For example, we asked, “Which 
management concepts have been introduced under your supervision?”, “What 
functional elements did the concept entail?” and “When did the implementation 
process commence?”) While the guideline was designed for the interviewer to 
give him a rough frame of reference for a guided conversation, all interviews 
were conducted in a very open manner. Thereby we sought to stimulate the inter-
viewees to engage in the process of accessing narratives about their experiences 
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in consuming popular concepts. To reduce common errors introduced by narra-
tions, our questions focused on past facts and behavior (Golden, 1992). As Burke 
(1950) reminds us, it is hardly possible to ask people about their general motives 
for a certain behavior, as peoples’ motives vary from context to context and from 
time to time.23 Accordingly, we only investigated what people state about their 
motives with reference to a particular time and context. To do so, we used a last-
incident approach. Hence, our questions focused on the last management concept 
introduced under the interviewee’s command.24 We did not impose any further 
restrictions upon the participants regarding the management concepts they would 
be questioned about. We also assured the interviewees of their complete anonym-
ity and acknowledged that all identifying information was to be removed upon 
transcription of the interviews. All interviews were conducted in German, the 
native language of the interviewer and all interviewees. We selected experienced 
top managers as interview partners, most of whom had two to three decades of 
management experience. In view of their seniority, we expected them to be 
knowledgeable and experienced with regard to management concepts. We decid-
ed to allow considerable spread in terms of company size and location. Also, our 
sample included a broad range of professional training qualifications (business 
degrees in human resources, finance and accounting; doctors of chemistry; and 
engineers). In this way, we attempted to ensure that our data reflected the inter-
viewees’ identity as managers and was not simply the consequence of training in 
business administration or limited to a particular industry and company size. Ta-
ble 6.1 provides an overview of the interviews we conducted. 
 
Table 6.1: Description of Interview Data 
Nr. Interviewee Industry Employees (approx.)  Management Concept  
01 General Manager Automotive 350 Lean Production 
02 Head of Human Resources Chemicals 600 Management by objectives 
03 Head of Human Resources Consumables 650 Management by objectives 
04 Head of Procurement Consumables 400 ISO 9000 
05 General Manager Automotive 200 ISO 9000 
06 Head of Human Resources Synthetics 250 Lean Production 
07 Head of Human Resources Chemicals 900 Management by objectives 
08 General Manager Synthetics 200 ISO 9000 
09 Head of Human Resources Pharmacy 11,000 Management by objectives 
10 Operations Manager* Chemicals 95,000 Value driver Concept 
11 Operations Manager* Chemicals 95,000 Value driver Concept 
12 Operations Manager* Chemicals 95,000 Value driver Concept 
13 Operations Manager* Chemicals 95,000 Value driver Concept 
Note: An asterisk (*) denotes interviewees who worked for the same company group but were responsible for different departments. 
 
                                                 
23 We thank one of the reviewers for pointing out this critical issue to us. 
24 While this approach implied that every interviewee had recent and direct experience with using the 
concept about which he or she was questioned, we received accounts of different management concepts. 
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Each of these 13 interviews lasted about an hour and a half and was taped and 
transcribed shortly after to ensure reliability (Eisenhardt, 1989). While these data 
represent an important source for our inquiry, we also conducted site visits and, 
whenever possible, collected artifacts related to the enactment of the manage-
ment concept in the organization (e.g., booklets distributed among the employ-
ees). Data were also collected in more informal conversations, e.g. over lunch. 
The initial step of analyzing our interview data was done by coding about 400 
pages of transcript using both inductive and deductive approaches (Eisenhardt 
and Graebner, 2007). While our inductive approach focused on developing 
themes and grouping managerial discourses around how managers account for 
their consumption of popular management concepts, our deductive approach was 
guided by our interest in the manager’s identity as someone who exerts control 
over organizations by rational means. Following the method suggested by Ernst 
and Kieser (2002), who together investigated the concept of control in a man-
agement consulting context, our deductive approach was based on an established 
category scheme developed in control psychology by Rothbaum, Weisz and 
Snyder (1982). Alternating between our deductive scheme and our data, we de-
veloped themes and codes that allowed us to categorize findings (Miles and Hu-
berman, 1994). In the course of analyzing the data and theorizing about its mean-
ing, our focus shifted from control psychology to the consumption of popular 
concepts. In doing so, we turned to the literature on narratives to develop mana-
gerial discourse categories on popular-concept consumption (Czarniawska-
Joerges, 1997; Alvesson and Kärreman, 2000). Approaching managerial con-
sumption of concepts in a story-like way seems to be a sensible method because 
this approach allows us to better understand the managers’ multiple and different 
lines of argumentation when reflecting on concept consumption. This approach 
also resonates with Czarniawska’s (2008: 126) thesis that such “rhetoric of re-
flection” is fed by the logic of appropriateness. In order to strengthen the credi-
bility of our interview material and to substantiate our analysis, one author con-
ducted follow-up meetings with managers from two companies from our sample. 
These meetings allowed us to discuss and corroborate our interpretations of the 
managerial discourses on popular-concept consumption. 
6.4 Findings: Managers’ Accounts for the Consumption of 
Popular Concepts 
As stated above, we identified four common categories that managers refer to 
when questioned about the consumption of concepts: learning from others’ expe-
riences, controlling organizational change, gaining external legitimacy, and col-
lective sensemaking. Each of these narrations on the managerial engagement 
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with popular concepts provides a context for examining specific discourses asso-
ciated with popular concepts. Table 6.2 summarizes sample responses from our 
interviews. 
 
Table 6.2: Evidence from Data Illustrating Accounts for the Consumption of Popular Concepts 
Discourse Category Example 
Learning from Others’ Experiences 
 
‘There is quite an exchange of experience taking place [in cross-industry workshops]. 
Well, you’ll be talking to different people and then there will be questions—you’ll be 
hearing about different stuff’. (P03: 591–592) 
 
Controlling Organizational Change 
 
‘[Popular concepts are] always about one thing: do I have something to straddle on the 
management concept in order to bring this thing to life? If this is the case: I use it. [...] 
It’s all about politics and show’. (P13: 421–423, 430) 
 
Gaining External Legitimacy 
 
‘The effect [of ISO 9000 certification] is more external then internal. External in terms of 
letting your customers know: this company is certified, so that they can resort to it in 
case of being subject to an audit themselves [. . .]’. (P04: 123–126) 
 
Collective Sensemaking ‘It increases transparency—that is for sure [referring to management concept]. There are 
situations that might have been prevalent before but we simply were not aware of them. 
Now with the concept, those situations have become clearer. By now, they are compre-
hensible’. (P02: 158–160) 
 
 
Following the insight of Lakatos that “there are and can be no sensations unim-
pregnated by expectations [...]” (Lakatos, 1978: 15), we refrain from presenting 
our interview data without theoretical interpretation. We think that Lakatos’s 
statement on the non-existing demarcation between observational and theoretical 
propositions is particularly relevant to the current inquiry because our analysis 
and interpretation of data are guided by our interest in theorizing the managers’ 
accounts. Therefore, in the following sections, we present excerpts from our in-
terviews as well as theoretical arguments that help us to elaborate on each cate-
gory in greater detail. 
6.4.1 Discourse 1: Learning from Others’ Experiences 
In general, we argue that popular management concepts are designed to appear as 
convincing success stories to managers (cf. Røvik, 2002; Clark and Greatbatch, 
2004). Building on “principles [that] appear relatively simple and clear” (Simon, 
1946: 53), these concepts provide managers with the idea that ready-made solu-
tions exist for problems they may face in the future (Mayer, 1983). As one of our 
interviewees stated, such concepts can give the manager an idea of how ‘to attack 
a given problem in the correct manner’ (P11: 691–692).25 A common belief 
among our interviewees is that these prefabricated solutions were the result of the 
experiences of successful managers and companies: leaders of organizations 
“watch one another and adopt what they perceive as successful strategies for 
growth and organizational structure” (Sevón, 1996: 61). This experience is valu-
                                                 
25 Throughout this chapter, citations taken from our interviews are identified by the following scheme 
(P[number of interview]: [line number in the transcript]). Non-verbal events are denoted by (event). 
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able because managers face a need for proven know-how. As one of our inter-
viewees said: “Management is always about trial-and-error. [...] Management 
concepts are little more than accumulated experience. All these books, articles 
and heaven know[s] what else—all this is simply an interchange of experience. 
In so far, they have to be considered as very useful. [...] In the end you try pick-
ing out the best from the single sources in order to use it for yourself.” (P11: 694, 
697–698, 702–703) 
 
Learning from the experiences of other managers in principle implies infor-
mation-collecting behavior from peers. Our interviewees commonly agreed that 
this kind of social authorization is crucial when judging the relevance of the con-
ceptual information collected. When questioned about the proper sources of 
management concepts, they emphasized the importance of industry-wide and 
intra-organizational workshops. Typically, such seminars are offered by profes-
sional associations or consultants. One interviewee commented that “The DGFP 
[German Association for Personnel Management] offers some very good work-
shops on different topics. That is really helpful in terms of staying informed on 
new developments and new instruments” (P02: 489–491). While on the one hand 
sharing a specific professional context might contribute to the social authoriza-
tion of a concept, on the other hand we also find our interviewees commonly re-
ferring to renowned companies or universities that lend their name to a concept 
(Røvik, 2002: 124f.). Consider, for example, the well-known success story of 
Toyota, a company intimately linked to the popular management concept lean 
production (Womack et al., 1990). One of our interviewees remarked on this as-
sociation as follows: “Take the story of Toyota and all that: they’ve made their 
success. Otherwise, all this [using the Toyota concept in the interviewee’s com-
pany] would be senseless” (P06: 694–696). When questioning interviewees about 
this category in more detail, we find that managers commonly offer statements 
entailing references to sources that grant social authorization. The stated rationale 
among managers connected to this discourse is thus that, if the suggested success 
patterns for a concept originate from a legitimate and trusted source, managers 
can learn to solve their problems from more experienced actors. 
6.4.2 Discourse 2: Controlling Organizational Change 
Our study provides evidence that managers account for the consumption of popu-
lar management concepts as instruments to exert control over other members of 
the organization. Central to this discourse is the notion that managers understand 
individuals as being controllable by means of rational language (cf. Czarniawska-
Joerges and Joerges, 1988; Drucker, 2007). When talking about organizational 
change, our interviewees commonly provided narrations on how managers could 
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exert vicarious control by employing popular management concepts. However, it 
became obvious that the way our interview partners disclose intended goals and 
actions when exerting control varied in their narrations. On one hand, the manag-
ers argue to use concepts to convince subordinates to follow a common organiza-
tional goal. On the other hand, the use of management concepts is depicted as a 
way to pursue rather private goals and actions, as concepts provide a foundation 
to power. 
6.4.2.1 Persuasion 
Given that organizational change implies organized action, managers must per-
suade other organizational members to adopt the manager’s ideas (cf. Nord and 
Tucker, 1987). As one of our interviewees emphasized, “The manager has got an 
idea how things should be done, but someone has to put it into practice” (P01: 
47–48). This exertion of control cannot be achieved solely by dint of the manag-
er’s hierarchical position, because the social power available to an individual is 
not entirely dependent on his or her formal title in the organization’s hierarchy 
(Barnard, 1938; Grey, 2005). Given this imperfection of hierarchical control, 
managers are dependent on their ability to persuade other organizational mem-
bers to adopt certain behavior patterns (Judson, 1991; Ford and Ford, 1995). One 
of our interviewees put it forcefully: “You literally took the hand of the people 
affected by the change and tried to brainwash them—just like Scientology does. 
Convince them that the change is good for them” (P07: 629–631). As research-
ers, we were interested in how our interviewees rationalize the use of popular 
management concepts as instruments of persuasion in organizational change. In 
accordance with our assertions on norms of managerial rationality in organiza-
tions, a common reply referred to the use of rational arguments, particularly in 
the form of figures and numbers. One manager illustrated his rhetorical strategy 
in the following way: “You can’t just say: ‘We’ll do this now’—rather you’ll 
have to build up numerical material, in terms of a problem description” (P01: 
677–678). Numbers and figures are powerful tools because people usually accept 
numbers and statistics without challenging them (Best, 2001; Bort and Kieser, 
2011). Moreover, people tend to forget that most numbers and statistics are pre-
sented in such a way that they focus attention on a desired point of view. There-
fore, numbers and statistics can be seen as “tools, used for particular purposes” 
(Best, 2001: 7). As one interviewee pointed out, management concepts common-
ly provide a number of such ready-made rational arguments and labels that can 
be used to generate such figures: “This is just the case with value-driver concep-
tions, cost/value analysis—that is, something catchy, something that everybody 
understands in terms of its necessity” (P11: 349–350). This interviewee’s re-
sponse illustrates how imposing frames of reference such as management con-
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cepts is understood to be a means of control for organizational behavior. In this 
sense control is exerted through the use of symbols. As soon as people hear or 
read statistical figures, they tend to forget the people and the social processes that 
produced the figures (Best, 2001: 31). Therefore numbers take on a life of their 
own—they become powerful symbols. Seen in this light, management concepts 
serve as powerful symbols for labeling, communicating and persuading (Clark 
and Salaman, 1998). The interviewee’s response also highlights the close con-
nection between organizational change and power within organization, for “poli-
tics in organizations breed in times of change” (Pettigrew, 1985: 43). 
6.4.2.2 Power 
“Power” represents our second subcategory within the broader category of organ-
izational change and can be defined as one person’s action structuring the possi-
ble actions of other people while enforcing a private agenda (cf. Foucault, 1982). 
One interviewee illustrates the power rationale by describing a loophole in the 
company’s benchmarking concept, a loophole that provided him leeway in his 
staffing budget: “According to the figure of [concept used by the company], this 
factory is nearly as big as [the biggest facility of the company], which is quite an 
exaggeration. [...] I can take advantage of this for myself since another colleague 
would actually have to explain why he needs so many employees. [...] In the 
event that the controlling units are about to argue for staff cuts, I’ve got good 
arguments against them.” (P12: 299–303, 311–313) This statement was given by 
an employee of a company that was restructuring and downsizing because of a 
decrease in sales during the financial crisis in 2008. In such circumstances, the 
underlying logic of the management concept is turned against the goals of the 
organization in favor of the manager’s personal goals, such as maintaining a 
larger staff, despite organizational ambitions to cut staff, thus emphasizing the 
power that these concepts have in peoples’ minds. Not only can management 
concepts that have been established within the organization for some time be 
manipulated for personal power, but we also found evidence that concepts new to 
managerial consumption are rationalized as opportunities to pursue more private 
agendas. Here, we find that a power play can be realized by focusing the minds 
of the organizational members in a particular direction and their actions on a par-
ticular topic. This interpretation is illustrated by one of our interviewees, a very 
experienced manager of multiple factories with a PhD in chemistry, who states 
that: “[popular concepts are] always about one thing: do I have something to 
straddle on the management concept in order to bring this thing to life? If this is 
the case, I use it. [...] It’s all about politics and show” (P13: 421–423, 430). This 
comment articulates well the concept of “issue selling” described by Dutton et al. 
(2001: 716): “In reality, organizations are a cacophony of complementary and 
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competing change attempts, with managers at all levels joining the fray and push-
ing for issues of particular importance to themselves”. This discourse highlights 
that the consumption of popular concepts is depicted by managers as a means to 
exert vicarious control over other individuals. The managers we interviewed 
elaborated on these themes especially in the context of organizational change and 
innovation projects. Managerial control is suggested to be exerted by expressing 
commitment to a concept while at the same time working to accomplish personal 
or other goals that may be contradictory to the espoused organizational goals. 
6.4.3 Discourse 3: Gaining External Legitimacy 
Legitimacy is a critical resource that external stakeholders bestow on an organi-
zation (Dowling and Pfeffer, 1975; Meyer and Rowan, 1977; Ashforth and 
Gibbs, 1990; Suchman, 1995). Legitimacy is granted when an organization com-
plies with certain rules and norms put forth by the institutional environment of 
the organization (Suchman, 1995; Scott, 2001). Recent work in the neo-
institutional tradition substantiates the reflective and agentic character of actors 
towards institutional pressures (cf. Lawrence and Suddaby, 2006; Czarniawska, 
2009; Heugens and Lander, 2009). In adopting this perspective, our interview 
partners seem well aware of the possibility of influencing the perception of 
stakeholders by making use of symbolic management (cf. Elsbach, 1994; Such-
man, 1995; Westphal and Zajac, 1998). For example, one of our interviewees, a 
manager at a large international stock corporation, illustrates the relevance of 
such modes of communication as a way to acquire financial resources: “Being a 
stock corporation, increasing company value means in any case: communicating 
to your environment in order to make the company value actually increase” (P11: 
144–146).26 Within this discourse, the consumption of popular management con-
cepts is depicted as a means to impress external stakeholders. One of our inter-
viewees provides evidence for this assertion by pointing out how important it is 
to be up to date on the current management concepts. He calls this strategy 
“opinion leadership in the stock market” (P13: 354). The need to be the “opinion 
leader” in the stock market led this company to extensively communicate their 
value drivers to the financial market: “Sure, there are goal agreements or pay-for-
performance programs and key performance indicators [concepts applied in his 
company]. But all that is rather dull. [...] These things are taken for granted now-
adays. [Whereas] [a]ctually defining your value drivers—where we allocate our 
attention or our focus—that is no mean feat.” (P11: 149–150, 154–156) Because 
many organizations face a variety of stakeholders, the use of management con-
                                                 
26 The importance of the financial market in the diffusion of management concepts implied here is in 
accordance recent findings of more macro-oriented researchers on management concepts (cf. Nicolai, 
Schulz and Thomas, 2010). 
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cepts as communication tools is often not limited to the professional environment 
of a given company; it also extends to the broad public and the mass media 
(Mazza and Alvarez, 2000). This practice is illustrated by quotes from managers 
of the same large, international chemical company. While this company today 
enjoys the status of a renowned employer in the region where it is located, 
throughout its history it has been associated with several hazardous environmen-
tal incidents. These incidents have shaped public opinion about the company, 
leading to a perception that it is potentially dangerous to nearby residents. In re-
sponse to these public image issues, the company has strongly engaged in social 
and ecological projects. It recently began a campaign to communicate the value-
based management concept of the company to the broader public. A manager of 
the company reflects upon the communication of values to counteract threats to 
the organizational legitimacy: “On a common basis, you have to face a quite neg-
ative stereotype: ‘The [company name]—all this poison and what else they do.’ 
That is a rather negative image, which you encounter on a personal level as well. 
[...] And that is why it is crucial that [company name] communicates: Values are 
important to us” (P12: 178–182). 
 
The enactment of popular management concepts within an organization might 
conflict with technical demands of production inside the organization or be at 
odds with expectations in other relevant institutional fields (Meyer and Rowan, 
1977). These issues might lead managers to consume concepts only superficially, 
especially when they are using them solely to impress external organizational 
stakeholders (Westphal and Zajac, 2001; Nicolai and Röbken, 2005). Managers 
seem to be well aware of the strategic potential of symbolically using concepts in 
order to gain external legitimacy. We find narratives that confirm this tendency 
to superficially adopt concepts primarily to manage external organization stake-
holders. “The effect [of ISO 9000 certification] is more external than internal. 
External in terms of letting your customers know: this company is certified, so 
that they can resort to it in case of being subject to an audit themselves [...]” 
(P04: 123–126). 
6.4.4 Discourse 4: Collective Sensemaking 
Our last discourse illustrates how popular management concepts are rationalized 
as means to help managers engage in collective “sensemaking”. As Weick, Sut-
cliffe and Obstfeld (2005) eloquently put it, the process of “[s]ensemaking in-
volves turning circumstances into a situation that is comprehended explicitly in 
words and that serves as a springboard into action” (ibid: 409). In this sense, con-
suming popular concepts is understood as a way to reduce uncertainty and ambi-
guity, because it allows the organization members to increase the understanding 
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of the environment in which they operate. Sensemaking in organizations is a de-
manding undertaking (March and Olsen, 1976; Weick et al., 2005). As one of our 
interview partners stated: “general managers are poor chaps—often, we don’t 
have all the training and knowledge required to work off all issues in a proper 
manner—you have to be very self-critical on this” (P01: 537–539). The concept 
of sensemaking is to identify what one has to look for in order to understand why 
something has happened. Following the identity as rational actor, a manager can-
not simply apply any arbitrary frame of reference and expect that frame of refer-
ence to be collectively accepted as a means of ambiguity reduction (March, 1994; 
Weick, 1995b). A manager openly framing his or her company as an organized 
anarchy (cf. Cohen et al., 1972) will most likely be replaced by a manager fram-
ing his or her organization as a complex, intentional, rational system aimed at 
generating revenue. Popular management concepts offer an attractive and social-
ly accepted frame of reference to overcome organizational ambiguity and engage 
in collective sensemaking. We find two elements commonly mentioned by our 
interviewees that contribute to a proper managerial frame of reference: (1) terms 
and labels on what information to collect, and (2) conceptual frames about how 
such pieces of information relate to one another. The managers we questioned 
depicted management concepts as a way to sort out what information should be 
collected and what information should be discarded. One of our interviewees il-
lustrated how concepts provide terms and labels on what information to collect 
by reflecting on a number of sources of information focus (such as efficiency 
numbers within an administrative department and throughput times): “Our goal 
[by implementing the concept] is to increase efficiency—especially in the admin-
istrative department. We want to optimize the workflow—create a faster work-
flow from order intake to shipping—reducing friction loss. The paramount goal 
is, of course, customer satisfaction.” (P06: 88–92). 
 
Keeping in mind the volume and possible ways to collect and sort information 
that organizations must cope with, the task of figuring out what to measure is not 
to be underestimated. As concepts are developed around central terms or labels 
(Kieser, 1997; Røvik, 2002), such terms are likely to receive increased attention 
within the organization. Accordingly, the manager can more easily allocate re-
sources to generate information streams on these areas (Cohen et al., 1972). In 
addition to providing managers with terms and labels which can focus attention 
on what information to collect, management concepts are understood as relating 
pieces of information to one another. By illustrating how one piece of infor-
mation relates to another, management concepts offer a way to frame ambiguous 
events within an organization. In this vein, management concepts provide “an 
understanding of the way things are and might be, a basis for engaging others in 
discourse about what is possible and what has happened” (March, 1994: 258). 
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Our interviews provide accounts of how managers account for the consumption 
of concepts as a way to reduce ambiguity surrounding managerial problems. One 
manager we interviewed offered the following anecdotal evidence about how the 
popular management concept “Reengineering” (Hammer and Champy, 1993) 
raised his awareness of organizational rules generating information not required 
for business: “I believe this issue was described in there [referring to Hammer 
and Champy, 1993]. I’m speaking of the introduction of things [like organiza-
tional rules] (laughs) which then remain about for 30 years in an organization, 
but no one remembers them anymore. Thus, they are never put ‘ad acta’. But the 
company, like a machine, keeps producing this stream of information, which 
costs money...”. (P01: 645–649) Concepts that are enacted in organizations often 
provide “short-cuts in decision making by enabling decision makers to omit or 
abbreviate some steps by filtering out some alternatives and consequences” 
(Brunsson, 1982: 38). Our interview data support the notion that management 
concepts are understood as a rational reference structure for the manager. For 
example, one manager we interviewed supports this point by using the metaphor 
of a traffic light: “There are concepts, working models which make it possible to 
act in the early warning area. [...] That means that we have some strong points of 
reference. [...] If I cross against the red light, the business will be gone” (P07: 
940–942, 943–944). Thus the concept is depicted as a check on decision making 
that removes subjective criteria and therefore bolsters credibility of business de-
cisions, whilst also providing an explanation when decisions turn out to be wrong 
(cf. Luhmann, 1995). 
6.5 Discussion and Conclusion: Appropriate Accounting for 
Concept Consumption 
We derived four discourse categories from our empirical inquiry: (1) learning 
from others’ experiences, (2) controlling organizational change, (3) gaining ex-
ternal legitimacy and (4) collective sensemaking. Within these discourse catego-
ries, managers accounted for the consumption of popular concepts using highly 
idiosyncratic narratives. Such plurality is in line with the claim that “consumers 
are rarely passive recipients, but [are] typically active, ambivalent and creative in 
their adaptations of commodities” (Heusinkveld et al., 2011: 142). Yet, the dis-
courses not only illustrate the cornucopia of managerial accounts for the con-
sumption of popular concepts; when analyzed from the logic of appropriateness 
perspective, they also further our understanding of how managerial accounts are 
shaped by norms of managerial identity and socially defined rules about how ra-
tionality is realized in typical management situations. While the discourse cate-
gories are diverse, what all four have in common is that the managers account for 
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the consumption of concepts in terms of means and ends. These accounts support 
our claim that rationality is a central social norm for actors pursuing managerial 
identities. In the narratives in our first discourse category (learning from others’ 
experiences), managers account for the consumption of concepts as processes of 
vicarious learning from experienced managers and renowned companies. Here, 
the consumption of concepts complies with norms of rationality in which suc-
cessful actions are imitated while unsuccessful actions are avoided (Levitt and 
March, 1988; Denrell, 2003). The second discourse category (controlling organi-
zational change) provides narratives on the consumption of popular concepts in 
the context of organizational change processes, while the third discourse (gaining 
external legitimacy) pertains to managing stakeholder’s perception of the organi-
zation. The latter two discourse categories depict the consumption of concepts as 
a means to achieve control over entities particularly disinclined to managerial 
control (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Ford and Ford, 2009). The fourth discourse 
category (collective sensemaking) features narratives related to the comprehen-
sion of (past) organizational events. Managers account for the consumption of 
concepts as means to reduce uncertainty and causal ambiguity within the organi-
zation (March, 1994; Weick, 1995b). 
 
While each of the four discourse categories accounts for the consumption of con-
cepts in terms of means and ends, we find that even managers within the same 
company consuming the same concept (e.g. interviewees 10–13) do not identify a 
single common goal or end toward which the consumption of the concept is di-
rected. In addition, we find that managerial accounts of concept consumption are 
highly contingent on particular social settings and situations, the opposite of a 
logic of consequence perspective, where rationality is “an abstract process, en-
gaged in by a transcendental subject, a socially disembodied being” (Townley, 
2002: 556). For example, the third discourse category (gaining external legitima-
cy) entails narratives of how a value-driver concept offers an opportunity to gain 
opinion leadership in the stock market and to counter a negative public percep-
tion. This narrative is in contrast to the logic of consequence perspective, from 
which one would expect managers to account for a value-driver concept as a 
means “to improve resource allocation, performance measurement, and the de-
sign of information systems by identifying the specific actions or factors that 
cause costs to arise or revenues to change” (Ittner and Larcker, 2001: 368). In the 
four discourses, it is not the alleged superiority of a popular concept that drives 
managerial narratives, but rather specific and historically developed situations 
that managers face while consuming a concept. For instance, the managerial nar-
ratives for the consumption of the value-driver concept in the large, international 
chemical company we visited draw on a history of hazardous environmental in-
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cidents and a current situation which demands legitimacy management towards 
nearby residents. What is considered rational, and what therefore represents an 
appropriate account for concept consumption, depends on situations that manag-
ers face. Therefore, we argue that the discourse categories we have introduced 
substantiate our assertion that managers comply with norms of rationality based 
on their identity, but how rationality is achieved remains subject to processes of 
social construction. Typically, such processes follow taken-for-granted rules that 
provide a certain level of ontological security to actors (Meyer and Rowan, 1977; 
Giddens, 1991). How managers account for the consumption of popular concepts 
therefore depends not only on the norms of managerial identity, but also on the 
specific situations which the manager faces. For example, accounting for the 
consumption of concepts in the discourse category “learning from others’ experi-
ences” discloses discernibly different—and not necessarily compatible—
rationales for concept consumption compared with the discourse category “gain-
ing external legitimacy”. While rationality in “learning from others” experiences’ 
requires one to adopt what others have done to succeed and to avoid where others 
have failed, rationality in “gaining external legitimacy” requires one to adopt 
what corresponds to the expectations of the institutional environment. 
 
We conclude our discussion by highlighting that the logic of appropriateness ex-
pands our understanding of how managers account for the consumption of con-
cepts. Understanding human reasoning as following from necessity (as opposed 
to consequence) shifts attention to the interaction between situational factors and 
the identity an actor adopts. Based on our empirical inquiry, we argue that this 
perspective highlights the central yet situational character of managerial ration-
ality when studying accounts of the consumption of concepts. Rationality is cen-
tral in these accounts, as it pertains to managerial identity. It is also situational, 
because accounts of concept consumption describe specific situations that man-
agers face in daily situations. The logic of appropriateness therefore allows us to 
categorize into stable entities the polyphony of fragmented accounts we found 
when talking to managers about their consumption of concepts, such as manage-
rial identity and the rules that define rationality in specific situations. Our find-
ings urge future researchers to pay close attention to the central yet situational 
character of managerial rationality when studying the consumption of concepts. 
This advice particularly pertains to studies assuming a logic of consequence per-
spective, since our findings fray the connection between the managerial ration-
ales for consuming popular concepts and organizational performance. While we 
are convinced that organizational performance is highly relevant to managers, 
accounts indicating a direct effect from concept consumption on organizational 
performance were rare in the narratives we analyzed. We therefore suggest that 
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performance implications of concept consumption are rather indirect; for exam-
ple, stakeholders will provide resources to more legitimate companies (Deeds et 
al., 2004), thereby increasing the companies’ prospects of survival (Baum and 
Oliver, 1991). Depending on the situation a manager faces, the consumption of a 
concept might be largely decoupled from the organizational routines that influ-
ence the performance of an organization. Our inquiry therefore urges researchers 
studying the impact of concept consumption on organizational performance to 
carefully consider the situations that managers seek to address when they con-
sume concepts. In general, we favor the idea that the consumption of popular 
management concepts should be viewed from an appropriateness perspective. 
Applying the logic of appropriateness allows the researcher to treat the consump-
tion of concepts in a multifaceted way that encompasses the local translation of 
the linguistic content of a concept within an organization, is based on a manag-
er’s identity, and recognizes the importance of social rules of behavior in specific 
situations. 
 
Our research also highlights that there is a limited range of explanations manag-
ers can provide when accounting for their consumption of concepts. Rationality, 
as the core of managerial identity, and rules, ingrained in the situations that man-
agers face, require that managers not stray too far from reason when explaining 
their rationale for consuming concepts. Similar to Cervantes’ (1866) famous 
knight Don Quixote, whose identity is bound up in adventurous situations of 
chivalry, managerial narrations draw on norms of managerial identity and social-
ly defined rules of how rationality is achieved in typical management situations 
(cf. March and Weil, 2005). Therefore managers must make reasonable connec-
tions to accepted norms, in particular the norm of rationality, and common situa-
tions that managers face in organizations when accounting for the consumption 
of management concepts. At the same time, these accounts of concept consump-
tion should not be confused with the necessarily improvisational practice of con-
sumption (cf. Certeau, 1984; Bourdieu, 1990). We suggest that managerial ac-
counts of concept consumption and the actual practice of concept consumption 
should not be studied as exclusive dualisms, but rather as a mutual constitutive 
duality, and that doing so provides a promising avenue for future research 
(Farjoun, 2010; Feldman and Orlikowski, 2011). As the organizational consump-
tion of popular concepts is strongly subject to the dynamics of routine change (cf. 
Feldman and Pentland, 2008b), we suggest that future research on the consump-
tion of popular concepts should also join forces with research on organizational 
routines. The logic of appropriateness provides a promising perspective to en-
gage in this joint endeavor. 
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